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Foreword
A Quest for True Islam is a study of one of the most important movements of
renewal in the history of Indonesian Islam. This movement began in the 1970s
at a time when the Islamic world was entering its 15th century. It took shape in
the 1980s and, in the late 1990s, developed a political dimension that has
continued to carry forward efforts to the present.
A particular value of this study by Drs Rifki Rosyad derives from the fact that
it was carried out, in the early 1990s, in the midst of the movement, when its
various directions were by no means evident. Drs Rosyad saw the importance
of the movement as a vital form of renewal and recognized its broad foundation
among the Muslim student population of Indonesia. He was able to identify its
beginnings at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) and to chart its rapid
spread and development in other universities throughout Indonesia.
The publication of this volume thus offers to a wider community a study of
considerable research prescience. Drs Rosyad has done more than document the
events of the period; he has captured the ‘flavour’ of the early 1990s with its
defiant optimism amid frustration. He also provides an historical context for
these occurrences and, importantly, links them to wider developments in the
Islamic world.
As Drs Rosyad argues, no single factor can be cited as the cause of the Islamic
resurgence that emerged in Bandung. A confluence of factors was of significance.
To provide an understanding of these factors, Drs Rosyad examines the
understanding of the contemporary situation and of a perceived history held
by the key figures in the movement. This becomes an anthropology of the period
in its relationship to the past.
A core segment of this study is based on interviews with activists, including M.
Imaduddin Abdulrahim, associated with the Salman Mosque on the ITB campus.
Although this study focuses on the inspiration provided by activities at the
Salman Mosque, its strength is in its examination of what Drs Rosyad calls the
‘fertile milieu’ of the period that allowed a plethora of movements (harakah) to
flourish, ranging from those of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin, Hizb al Tahrir, Salafiyah,
Dar al-Arqam, or Jama’ah Tabligh to the efforts of the younger generational
proponents of Darul Islam. Anyone interested in the current activities of these
groups in Indonesia today would be well advised to read this study to appreciate
the context of their inception. This is a perceptive and original research effort
that offers many valuable insights.
Drs Rifki Rosyad was enrolled at The Australian National University as a student
for two years from 1993 to 1995. As part of his study for the Masters degree, he
conducted his research in Indonesia for his thesis. Since 1992, he has held the
ix
position of professor at the State Islamic University — Universitas Islam Negeri,
UIN — Sunan Gunung Djati — Bandung and has continued to pursue a variety
of research interests. It is important that his work be recognized among a wider
audience for whom electronic publication represents the future.
James J. Fox
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Abstract
This study attempts to present the contemporary Islamic resurgence movement
among young people in Bandung Indonesia, focusing on its emergence,
development and its routinisation. It traces various factors and conditions that
contributed to the emergence of the movement. It also tries to explain how and
why young people (students in particular) turn to Islam, and how the movement
is organised and developed among students. Finally, it examines internal changes
among various Islamic groups as responses to social, political and cultural
changes.
The study indicates that this current Islamic resurgence is a continuation of a
long-standing tajdid (renewal) tradition in Islam. Like previous Islamic renewal
movements in Java, such as Muhammadiyah and PERSIS, it is an internal Muslim
transformation in response to spiritual, social, political and cultural problems
faced by Muslims. It is an attempt to maintain the Muslim commitment to the
fundamental principles of Islam and to reconstruct an Islamic society in accord
with the Qur'an and the sunna. The tajdid movement has always been two-fold:
in spiritual terms it attempts to purge Islamic teachings and practices of
non-Islamic influences and to present it once again in its original pure form; and
in non-spiritual terms it is an endeavour to solve various problems faced by the
Muslim community.
The difference between earlier Islamic movement and contemporary Islamic
movements is that the current Islamic movements now occur in an era of
globalisation, when the advance of electronic mass media has loosened national
boundaries. This had several impacts on the current Islamic movement: first,
international influence is not limited to Islamic ideas but also events; second,
Islamic ideas can spread rapidly and widely regardless of national boundaries;
third, one movement in one Muslim country can not only spread its ideas but
can also establish its branches in other countries; finally, the growth of a global
system reinforces the notion of a single Muslim community (Ummah).
Islamic resurgence is a global phenomenon throughout the Muslim world;
however, it takes forms unique to each culture. Different from Islamic resurgence
in the Middle East, Islamic resurgence in Indonesia has not been manifested in
radical political activism and revolutionary actions. There was a tendency toward
political revolutionary activism, but it carried little power. The common tendency
rather is more cultural in its nature, i.e. to make Islam an ethical, moral and
cultural foundation and to colour and fill the established social and cultural
edifice with Islamic spiritual and moral content. This study propounds an
understanding of the pattern in religious movements in the Islamic community
and in Islamic cultures.
xiii

Chapter 1: Islamic Resurgence in
Indonesia, an Introduction
1.1 The Moral Force: Bandung in Historical Perspective
Bandung, the capital of West Java, is a city with a long association with the
structures of a modern industrialised nation. When the activities of the Dutch
colonial government in this area increased in the late nineteenth century, central
administrative offices, post office, telegraph and railroad system were established
in Bandung. Bandung became an educational center for native islanders in the
colonial period with the opening of a technical institute for indigenous students.
Today it is called Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), one of the most
prestigious universities in Indonesia. In this university, Soekarno, the first
president of Indonesia, finished his higher education, and in this university he
established a study group, which became the forerunner of the Indonesian
National Party (PNI, Partai Nasional Indonesia). In 1955 the city's importance
in the Indonesian state was demonstrated symbolically, when it became a site
of the Asia-Africa Conference of Non-aligned Nations.
In the Islamic history of Indonesia, Bandung was known as one of the most
important places where a reformist and puritan Islamic organisation was
established. In 1923, a group of merchants established an organisation called
Persatuan Islam (PERSIS, Islamic Union). It was known because of its strict
attitude to some Muslim customs, which were considered as superstition in
contradiction with the main Islamic teachings (aqidah, faith), although other
Muslims accepted those customs as proper Islam. It also accused the nationalist
circle of wanting to establish Hindu and animism beliefs (Noer, 1987:13). The
PERSIS's methods in promoting their ideas were very strong and even rough;
members of the organisation often challenged and invited people to debate. Ideas
of this organisation spread not only in Indonesia but also in Malaysia and
Singapore. Among Indonesian intellectuals, Persatuan Islam ideas were spread
through the writings and activities of Mohammad Natsir, a student of Ahmad
Hasan, who was also the leader of Masyumi (Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia,
Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslim).1
Like Yogyakarta or Jakarta, Bandung is also known as a student city, in which
two large universities ie. Bandung Institute of Technology and Padjadjaran
1 Masyumi was a national Muslim organisation established during the Japanese occupation. At a National
Islamic Meeting (Muktamar Islam Indonesia) held between 7–8 November 1945 in Yogyakarta, this
organisation changed itself into an Islamic party. Most of Islamic organisations were represented within
this party, but in 1952 Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, the Rise of the Religious Scholars), a conservative Islamic
organisation, withdrew and became another Islamic party. In the 1955 election, Masyumi proved itself
as the strongest party in the outer islands and in the West Java, while NU had the strongest support in
East Java province.
1
University are located. These two universities are regarded as two of the nine
universities of excellence in Indonesia (Railon:1985:23). Besides these universities,
there are more than forty other higher education institutions, including private
and public academies, institutes, and universities. Not surprisingly, students
and lecturers from other places came to this city, and this situation has made
Bandung a cosmopolitan city where the local Sundanese traditions are gradually
adapted. The activities of these intellectuals made Bandung's intellectual, cultural
and art life much more prominent (Ibid,:24).
Bandung is also a military centre. It is a center of the Sixth Regional Military
Command (KODAM, Komando Daerah militer VI) Siliwangi, which for a long
time has been regarded as one of the most professional of the Indonesian army
ground forces (Angkatan Darat) with the best weaponry system. In Bandung
are also located various military and police schools. Two of the most important
institutions are the command staff college of the army ground forces (SESKOAD,
Sekolah Staf Komando Angkatan Darat) and the joint command staff college of
the army forces (SESKOGAB, Sekolah Staf Komando Gabungan). Besides these
military schools, Bandung has several army groups scattered throughout the
Bandung area.
Geographically, Bandung is very close to the national capital, Jakarta, only three
or four hours’ trip by bus or train from Jakarta. Elite from Jakarta usually come
to Bandung and spend their weekend looking for fresh and cool air and a quiet
environment. Likewise, many Bandung residents work in Jakarta, and every
weekend they return to Bandung. This close relation creates an easy and smooth
exchange of people and ideas between these two cities. International and national
information is disseminated in Bandung at almost the same time as in Jakarta,
and what happens in Bandung can immediately be heard in Jakarta.
Before the establishment of the New Order (Orde Baru) in 1965–66, Bandung
became a place where the anti-Soekarno forces had wide support not only from
the strictly Islamic groups, but also from student movements and military groups.
Various events in early 1966 demonstrated Bandung students’ important roles.
They were always much braver and more radical than their colleagues in Jakarta.
Although various important events took place in Jakarta , the role of Bandung’s
students was significant in decision making in Jakarta. Rahman Tolleng, the
ex-chief editor of Mahasiswa Indonesia,2 remarked “In Jakarta there might be a
revolution, but Bandung is always the trigger”.3 Moreover, many political, social
and art ideas are created or tested in Bandung before they are applied in Jakarta.
2 Mahasiswa Indonesia (Indonesian Student), was a weekly student tabloid which played an important
role in the establishment of the New Order. Through this publication student movements in Bandung
spread their vision and analyses about the current situation of society. Besides, it became a means
through which they expressed and unified opinion among those students organisations included in
Indonesian Student United Action (KAMI, Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia).
3 Interview with an Economic Lecturer at the Indonesian University (UI) Jakarta, 3 November 1994).
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Arief Budiman, as cited by Raillon (Ibid,:26), points out, “There is a tradition in
Jakarta, that if we are dissappointed with the students’ behaviour in Jakarta,
we always turn to Bandung”. Bandung became a city that complemented the
national capital, Jakarta as “the political force” and Bandung as the “moral
force”. Budiman further says:
With ‘moral’, it should be understood that they struggled based on right
and wrong, just and unjust principles without considering political
power. Whereas ‘political force’ means that student movements based
their struggle on fertilising power, so that they were forced to political
opportunism… Bandung ['s students] also have a peculiarity in their
struggle, ie. their originality, and this is a manifestation of their creativity
(Ibid,:26).
In the 1970s, Bandung became a center of attention not only at the national but
also at the international level,4 when student Islamic activities at Salman Mosque
of ITB developed rapidly and provided a model of Islamic activities in university
campuses throughout Indonesia.
1.2 Islamic Resurgence and Tajdid (Renewal) Tradition
In November 1979 Muslims throughout the world celebrated the beginning of
the 15th century of Islamic calender (hijriah), which was expected as ‘the century
of Islamic Resurgence’ (Abad Kebangkitan Islam). It was expected that by entering
the new century, “Muslims would return to Islam, a religion and a way of life
which is believed would increase Muslims' prestige and humanity” (Hamka and
Saimima, 1980:1). In the 1970s in Muslim countries throughout the world, various
social and political events occurred. These events included the application of
Islamic law in Pakistan and Libya, the Islamic opposition movements in Egypt
and Turkey, Muslim rebellions against Marxist government and Soviet invasion
in Afganistan, and the Islamic separatist movement in Mindanao Island in the
Philippines. Similar phenomena also occurred in Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan,
Morocco, Malaysia and other countries where Muslims constituted the majority
of the population. One of the most important events was the Iranian Revolution
in 1979, which has influenced Islamic activists throughout the world.
Besides this political activism, there is a growing consciousness of Muslims
toward Islam both in social and individual lives. In social life, this can be seen
in the establishment of various Islamic institutions such as Islamic banks,
organisations, laws, social welfare services and educational institutions. Likewise,
in individual life, this can be seen in the increasing attention to religious
observances such as mosque attendance, prayer, and Islamic dress, and from the
4 Various reports on students Islamic activities at Salman can be found for instance in New York Times,
3 June 1979 page 3., Naipaul's travel diary Among the Believers, and in Far Eastern Economic Review,
“An Islamic Revival threatens government moves to secularise the state,” 24 January 1985.
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increasing Islamic proselytization (dakwah). These political, social and individual
manifestations of the Islamic resurgence can be seen throughout the Muslim
world, in a variety of political, social and cultural settings.
In Indonesia such phenomena could also be seen in the mid-1970s when Islamic
resurgence among young Muslim generations emerged. This was marked by the
involvement of young people in various religious activities. Many young people
went to the mosque where they learnt and discussed Islam. Such activities not
only could be seen in various public mosques but also in school and university
campuses. Moreover, many female students, both in senior high schools and
universities started to wear the veil (kerudung).5 This was followed by the
emergence of various Ikatan Remaja Masjid (Youth Mosque Associations) in
public mosques and Islamic preaching institutions in university campuses
(Lembaga Dakwah Kampus). In every large public mosque (Majid Jami or Masjid
Raya) there was always a youth sector, which organised Islamic activities for
youth. Istiqamah Mosque in Bandung, Sunda Kalapa and Al-Azhar Mosques in
Jakarta figured prominently in these activities. In almost every university there
was an institution which organised Islamic activities. From these universities
the da'wah movement spread gradually to other surounding universities. The
spread of the movement took place through mutual campus visitation, Islamic
preaching institutions, and coordinated joint activities.
In the 1980s there was another phenomenon, namely the emergence and
development of various Islamic movements, known as Harakah (an Arabic,
‘movement’). Different from conventional and formal Islamic movements, such
as Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama or Persatuan Islam (Persis), these Islamic
movements were not formal Islamic organisations, and some of them were even
called underground movements. Moreover, unlike those formal Islamic
movements founded by great ulama, the experts in traditional Islamic knowledge,
these new Islamic movements were founded and pioneered by young mubaligh
(preachers), most of them not trained in the traditional Islamic education system,
pesantren, but in public schools and universities. The main base of these
movements was usually the various campus Islamic preaching institutions (LDK,
Lembaga Dakwah Kampus) and the public mosques.
 Like Islamic movements in other parts of the world, there are three main themes
of this new Islamic phenomenon, namely: the application of Islamic law (shariah),
making Islam a way of life, and the freedom from non-Muslim political and
cultural domination. Politically and sociologically, these themes derived from
the awareness that the Islamic community (Umat Islam), even when in a majority,
was internally politically, economically and religiously weak. Religiously, these
5 They knew that they were not allowed by their schools and universities to do so. As a result, some of
them moved to Islamic private schools. This is because Department of Education’s acts forbade students
to wear something on the head.
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themes derived from a belief that Muslims have departed from true Islamic values
due to the infiltration and assimilation of both local indigenous and foreign
un-Islamic beliefs and practicies. The political and economic life of the Islamic
community, in their view, has for a long time been controlled by other religious
and ethnic minority groups. Moreover, they also assert that Islam, as the religion
of the majority, has not been able to inspire the social and cultural life of the
Indonesian community. Two intellectual Muslims explained:
The development of communication technology has been controlled by
‘other people’, who forced us to neglect religion (Islam) in our lives.
Every night television programs, which entered our bed rooms, tempted
us to leave Islamic values. Moreover, reading sources in our homes, such
as books, magazines and newspapers are almost all provided by those
who ruin our faith and belief (Iman and Aqidah). As a result of this, areas
formerly regarded as Islamic regions, such as the ‘Mecca veranda’
(Serambi Mekkah)6 and other places, are now penetrated by “modern”
culture with its all lousiness (kebrengsekannya), prostitution, gambling
and other wickednesses, which are regarded as proper things…
It is clear that politically from the old order till the new order, the Islamic
community, although they are a majority in this country, has always
been cornered (terpojok) (Hamka and Saimima 1979:3).
 Through religious legitimation, these new Islamic movements tried to transform
their present societies into the ideal society exemplified by the Prophet
Muhammad. To achieve this, like many previous Islamic revival movements,
they encouraged Muslims to return to the Qur'an and the Sunnah (model and
example) of the Prophet. Based on these prime sources, they believed that Islam
is the only solution of those problems faced by Muslims. For them, Islam is a
total way of life which is applicable to all times and places. There is no separation
between the religious and worldly life, and between state and religion. The main
goal of these movements is the government of a community based on the God's
revealed law (Sharia). Within this ideal community, God is sovereign over all
people, and individual freedom is guaranteed. Those who resist this goal, either
Muslims or non-Muslims, are regarded as enemies of God.
This research is concerned with these phenomena of the Islamic resurgence
movement among young people in Bandung, focusing on its emergence,
development and routinisation, which took place between the 1970s and the
early 1990s. The subject I have studied, borrowing Nakamura's7 term, is an “on
going [process] of Islamisation … in which a substantial number of Muslims
regard prevailing religious situations (often including themselves) as
6 Serambi Mekah is another name of Aceh, it refers to a place which has strong Islamic bases.
7 Mitsuo Nakamura is a professor of Anthropology at Chiba University Japan. He has written book and
papers on Islam in Indonesia including The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree.
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unsatisfactory and, as a corrective measure, strive to live up to what they
conceived as the standard of the orthodox teaching of Islam” (1983:2). Such a
process, Nakamura further said, is a “self-conscious re-Islamisation of Muslims
by themselves… [which] emphasized not only the necessity to conform to the
ritual orthodoxy of Islam but also the genuine devotion to fulfilling the moral
and ethical teaching of Islam” (Ibid).
Contemporary Islamic resurgence in Indonesia, like Islamic movements in other
parts of the Islamic world is deeply rooted in the Muslim medieval and modern
historical experience. Muslim historical heritage provides bases, symbols and
concepts for the current Islamic resurgence. Contemporary Islamic resurgence,
like previous Islamic movements, is a reflection of longstanding tradition and
continuation of a renewal (tajdid) tradition in Islamic history (Voll, 1983:32–47
and Ahmad, 1983:222). It is an expression of the revitalization of Islamic faith
and practices as an attempt to bring Muslim individual and communal life into
the right path based on the Qur’an and Sunnah. Besides this notion of tajdid,
there is also the Islamic idea of dakwa (to call people, especially Muslims to obey
the divine command and to model the life of the Prophet Muhammad) and of
al-amru bi al-makruf wa al-nahy an al-munkar (to command the good and forbid
the evil) which obliges every Muslim individual to correct any kind of impurity
and corruption within society.
The notion of tajdid (renewal) in the Islamic tradition can be traced back to the
Prophet Muhammad, who said that “At the turn of each century there will arise
in this ummah (the Muslim community) these who will call for a religious renewal
(revival)”.8 Such people (mujaddid),9 are believed to always come in the time
when Muslim community departs from the true path defined by the Qur’an and
sunnah (example of the Prophet). The task of the mujaddid, therefore, is to return
Muslims to their basic sources (the Qur’an and sunnah), to clean Islam from all
un-Godly elements, to present Islam and make it flourish more or less in its
original pure form and spirit (Maududi, 1981:34–5 and Voll, 1983:).
The source of validity of this Islamic renewal (tajdid) is the perfect model available
in the revelation, Qur’an (wahyu, words of God) and the traditions and customs
of the Prophet (sunnah). The era of the Prophet is an ideal model of a society in
which revelation is applied in human life. The purpose of the tajdid is to
implement this ideal model in Muslims’ lives, wherever and whenever Muslim
society exists. This purpose implies that tajdid is a continuous effort by Muslims
always to explain Islam and make it applicable in continually changing situations
without violating its principles. Contemporary Islamic resurgence, therefore, is
inspired by the example of past experience, not by a hope for a future utopia
8 This quotation related by Abu Huraira in Sunan (a collection of Hadits, traditions of the Prophet) of
Abu Dawud (Cairo 1348 Hijri)
9 The activity of renewal is tajdid, and the person who brings it about is called a mujaddid.
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like messianic or millenarian movements, which depend on the notion of the
future when a saviour or Messiah will appear. Nevertheless, the tajdid tradition
in Islam cannot be seen as conservatism10 because of its past orientation. This is
because, as history has shown,tajdid movements often criticise the established
institutions and traditions, and even by revolution challenge the existing system.
Moreover, the progressive ideas of the tajdid tradition and current Islamic
resurgence are demonstrated in their basic acceptance and accommodation to
modernity11 (Cantory 1990:183–94). The notion of the ideal era of the past here
should be understood as a perennial model and not as antiquated custom.
 The difference between contemporary tajdid (renewal) and the previous ones
is that the contemporary tajdid movement occurs in an era of globalisation in
which the electronic revolution in mass communication has broken down
boundaries between countries. Satellites, transmitters and television networks
make the citizens of the world a global community. In such a situation the
insistence on Muslim unity in a single Islamic international community (Ummah)
becomes a reality. The growth of global systems of communication, according
to Bryan S. Turner (1994:90), “[reinforced] the concept of Islam as a global
system.” Such a situation also influenced the way tajdid ideas and movements
have emerged and spread. Through global communication systems tajdid ideas
and movements in one Muslim country can rapidly spread to other Muslim
countries. This makes it possible for one movement in a Muslim country to have
branches in other Muslim countries, a phenomenon that never existed before.
1.3 Islamic Resurgence: a Definition
Different observers have named these new phenomena Islamic revivalism,
revitalisation, upsurge, reassertion, renewal, awakening. Others have called
these phenomena Islamic fundamentalism, neo-fundamentalism, militant Islam,
and political Islam. All these names are useful to analyse the new wave of Islamic
movements, but they cover only certain aspects of the phenomena and neglect
others.
10 According to Charlotte Seymour-Smith (1986:53), conservatism is “the preference and maintenance
of traditional ways of acting, forms of social institutions and cultural patterns.”
11 Their acceptance of modernity can be seen in their adoption of modern institutions and technology.
Many of the leaders of Islamic movements are graduates of major universities from faculties of medicine,
science and engineering: some of them are even graduates from Western universities.Ulama and Muslim
activists harnessed modern technology to organise and mobilise mass support as well as disseminate
their religious messages and their socio-political activism. The wide-spread use of mass communication
technology such as radio, television and video-cassettes, computers and fax machines established
effective communication among these activists. What they reject from the modernity is that, as Esposito
(1992:11) points out, “secularisation is a sine qua non for modernisation.” Moreover, since the notion
of modernisation -often equated with the idea of development- was Western in its origin and form,
when it is applied in the Muslim world it inevitably leads to“occidentalisation” or “Westernisation”
(cf. Sardar 1977:39). They selectively accept some aspects of modernity and reject what they believed
is non-Islamic.
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 ‘Islamic reassertion’, the term used by Mohammed Ayoob (1981), for example,
captures the idea of regaining power and position by the Islamic movements,
but it does not reflect the notion of threat and challenge to the status quo and
the dominant paradigms (Muzaffar 1987). Moreover, it merely conveys the
political aspects of the Islamic movement, but neglects other aspects of the
movements, such as social and ritual aspects, which are the main characteristics
of these movements as religious movements.
Similarly, the ‘Islamic revivalism’ concept does capture the idea of idealising
the era of the Prophet and his companions. It suggests the notion of reviving
practices and ideas and the notion of renaissance and renewal of thought. This
is a true description of certain segments of the Islamic movements, but it does
not explain their whole outlook. The notion of back to the Qur’an and the Sunnah
(the example and tradition of the Prophet) and idealising the period of the Prophet
and his companions, does not mean going back 1500 years to antiquated traditions
and practices. ‘Back to Qur’an and Sunnah’ means reinforcing Muslims’ loyalty
to ‘perennial and eternal values’ (Muzaffar, 1987:3).
Likewise ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’, the most common term used by Western
press and even academics, merely explains minor aspects of the current Islamic
phenomena. To quote Esposito (1992:7) the term ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ “tells
us everything and yet, at the same time, nothing”. It is true that Islamic
movements call Muslims to return to their basic fundamental faith and beliefs
(Aqidah). However, the word ‘fundamentalism’, which derives from a unique
phenomenon in a certain period of American Protestanism, is not appropriate
to the current phenomena in Islam (cf. Khurshid Ahmad, 1987:226).
‘Fundamentalist’ in Christian traditions refers to those “who advocate a literalist
biblical position and is thus regarded as static, retrogressive and extremist…
and wish to return to and replicate the past” (Esposito 1992:7). In fact leaders
and founders of the so-called ‘Islamic Fundamentalist movement’, are Western
educated people,12 and are fond of modern technology. In addition, the image
of ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ as “political activism, extremism, terrorism, fanatism
and anti-Americanism” might be true to refer to some radical religiopolitical
activism, especially in the Middle East. Many Islamic movements, however, are
involved within the existing system. Furthermore, as Gregory F. Rose, an
Assistant Professor at the University of North Texas observes (1990:219–28),
the main problem with the term ‘fundamentalism’ is a not semantic one, but a
‘misconceptualization’ as a result of misleading cross-cultural analogies.13
12 Many of them even are Western educated, or at least they studied Western knowledge. Sayyid Qutb,
an important thinker of Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) movement in Egypt, Imam Khomeini,
the Iranian spiritual leader, studied and lived respectively in the United States and France
13 Rose (1990:220) argues that although the notion of fundamentalism was first applied to
nineteenth-century American religious movements, the term was later colored by Talcott Parson, in his
study of the ‘fundamentalism reaction’ (his analyses of the rise of European Fascist movements. Rose
recognises that Parson regarded fundamentalist reaction as a “pathological, authoritarian reconstruction
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‘Fundamentalism’, he argues, is an “ethnocentric, militantly secularist sociological
categorization”, which in turn makes it difficult to analyse comprehensively the
current Islamic resurgence.
Like many recent observers, such as Hillal Dessouki, Chandra Muzaffar, John
Esposito and Daniel Regan,14 I will use term the ‘Islamic resurgence’.
Borrowing Muzaffar’s (1987) idea, the word resurgence, meaning “reappearance
and growth of a particular attitude or activity among a group of people, especially
one which has been forgotten for some time” (Collin Cobuild Dictionary 1992)
perfectly explains the current emergence of new Islamic movements. In Muslims’
view, Islam has been for a long time forgotten by Muslims themselves, and now
they are increasingly aware of their Islamic identity. Through their attachment
to Islam they regain their self esteem and dignity, and this indicates clearly that
Islam has become important again in Muslims’ lives. Another point is that the
word “reappearance” explains the relation between the recent development of
Islamic movements and the past glory of Islam and the ideal society in the era
of Prophet and his companions. As Muzaffar (1987:2) puts it, the term resurgence
represents the idea of challenge and threat. Many Muslims believe that Islam as
an alternative way of life challenges the dominant social systems. On the other
hand, the dominant groups and those who are being challenged, view their
position as being threatened by these Islamic movements.
Two good definitions of Islamic resurgence have been offered by Khurshid
Ahmad, Chandra Muzaffar and Hillal Dessouki. A combination of these
definitions, I believe, are representative enough to explain current Islamic
development throughout the world. According to Ahmad (1987:226), Islamic
resurgence is a “future-oriented movement” concerned with the problems of
modernity and the challenges of technology and offering solutions based on the
original sources of Islam, the Qur'an and Sunnah. It is a movement that on the
bases of these sources tries flexibly and capably to innovate what have been
neglected by conservatives who stick to a particular school of fiqh (law).
Another definition offered by Muzaffar (1987:2) says that: 
Islamic resurgence is a description of the endeavour to re-establish Islamic
values, Islamic practices, Islamic institutions, Islamic laws, indeed Islam
in its entirety, in the lives of Muslims everywhere. It is an attempt to
of an idealized social status quo ante in response to increasingly high levels of dysfunction in the existing
social status quo.” In Parson’s view, regardless of source, every challenge to the established social order
is regarded as deviant, residual and marginal. Therefore, Rose concludes, treating religion as residual
and marginal shows the uncritical acceptance of Parsonian functionalism and its assumptions, and the
insistent belief that despite social disruption, a Western model of economic and political development
could be applied comprehensively in non-Western settings.
14 See respectively their books Islamic Resurgence in The Arab World, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia,
Voices of Resugent Islam and “Islamic Resurgence: Characteristics, Causes, Consequences and
Implications”, in Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 21. No 2. Winter 1993.
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re-create an Islamic ethos, an Islamic social order, at the vortex of which
is the Islamic human being, guided by the Qur'an and the Sunnah.”
Dessouki (1982:4) defines ‘Islamic resurgence’ as referring to
“an increasing political activism in the name of Islam by governments
and opposition groups alike. It designates a politicized, activist form of
Islam and the growing use of Islamic symbolism and legitimation at the
level of political action… We are not dealing with calls for or attempts
to provide a new interpretation of the Qur'an but, rather, with social
and political movements that are engaged in mobilization, organization
and possibly the seizure of political authority. Thus [it] refers to the
increasing prominence and politicization of Islamic ideologies and
symbols in Muslim societies and in the public life of Muslim individuals”
When these definitions are attached to the word ‘movement’ they refer to a
“worldwide, open and diffuse system in which individual Muslims or Muslims
organised in groups are consciously working towards the reconsolidation of the
Ummah into a behavioural, operational and goal seeking system” (Siddiqui,
1980:9). Based on these definitions the resurgent Islamic youth movement in
Bandung Indonesia is a part of the worldwide Islamic movement which
endeavours to establish Islamic values, practices, institutions, laws, politics and
its entirety in Muslims' lives everywhere.
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Chapter 2: The Foundation of the
Movement
2.1 Introduction
Although they had in common, the growing attachment of Muslims to Islam,
Islamic resurgences that occurred throughout the Muslim world from the 1970s,
were historically and behaviorally diverse and complex phenomena (Dessouki
1982:6). In each Muslim country -even within each Muslim country- there were
always different causes, different historical backgrounds and different cultural
settings. In the Middle East, for example, Islamic resurgence often occurred
through radical political activism, whereas in Malaysia and Indonesia it is
manifested respectively through Malay ethnicity (Muzaffar 1985: 14–6) and
through the Islamic cultural movement.
From a sociological point of view, it is difficult to pin-point one absolute cause
of a social phenomenon. It comprises various factors which directly or indirectly
affect one another. A social movement, for example, is an accumulation of various
factors, including the emergence of radical ideological powers, class
consciousness, group and race identity, nationality and the emergence of
important (charismatic) figures, who are able to mobilise power. These factors
are not sufficient for the emergence of a social movement, without a conducive
social millieu and an apt social issue or event that triggers the movement. These
may include leadership disintegration, social chaos, economic problems, national
instability, and foreign influence and intervention (Perry and Perry 1988;280–2,
cf. Tolkhah 1994:9).
Similarly, there is no single factor which caused the emergence of Islamic
resurgence movement among young people in Bandung. To understand this
phenomenon at least four important aspects should be considered: socio-historical
backgrounds, radical ideology, foreign influence and individual personalities.
In examining these I restrict myself to the history of student movements from
the early period of the New Order, ie late 1965, to late 1979. This history is
important because Islamic youth movements emerged, when the student
movements seemed to be dead.
Secondly I analyse how the founders and their followers perceived the history
of Islam in Indonesia, and how they viewed social and political situations at the
time they initiated the movement. The study of perceptions of the past, as
Gungwu puts it, “is an attempt to understand the contemporary values of some
periods of the past … [which] constitutes a valuable background for explaining
what is happening today” (1979:6). It is important to understand these historical
perceptions since they can be adjusted along with radical changes of the world
around, and can deliberately be used ‘for social and political purposes’ (1979:2).
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Islam was understood by the founders and the followers of the movements as
an alternative ideology and civilisation which completely contradicts other world
ideologies such as socialism and capitalism. Such a view is very different from
previous Islamic movements such Muhammadiyah, PERSIS (Persatuan Islam,
The Unity of Islam) and NU (Nahdlatul Ulama, The Rise of Islamic Scholars) that
put much more emphasis on ritual, social and political aspects.
My third interest is to examine to what extent international Islamic movements
and foreign influences played a role in the emergence and development of Islamic
youth resurgence movements in Indonesia.
Lastly the individual background of the founders is significant in understanding
the movement. I will observe the background of only one of the founders,
including his familial and educational background, and his relation to the
emergence of the movement.
2.2 Student Movement and Political Suppression
Students' interest in social problems lead to their involvement in politics.
Students, according to Curran and Renzetti (1990:598), “have a long history of
activism in such political pressure groups”. Such a position, in Lipset's view, is
gained because students “are more responsive to political trends, to changes in
mood, to opportunities for action, than almost any other group in the population”
(Lipset and Altbach 1969:497). This shows that the role of students in society is
not only as social critic, but also as a political force which can stimulate social
and political change within society.
In developing countries, the role of students in society is very important because
they are elite groups who are among the first introduced to modernisation. This
was even clearer in the post-colonial era, between 1950s and 1970s, when very
few people had access to higher education. Within a society with a small number
of educated middle class, students became a source of public opinion. Moreover,
their concern with modernisation and development made them important agents
of social, political and cultural changes. They began to diverge from the
traditional prescriptions to which the older generation was very much attached,
instigating, as Feuer (1969) puts it, a “conflict of generations”.
In Indonesia this conflict of generations was marked by various student
demonstrations which criticised government policies and proposed radical
changes and solutions to social, economical and political problems faced by
Indonesia. In the 1960s students and other sections of society, including some
army members (Railon 1985:7) struggled for the establishment of the Indonesian
New Order. In the New Order era student movements continued to criticise
government policies. In 1974 students demonstrations demanded the dissolution
of the group of personal assistants of the president who had too much influence
at the time, a reduction in prices and the crushing of the corruptors. This
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demonstration turned into violence and destruction when demonstrators'
behaviour went out of control, and about 9 students were killed and 23 others
were injured (Tomtowi Syafei 1987). This event was known as ‘Peristiwa Malari’
(The Fifteenth of January Event).
This event had a long and tragic impact on student activism. In 1977, the Ministry
of Education banned student involvement in politics. It was followed by the
dissolution of Student Government (Dewan Mahasiswa, Dema) in 1978, by order
of the Pangkopkamtib (Panglima Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban,
the Chief of Operations Command for the Restoration of Security and Order),
Admiral Sudomo. Finally, on April 19th 1978, the Ministry of Education decided
on a new policy, ie. Normalisation of Campus (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus,
NKK). A year later students protested against this policy in Bandung, Jakarta,
Surabaya and Jogjakarta (CSIS 1980:15), but, the policy still applies in 1995.
For students, this was the death of university campuses. According to a student,
the NKK policy resulted in disadvantages not only to the students but also to
the government. Students became passive and were no longer interested in the
social and political problems of their societies. They were alienated from their
surrounding environment and frustrated. Their ideal intellectual and spiritual
dimensions disappeared. They become bodies (tubuh) without soul (ruh). In MH
Ainun Najib's view, students became bulls in the stall of NKK.
From 1983 Islamic student organisations such as HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa
Islam, Islamic Student Association), PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia,
Indonesian Islamic Student Movement), IMM (Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah,
Muhammadiyah Student Association) and PII (Pelajar Islam Indonesia,
Islamic School-Student Association),1 were forced to change their ideological
base, ie. Islam, into Pancasila. In the 15th HMI Congress inMedan, HMI decided
not to adopt Pancasila as its azas (foundation), even though there was strong
external pressure from the government. However, in 1985 when the government
began to apply the Basic Guidelines for Mass Organisations (Rancangan
Undang-Undang Keormasan), all mass organisations, including here students' and
religious organisations were required to accept Pancasila as their bases. Therefore,
in the 16th congress, after a long and heated debate HMI accepted Pancasila.
This attitude led to internal conflict, ie. the break-up of HMI into HMI itself and
the ‘Assembly to save the organisation,’ (Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi, MPO).
Muhammadiyah Student Association (IMM) and Indonesian Islamic Student
Movement (PMII) automatically accepted Pancasila when their main body
Muhammadiyah and NU, respectively, accepted it as the foundation of all
organisations. Only one organisation, the PII, preferred to dissolve itself rather
1 In Indonesia there are two terms which refer to the word ‘student’in English First students of High
school and below are called ‘pelajar.’ The other term is ‘mahasiswa,’ which refers to students of higher
education institution, universitiesand academies.
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than accept Pancasila as its ideological foundation. Although it formally dissolved,
it continued to hold trainings at an underground level.
This situation for Muslims and students in general was quite frustrating. To
reduce their alienation they tried to find channels through which they could
express their ideas. At this stage public and university mosques became a centre
of student activities.
The late 1970s and early 1980s (after the banning of Dewan Mahasiswa),
according to Denny J.A., (1990), marked a new stage in the student movement
in Indonesia. Student movements changed their orientation, format, organisation
and type. While the orientation of previous student movements was challenging
the ‘power structure’ (struktur kekuasaan), in the 80s their orientationwas to
form political and social opinion among the masses.
2.3 Historical Perception: Disappointment of The Past
In concentrating on this historical perception my intention is to relate the
founders' perceptions of the past to their response to contemporary situations.
These past perceptions contribute “a valuable background for explaining what
is happening today, why contemporary [people]respond as they do to current
developments and in what ways they are likely to interpret presentevents in
the future” (Gungwu 1979:6).
In the view of the founders and followers of various Islamic youth movements,
the history ofIslam in Indonesia is the history of “continuous defeat and
dissappointment.” 2 For them it is ironical that throughout history Indonesian
Muslims have been the majority of the Indonesian population, but have always
been marginal politically. Islamicparties and organisations have been impotent.
The Indonesian government has actually been dominated by other powers.
Although some Muslims have been involved in the government, Muslims have
seen it as un-Islamic. In their view government has been infiltrated by Christians,
and government policies identified with Christian policies directly or indirectly
push Islam into a ‘corner’ (terpojok). 3 Since the birth of the New Order, Christian
figures have occupied some very important and strategic positions in the country.
In the view of Muslim activists, the role of Muslims in the independence
movement began since three centuries ago, with resistance movements against
the Dutch by Muslim sultanates and leaders. Due to this continuous resistance
by Muslims, Indonesia was increasingly identified with Islam, and the Dutch
with Christianity, since Christianity was introduced with colonialism. The Dutch
were seen as kafir (infidel) who not only wanted to control the country politically
and economically but also to destroy Islam. This identification of the Dutch
2 Interview with some of the founders of Islamic movements and many youth Muslim activists.
3 The word terpojok (cornered, marginalised) was a common theme among the young Muslim activists
to describe the position of Islam in Indonesia.
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Christian as a threat and enemy of Islam became the roots of political conflict
between Christians and Muslims in the period of post-independence, when the
issue of Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta)4 emerged (Hasan 1980:7).
Most movements and revolts were crushed by the Dutch. However, the Dutch
had to pay a high price in terms of money and human life. The resistance
movement of the Acehnese was successfully crushed after Dr. Snouck Hurgronje,
an Islamic specialist, studied Islam in Aceh.5 His report on Aceh was then used
to plan an effective strategy to surpass the Acehnese. He was appointed as the
Dutch government specialist for Islamic affairs, and he developed an effective
policy to prevent and destroy any forms of an Islamic resistance movement. His
policies became more important when the Dutch realised that the biggest
challenge to their domination was coming from ulama a and Islamic leaders. One
of the most important policies of Snouck Hurgronje was to encourage Islamic
religious activities (ritual aspects), while preventing and proscribing any attempts
to develop a powerful Islamic political base. This policy, according to Muslim
activists, continued to be applied by the Sukarno and Suharto regimes (cf. Samson
1972:229–30).
 Indonesian history, for Muslims especially the militant, has been an irony. In
the political sphere, throughout history, Indonesian Muslims, who are the
majority of the Indonesian population, were characterised as ‘outsiders’ (McVey
1983:199–225). Indonesian Muslims have been characterised, borrowing
Wertheim's (1980) term, as a “majority with [a] minority mentality”. Indeed, as
Drakeley (1992) puts it, throughout the New Order (Orde Baru) period Islam in
Indonesia has occupied a position as political outsider, “despite being a crucial
political midwife at its birth” (p.5).
Furthermore, Muslim activists believed that the Muslim ummat (community),
organisationally and individually, was often sold out by both Muslim and
non-Muslim leaders. Islamic power was always used and exploited, but it was
neglected when the glory was gained (Rosidi 1970). One informant said, “When
this country was in a crisis Muslims, who were the majority of the population,
were always in the front line, but when the crisis was over the Muslims were
ignored.” This awareness led to a belief that there must be something wrong
4 The Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta) was a draft preamble of the Constitution of 1945 (Undang-Undang
Dasar 45) which said that the state was “based on belief in God with the obligation for adherents of
Islam to carry out Islamic law” (“berdasar ketuhanan, dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi
pemeluk-pemeluknya”) (Boland 1985:28). According to Hasan (1980:8), this was a minimal demand from
Muslims during the debate on the national state base in 1945. After heated debate between nationalist
secularists, Christians and Muslims, the last seven words known as the “tujuh kata” (seven words) were
finally dropped from the draft preamble because -it was believed-they would create religious conflict
and in turn destroy national unity.
5 It was reported that he studied Islam in Mecca and disguised himself as a Muslim. One of the important
concepts is his three categories of Islam: as pure religion, social aspect and political aspect. For further
information of Islamic Politics of Dutch Colonial Government see Husnul Aqib Suminto in his Politik
Islam Pemerintah Hindia Belanda, especially between pages 115 to 125.
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with the ummat. Among other things, Muslims realised that Islam was remote
from the ummat. In a public sermon, one mubaligh (preacher) even said that the
Quran had been treated as a house decoration. Hadits (the traditions of the
Prophet) had been left behind.
Muslims have always been in opposition to the government not only because
of Suharto, who ignored and suppressed Muslims' aspirations, but also because
of the people surrounding him. Some big mass media, publishers and social
infrastructures were controlled by Christian institutions. Furthermore, Christian
missions which successfully converted Muslims in many parts of Indonesia,
were regarded as a big challenge for Muslims. These facts, according to Mursalin
Dahlan, one of the founders of Islamic resurgence in Bandung, “showed that
Islam, as in the colonial era, has been dominated and controlled by other powers
that were always hostile to Islam.”
2.4 Islam: The Only Alternative
Basically, the core of Islamic teachings developed by the Islamic resurgence
movement is similar to other Islamic groups. Their teachings are based on similar
sources, ie. Quran and Sunnah (tradition of the Prophet). The differences are tied
to the way they approach Islam. These differences result in various religious
views, such as reformist, modernist, traditionalist, and fundamentalist (Aziz
1989:236).
According to one informant, Muslims' view of Islam was deeply influenced by
Snouck Hurgronje, who tried to restrict Islam to a ‘the mosque religion’ (agama
mesjid) and deny its social and political life (cf. Suminto 1985:122 and Samson
1972:229–30). Islam, in the view of young Muslim activists, for a long time has
been misunderstood by Muslims, and because of this misunderstanding, Islam
has been mocked and humiliated by other powers. Islam, in Mohammad Abduh's6
term, “has been covered up by Muslims” (al-Islamu mahjubun bi al-Muslimin).
I found there was a general dissatisfaction among important figures of the
movement with the concept of Islam offered by previous ulama and mainstream
Islam. Moreover, some ulama in the view of young Muslims were afraid to
explain the ‘true Islam’. Because of this, young activists preferred young and
‘brave’ preachers.
This new tendency was related to the wide distribution of Islamic translations.
Almost all reference books of the movements came from the Middle East, and
other Muslim countrries. Some of those important books were written by Sayyid
Qutb, Hasan al-Banna and other members of Muslim Brotherhood
(Ikhwanal-Muslimun). Another important writer was Abul A'la Maududi, the
6 Abduh was one of the most prominent figures of Islamic reformism in Egypt. In Indonesia his ideas
deeply influenced the Islamic reformist movement, Muhammadiyah.
16
A Quest for True Islam
founder and the leader of Jama'at al-Islami (Islamic Group) in Pakistan.7 Those
books emphasised at least three major points. First, they attempted to re-examine
Islam, and they tried to correct the view of Islam previously held by Muslims.
In addition, they proposed Islam as a solution for all problems faced by Muslims.
This led to their rejection of other ideologies, including socialism, nationalism
and other ‘isms’. Compared with other Muslim groups, they were more concerned
with aqidah (basic faith), basic meanings of Islam, and the social and political
aspects of Islam. These three aspects, in terms of approach, were quite radical
and different from mainstream Islam. This was a crucial factor in the development
of the movement.
Aqidah (basic faith), for young activists, is the most important aspect of Islam
because it is the foundation of all activities and determines people's lives. An
informant said that like a foundation of a house, it determines the strength of
the building. Although the building is made from very good material, it would
be ruined if its foundation was fragile. Aqidah, therefore, is conceived as
comprehensive and basic thought about the universe, mankind and life, and it
becomes a base of all activities. At this point Islam is identified as an ideology
which opposes the established ideologies of Capitalism and Socialism.8
Based on my interviews with many Muslim activists, I found similar views that
Islam is not only a belief and ritual system, but also includes law (Syari'ah),
politics and way of life (nizham). Islam, according to this view, is a complete
code of life which rules all aspects of life, including individual, social, economical,
political and cultural life. This implies that Islam is conceived as not only a setof
beliefs and a socio-political code but also a cultural code.
This new cultural view of Islam emerged as a result of dissatissfaction not only
with the established social and political order, which oppressed Islamic social
ideas and political aspirations, but also against the cultural order. From their
historical perceptions, Muslim activists believed that Islam and Muslims often
became victims of corrupt leaders and a bad system. They asserted that Western
cultural infiltration through mass media, both printing and electronic, had
“intoxicated” the Muslim ummat, especially young Muslim generations. The
general trend among youngsters who often regarded everything which came
7 Some titles of these books are This Religion of Islam, Al-Islam, Towards Understanding Islam, The
Future for Islam, Islam the Misunderstood Religion, Islam and Universal Peace, Iman dan 20 Perkara yang
Membatalkan Syahadatain (Faith and 20 Matters which Nullify the Profession of Faith), and Jundullah
Jihad Fi Sabilillah (The Soldier of God's War in the way of God).
8 Other religions such as Christianity, Judaism and Budhism, in the view of Muslims activists, do not
cover all aspects of human life. Christians, for example, believe that Christianity the religio taught by
Jesus Christ is universal. However, in the Muslim activists' view, it does not havecomplete rules by
which all dimensions of life of the Christians must be ruled by the Christian teachings. In Christianity
there is a division of spiritual and temporal (wordly) life. It was knownthat in Christianity there is a
doctrine “Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and to God the things which are God's.”
Likewise, Buddhism also accepts the dichotomy of life, spiritual and worldly life (Rais 1985:27–48).
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from the West (Barat, America and Europe) as good, for Muslim activists was a
clear evidence of “Westoxication.”9 This ‘westoxication,’ they believed, created
a permissive and valueless society resulting in moral decadence. Indonesia, as
Imaduddin puts it, was a place to be cleansed because it was full of injustice and
un-Islamic practices (Naipaul 1981:350:2).
Another implication of the idea that Islam is a complete code of life is that Islam
does notneed any other ideas from other sources. It does not need assistance
from other ideologies. Islam is self sufficient. This view leads to a total rejection
of any other value systems, such as socialism, liberalism, communism, secularism
and other ‘isms’. An informant said that valuesystems or ideologies other than
Islam are regarded as a source of chaos and conflict within Muslim society. The
world, including Muslim countries, was dominated by those powers. Behind all
of this, he further said, was the Zionist10power, which was always hostile to
Islam.
The idea that Islam is a complete code of life also implies rejection of the division
between the religious and non religious. Such division was often believed as a
9 ‘Westoxification,’ ‘Westoxication,’ ‘Westomania,’ ‘Occidentosis,’ ‘Westitis,’ ‘Euromania,’ and
‘Weststruckness’ are terms translated from a book written by a modern Iranian novelist and social critic
Jalal al-e Ahmad Gharbzadegi. According to Madjid Tehranian (1993), Westoxication is the right
translation because it “connotes a richer meaning in English in that the individual so addicted, just like
any intoxicated individual, enjoys the conditions of his own addiction.” This book became a major
source of ideological inspiration for the revolution, and because of this, the book was banned after its
first publication in 1963. After the revolution it was distributed widely throughout the country, and
the title of the book Gharbzadegi became a phrase for the malaise of modern Iranian society. The core
idea of this book is that the West has never been a panacea, but rather is a terrible disease which has
poisoned Iranian society. In his Gharbzadegi (English translation by John Green and Ahmad Alizadeh
Westruckness, Lexington: Mazda 1982), Jalal al-E Ahmad criticised the Western developmentalist policies
of the Shah's regime. He argues that Western neocolonialism often penetrated the minds and souls of
the nations of the Third World through a pathology called ‘Westoxication,’ a total irrational fascination
with everything Western at the expense of the indigenous cultural heritage. Furthermore, he discovered
Western intentions to destroy Islamic unity and the involvement of the Shahin this endeavour. At the
same time he also argued that ‘Eastoxication’ is pathological obsession among intellectuals with Marxist
and communist ideologies. While they were negating religion as ‘the opium of the masses,’ intentionally
or not these intellectuals disconnected themselves from the masses and on the contrary they served the
interests of the colonial powers of the Soviet Union. Based on these negative valuations of West and
East, came the slogan, which later became the slogan of the Islamic Republic of Iran, ‘Neither East nor
West, Islam is best’ (La sharqiyya wa la gharbiyya illa al-Islam) (Tehranian 1993:341–73, and Rajaee
1993:103–25). This term ‘Westoxication” has been used as a powerful rhetoric of various Islamic
movements throughout the Muslim world. The term Westoxication itself emerged and developed for
the first time in Iran, but the idea that Muslims had been intoxicated by Western values and culture
has been a common theme among those Islamic movements.
10 Zionism, according to Ismail R. al-Faruqi (1983), a professor of Islamic studies in Temple University,
America, refers to “a movement launched by Theodore Herzl following his disillusionment by the
Dreyfus Affair. It was designed to transform Palestine and its adjacent territoriesinto a Jewish state, ‘as
Jewish as England is English.’ Its pursuit of this objective is thoroughly Machiavellian. Its single-minded
purpose is given absolute priority over all considerations, including the moral” (p.261–267). This term
‘Zionist,’ like ‘Westoxication,’ was a common rhetoric label among young Muslim activists for those
who were believed as hostile to Islam.
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symptom of secularism11 an ideology that only thinks about and binds itself to
this present life and rejects the existence of the hereafter. “Secular people seem
to be good, their pragmatic actions make them forget future (hereafter) matters.
At the extreme level, they will do anything to reach their goals” (Imaduddin
1980:36). Islam, according to Imaduddin (an important figure of the youth Islamic
resurgence in Bandung) is a way of life which rules all of human activities, and
therefore none of our lives should be profane or non-religious. He explains that
Islam even prescribes what to do on going to the toilet. A Muslim for example,
is supposed to say a prayer (do'a) and enter the toilet with the left foot. He further
says, “keep our body healthy so that we can carry out God's order and obey
God much better, this is ibadah (worship) (Ibid, p.47). By this he rejects the
translation of the word al-Din in al-Din al-Islam as ‘religion’ (agama) because
al-din, for Imaduddin, means a complete way of life whereas‘religion’ is merely
a set of beliefs and rituals (cf. Lyon 1979:37).
Finally, the notion of Islam as a complete code of life led to the idea of an Islamic
state. It was commonly believed that the totality of Islam can only be
comprehensively applied in a system or state which is also completely Islamic.
Among the Islamic youth resurgence movement, there are at least two different
groups. There are some groups who believe that the present regime is nottotally
un-Islamic, but changes to be more Islamic are necessary. Other groups believe
that the present regime is completely un-Islamic, and should be changed by
revolution to Islam. Because Islam, as Mursalin Dahlan explains, cannot be
applied partially. In his view, there are only two choices accepting Islam
completely or rejecting it completely. He further says “Believing or practising
some parts of Islam and rejecting the others is kafir (infidel). Islam should be
accepted completely (kaaffah) or rejected completely.” This was the view of
Islamic underground movements, such as the Young DI (Darul Islam) and LP3K
(Pesantren Kilat Movement) movement, whereas the former view was held by
the formal Islamic movements, such as those at public mosques and campus
preaching institutions.
Their notion of a more Islamic and a completely Islamic state refers to the ideal
period of Islam in the era of the Prophet and his companions. It was believed,
by most Muslim activists, that the Prophet established a state which was built
on the basis of God's revelations. In this state, Muslims rule themselves with
Islamic law (shariat) which covered all aspects of life. This ideal conception of
an Islamic state, among the Islamic youth resurgence movement created two
11 Secularisation processes refer to “the separation of the state from the church leading in its advanced
stage to the separation of politics from religion, …[ie.] the disestablishmentof religion in the domain of
public policy and its relegation to the realm of private preference and judgement. …[As a result of] the
demonstrated and incontrovertible success of rationalism in various areas of life, religion would
eventually lose its salience even for the individual.… Thus secularism refers to both eradication of
religion as an institution in human society and erosion of man's faith in the divine and the trascendental
(Haq 1986:332–3).
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aims: to establish an Islamic state, and to apply Islamic law. These aims, as in
other Islamic resurgence movements in the world have been the two main
characteristics of contemporary Islamic movements, namely “legalist” (the
comprehensive application of Islamic law, shariat) and “autonomist,” or
“separatist” (the establishment of an Islamic state) (cf. Pipes 1980:17–39). In
Pakistan, for example, the Islamic movement demanded the application of Islamic
law, whereas in Sudan, in the Southern Philippines, and in Kashmir, Islamic
movements demanded an Islamic state and full autonomy.
To establish an Islamic state and a more Islamic identity, Muslim activists believed
they had to prepare the Muslim ummat so they could accept Islam as their law.
Furthermore, this preparation process could only be achieved through jihad 12
(endeavour, holy war) and dakwah13 (proselytisation). According to an informant,
the spirit of jihad had disappeared from the hearts of Muslims. It was not
surprising then when jihad became an important subject among young Muslim
activists.
Among some groups of Muslims I interviewed, there was an awareness that it
was impossible toreach the above aims without collective efforts. They believed
that there should be a cohesive group (jama'ah), who was expected to be the
pioneer of the dakwah (Islamic preaching) movements. This belief, they claimed,
is based on the examples of the Prophet in the early phases of development of
Islam. The Prophet Muhammad, according to an informant, established a small
group secretly in a companion' s house. Arqam’ s house became a secret centre
of the early Islamic movement, from which members of the groups spread to
preach Islam secretly. This period was named by some groups as the Mecca
period, or a period of forming cadres. Based on this view, some Muslim groups
believe that they shouldestablish a jama'ah which spreads Islam secretly. These
groups later developed as underground movements. Interpretation of the history
of early Islam of the Prophet varied among the Muslim groups, and in the later
developments, this became a source of disagreement among the Islamic youth
resurgence movements.
From the above description there are three important issues. First, the idea that
Islam as a complete code of life which provides answers for all questions of
modern life is quite different from what was previously conceived. Previously,
the Islamic movement was a purification movement which attempted to purify
Islamic teachings and to refute local un-Islamic traditions. In the following phase,
Islamic movements had a more political character. Finally, contemporary Islamic
12 The word jihad is an Arabic word meaning fight, battle and holy war against the infidels. The root
of this word is jahada which means to endeavour and to strive, and because of this the word jihad often
translated into Indonesian as “endeavour” (berusaha dengan sungguh-sungguh)
13 The term dakwah comes from the Arabic word da'wa which is from the root da'a, meaning to call or
invite, ie. to call mankind to Islam. Dakwah also means missionary activities, ie. Islamic evangelism
which promotes Islamic teachings among Muslims.
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youth resurgence movements have been less concerned with Islamic purification
and Islamic politics, and more concerned with the cultural aspects of Islam.
Despite these differences, contemporary Islamic movements and previous Islamic
movements have something in common ie. all of them try to make Islam present
and felt in society and to give Islam substance and a role in society (Bahasoan
1985:131–60). At this point, the current Islamic movements seem to be a
continuation of previous Islamic movements.
Second, through the translation of many books which later became a reference
for various groups of Islamic movement, ideas developed by various Islamic
youth resurgence movements in Bandung, and generally in Indonesia, were
highly influenced by other Islamic movements throughout the world, especially
in the Middle East. Among others, the thought of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin in
Egypt, and Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan were the most influential sources for the
Islamic youth resurgence movement in Bandung in its early development. This
international influence was not only in terms of ideas but also in terms of
motivation.
2.5 International Influences
Islamic reformist movements in Indonesia have always had connections with
other Islamic movements in other parts of the world. The emergence of reformist
movements, such as Muhammadiyah and PERSIS, was deeply influenced by the
Islamic movements in the Middle East, such as Wahabism in Saudi Arabia, and
the Islamic reform movement of Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) and Jamaluddin
al-Afghani (1839–1897) in Egypt. Like previous Islamic movements in Indonesia,
contemporary Islamic youth resurgence movements in Indonesia are also
influenced by international Islamicmovements.
Different from their predecessors, current Islamic movements developed in an
era of globalisation, in which mass communication technology has been
revolutionised. Recent advances of technology have led to a situation where
citizens of the planet earth are linked inextricably by satellites, receiver dishes,
transmitters and cable television networks and relays. At this stage, all humans
are in one community, a global community (Shupe 1990:17–26) or in McLuhan
and Fiore's (1968) term a “global Village.” This situation, in relation to the Islamic
movement, creates a closer connection among various Islamic movements.
Previously, the influence of the international Islamic movement reached Indonesia
after a period of time. Usually, the founders of the Indonesian movements met
reformist ideas in the Middle East when they studied Islam or when they did
pilgrimage (hajj) in Mecca. When they returned to Indonesia they preached their
reformists ideas and later established a movement. For this reason, there was a
time lapse which differentiated the Islamic movement in other parts of the world
and the Islamic movements in Indonesia. The agents of these movement were
21
The Foundation of the Movement
individuals. In later developments, this agency of change was also through books
and other printed media. Finally, the agency of the contemporary Islamic
movement is not only through individuals and printed media but also through
various electronic mass communication media, such as television networks and
direct broadcasting systems. This advance of telecommunication technology has
revolutionised the spread of ideas and information. What is on television in
America can also be seen at the same time in a small village in Bandung,
Indonesia. Through television, what happens in other parts of Islamic world can
immediately be seen and heard by Muslims in Indonesia.
This fast current of information is very important in understanding the emergence
and early development of the Islamic youth resurgence movement in Indonesia,
especially in Bandung. One of the most important international events which
greatly influenced the early development of the movement was the Islamic
revolution in Iran in1979. This event for Muslim activists had three impacts.
First, it gave Muslim activists the idea of an Islamic revolutionary movement
and that Islam could become a radical ideology which could challenge established
ideologies. Second, Islamic revolution in Iran psychologically motivated Muslim
activists and convinced them that they could also succeed like the Islamic
movement led by Khomeini in Iran. Third, the Islamic revolution in Iran also
influenced the way Muslim females wore clothes or at least reinforced the
teaching of the veil (kerudung, jilbab) This was because female Muslims who
supported the revolution in Iran wore the veil and black clothes.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, these influences could be seen clearly. There
was a kind of admiration toward Khomeini as the leader of the revolution. The
portrait of Khomeini was hung in young Muslim activists' rooms and in offices
of student and youth Muslim organisations. Another influence could be identified
clearly in the way Muslim female activists wore clothes. In the late1970 s there
were very few female Muslims who wore the veil, however in the early 1980s-
just one or two years after the Islamic revolution in Iran- those who wore the
veil increased rapidly. Furthermore, the distinct Iranian influence was that
Muslim female activists wore black veil and clothes similar to those female
activists in Iran.
The influence of the revolution in Iran was reinforced by the translation of books
written by important revolutionary figures. The works of some Shi'ite scholars,
such as Ali Shariati and Imam Khomeini were published and read by Sunni
Muslim people in Indonesia. Along with other books written by Sunni scholars,
such as Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al-Banna and Mawlana Maududi, these books shaped
a new Muslim view on Islam.
These impacts of the Islamic revolution in Iran on the early development of
Islamic youth resurgence movement are clear despite the fact that the revolution
in Iran was a revolution of the Shi'ite (Si'ah) Muslims. It is a quite interesting
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fact that regardless of differences,14 Indonesian Sunni Muslims accepted
revolutionary ideas from the Shi' ite Muslims in Iran. An informant says, “we
do not agree with some of the faith and teachings of the Shi' ite, but we have
learnt from the revolutionary ideas of the Shi'ite.” At this stage, as Khurshid
Ahmad (1983) says, the contemporary Islamic movement reached a very important
phase in Muslim history marked by its non- sectarian characteristic (p.223).
2.6 The Founder: An Individual Background
It is not easy for me to decide which Islamic institutions played the most
important role in the emergence of the Islamic revivalism among the young
people in Indonesia, especially in Bandung. As I focused my study on the Islamic
revivalism among young people, including students from the mid-1970s to early
1990s, I studied the case among the university campuses. During this period
Islamic activities in almost all university campuses began to take shape. Public
and campus mosques were crowded by young people, most of them students.
They came to pray (sholat), attend public sermons (pengajian) and take part other
activities. This was followed by the ‘veil (kerudung or jilbab) movement’. Female
university students and later senior high school students started to wear head
cover.
In Bandung, Salman Mosque at the ITB (Bandung Institute of Technology)15 was
the first Islamic institution in which Islamic activities for young people were
held in a proper organisation. That Salman Mosque with its Karisma organisation
was the most influential Islamic institution in the Islamic youth resurgence
movement in Bandung and in Indonesia, was reported by V.S. Naipaul who
visited Bandung in the late 1970s. Naipaul observed that Bandung is “one of
centres of the Islamic revival in Indonesia” (1981:338). Thousands of young
people from Jakarta, Bogor and other cities in Indonesia came to attend a short
Islamic course, which he called ‘mental training’, at Salman Mosque at The
Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB, Institut Teknologi Bandung). The course
was given by Imaduddin, an electrical engineer, a lecturer at the institute, who
hadalso graduated from the ITB. Imaduddin is one of the most important figures
involved in the establishment of the Salman Mosque, and in general in the
emergence of Islamic youth resurgent movementin Bandung.
His full name was Muhammad Imaduddin Abdulrahim. Among young people,
he was called Bang Imad.16 He was born in 1931 to a devout Muslim family in
14 Sunni or Ahl al-Sunna (People of the Sunna) refers to those Muslims who uphold customs based on
the practice and authority of the Prophet and his companions, as distinct from Shi'a (‘the party’ of Ali)
which comprising those Muslim who uphold the rights of ‘Ali and his descendants to leadership of the
Ummah.
15 ITB is one of the most, prestigious tertiary institution in Indonesia, having produced many national
leaders, including Soekarno, the first president.
16 Bang is an intimate name, meaning big brother. Usually used in Jakartaand some other regions in
Sumatra.
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Medan, North Sumatra. His mother was from a noble family of the Riau Sultanate.
Because of his mother's position, he could enter the Dutch School, HIS
(Hollandsch Inlandische School) which only recruited children from noble and
aristocrat families (Ulumul Qur'an 2:5:94). His father was a religious teacher, who
graduated from Al-Azhar Islamic University, Cairo, Egypt. He was one of the
teachers of a famous religious school (madrasah) run by the sultanate in the
Dutch time. At this school, he was also one of the principals (Naipaul 1981:345).
In the political sphere, Imaduddin's father was one of the leaders of Masyumi,
representing his region, North Sumatra. Moreover, in the Council of the Muslim
Clergy he had the highest position, as a qadi (Muslim judge) (Naipaul 1981:347
and Ulumul Qur'an, 2:5:94).
During the revolution against the Dutch, Imaduddin was involved in the Muslim
Army Hizbullah.17 At the age of fifteen, in 1946, he was trained as a guerilla
fighter, and he received a star and a stripe as a first sergeant. In 1953, he finished
his high school with the highest mark. While he was a student in Medan, he
was one of the leaders of thestudents in his school. After finishing high school
he continued his study in ITB. His ideal of becoming an electrical engineer was
deeply influenced by Dr. Hatta's speech on his visit to the largest waterfall close
to Medan. In his speech Hatta, who was then the vice president, stressed the
importance of electricity (Naipaul 1981:346).
In 1953 he found Bandung and especially ITB a secular place. He found it difficult
to find any mosque around the institute. The closest mosque was about three
kilometres away. Before 1957, when Sukarno threw the Dutch out, almost all
lecturers and professors in the institute were Dutch, and most of the lectures
were presented in English. On his first Friday, Imaduddin was shocked by the
fact that some classes took place during prayer time. Since he was brought up
in a strict Muslim family, absence from Friday prayer in the mosque was quite
a mental shock for Imaduddin. He asked permission to go to the mosque. The
lecturer allowed him and his three friends to go. He went tothe mosque but he
missed the lecture. This happened every Friday. He felt that the campus was
dry ofreligious activities.18 He became inspired by the idea of having a mosque
close to the campus (Naipaul 1981:347)
17 It means the party of Allah, a military unit for the Muslim youth, established by the Japanese at the
end of 1944. Ulamas and Muslim leaders also established Sabilillah (the way of Allah) which acted as
the main body and protector for Hizbullah. From the Japanese point of view, it was a strategy to defeat
the alliesu, and a realisation of Nippon's Islamic Grass roots Policy (Benda 1958:134). In addition, the
Japanese realised that the ulamas and the Islamic leaders were not only formal leaders but also very
influential figures in the Muslim community (Ma' arif 1985:99).
18 Interview with Imaduddin. A similar feeling was also experienced by Mursalin Dahlan. According
to Mursalin Dahlan, the campus environment with all its aspects made him thirsty for religious situations,
which he was used to. This was because at that period, between 1950s and 1960s, one's religion was
always identified as a political alliance. As a result of this, people, especially Muslims who performed
prayer five times a day, were unwilling to show their ritual performances. Furthermore, in the ITB at
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When he entered the ITB he became involved in HMI (Islamic Student
Association). In1954 he was appointed as a head of education and preaching
(dakwah) of the HMI Bandung region. This position forced him to organise
various training activities for members of the organisation. His experience in
managing training activities later inspired him to hold similar activities in Salman
Mosque.
One year after he finished his study in 1961, he became a lecturer in the Institute.
Later, beside teaching his discipline, ie. electrical engineering, he also taught
the Religion of Islam.19 In 1963 he was involved in the committee for the
development of the Salman mosque, in which he served as deputy chairman.
He also held Islamic discussions and pengajian (religous lecture). Gradually, his
preachings attracted audiences who not only came from among the ITB students
but also young people and students from surrounding areas. In the same year,
ITB sent him to the United States to get his masters' degree. He studied there for
three years at Iowa State University.
After finishing his study in 1965, he was asked to return to Indonesia to teach
again at the ITB as some of the lecturers had been involved in 30 th September
Communist movement (G30 S PKI) and were dismissed. On his return to
Indonesia, HMI held a National Congress in Solo. Knowing that Imaduddin had
returned, the congress nominated him as the head of Preaching Institution of
Islamic Students (LDMI,Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam). Through this
position he met Nurcholish Madjid (now a celebrated Indonesian Muslim
intellectual), Abdul Latief (now the Minister of Employment) and Mar'ie
Muhammad (now the Finance Minister). From that timehe regularly held training
activities for university students, which he called LKD (Latihan Kader Dakwah,
Preaching Cadre Training) and later changed into LMD (Latihan Manajemen
Dakwah, Preaching Management Training).
In 1970, the Malaysian Minister of Education came to ITB Bandung and with
his group joined Friday prayer. Imaduddin was, at that time, the imam and the
khatib. Interested in Imaduddin' s methods of Islamic education, the minister
asked him to come to Malaysia to encourage Islamic resurgence, as Imaduddin
had done in Indonesia.20 He happily agreed to the request, and in 1971 he went
to Malaysia as a lecturer from the ITB, under the auspices of the Indonesian
Ministry of Education (Imaduddin 1990:xvi–vii).
that time only very few of students and academic staffs came from santri (more a committed Muslim)
background.
19 According to Mursalin Dahlan, religion subjects, especially Islam, had never been taught in the
Institute until1962. Nowadays, all religions are taught in all universities, and all students are free to
choose any religions they want to studythe establishment of University of Technology Malaysia (UTM).
20 According to Naipaul, when Imaduddin was at Cornell University he met a Malaysian, through whom
in 1971 he went to Malaysia to help
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The first thing he did in Malaysia was to propose that Islamic subjects be included
in the university curriculum, as had been done in Indonesia in 1962. While he
was teaching at the University of Technology Malaysia (UTM) in Kuala Lumpur,
he also conducted religious talks for selected groups of Malay students, whom
he felt had leadership qualities, at different campuses in Kuala Lumpur. Students
regarded him as a powerful and convincing orator who could awaken awareness
in his audiences of their wrongdoing. According to Shukran Jamel Zaini, a
dakwah leader, “[Imaduddin] made us realise the gravity of our wrongdoing
and that we could not carry out a dichotomous life when we believe that Islam
is a complete way of life” (Anwar 1987:20).
In the middle of 1972, because of student enthusiasm for his teaching, he
proposed a special Islamic course, organised during the semester holidays. The
course lasted about four days and five nights, and was held in a surau.21 The
participants were limited to 40 students, and they had to pass an interview.
Through this interview Imaduddin tried to select students who were not only
clever but also had leadership talent. It was expected that after the course they
would become the pioneers of the dakwah movement on university campuses.
The course ended with tahajud (anoptional midnight prayer) and bai'ah (oath)22
together before dawn (subuh). Imaduddin named this course LKD (Latihan Kader
Dakwah, Preacher Cadre Training (Imaduddin 1990:xix–xx).
At UTM, he developed a core group of about 100 followers, many of whom later
went to Britainto study and continued their dakwah activities. When they came
back to Malaysia, with more committed zeal for Islam, they taught at various
universities and other institutions in Malaysia (Anwar 1987:21). Their dakwah
movement became much bigger and stronger, especially when they had higher
positions in the places where they worked. One of the students trained by
Imaduddin was Anwar Ibrahim, who now is a leader of UMNO (United Malays
National Organisation) party and Deputy Prime Minister.
The link with an Indonesian Muslim activist was as an important impetus to
Islamic resurgence in Malaysia. This link in fact was started when HMI
(Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, Muslim Students' Association) helped
ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia)
and PKPIM (Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar-Pelajar Islam Malaysia, National
Association of Muslim Students Malaysia) to organise several Islamic training
trips to Jakarta and Bandung. The HMI leaders helped ABIMto formulate ideas
21 Surau is a prayer house, communal building suitable for any prayers except Friday prayer.
22 The meaning of Bai'ah here is very different from the bai'ah in the period of the Prophet or bai'ah in
the Sufi Orders. In the above case, the participants only say a prayer or even only read a poem, which
is led by an instructor. The word ‘bai'ah’in fact has very broad meanings. It derives from ba'a which
mean to sell. Baya'a, to make the bay'a, in Arabic grammar called musyarakah, mutual, in which two
parties are bond together by rights and obligations. Therefore, the above case, according to Jalaluddin
Rakhmat, is not bai'ah.
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and arguments against the Nationalist and Socialist forces in their universities
and in the government (Anwar 1987:18–19).
Imaduddin stayed in Malaysia until he was ‘returned’ (dikembalikan) to Indonesia
in September 1973. In his view, the Malaysian authorities expelled him because
of his critical attitude. When he first came to Malaysia, he was actually shocked
by the act of a mufti (religious high judge) who kissed the hand of the Sultan.
Finally, in the middle of July 1973 Imaduddin was invited to be a key note
speaker at a big public sermon (tabligh akbar). In this sermon he criticised the
hypocritical attitude of some leaders who were known as drunkards but regarded
students who used drugs as criminal (Imaduddin 1990:xxiii).
His visit to Malaysia increased his interest in the international Muslim movement.
He then visited Libya, England and Pakistan. Because of his wide connections
and his position in the Islamic Student Association (HMI) as the head of the
Islamic Student Preaching Institution (Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam,
LDMI) he was nominated to be a secretary of the International Islamic Federation
of Student Organisations (IIFSO) (Naipaul 1981:349 and Aziz 1989:217). In the
name of this organisation, he held or sponsored LMD (Latihan Manajemen
Dakwah) type of training in many Islamic organisations in Australia, Korea,
Hongkong and Europe (Ulumul Qur'an 2:5:94). This organisation linked him
more closely to the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin)
movement, which was established by Hasan Al-Banna in Egypt. He also gained
contact with other Islamic movements such as Jami'at Islami founded by Abul
A'la Maududi in Pakistan. It is not surprising that his view of Islam was deeply
influenced by these movements.
In 1974, a year after he returned from Malaysia, he held LMD (Latihan
Manajement Dakwah) training in Salman Mosque of ITB, but with a small change,
ie. from Latihan Managemen Dakwah into Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (Dakwah
Warrior Training).23 At this time he was no longer the head of Islamic Student
Preaching Institution (LDMI) of the HMI, because after the 10th HMI congress
in Palembang in 1971, the LDMI was removed from the HMI structure (HMI
1972), and Imaduddin no longer held a central position in the institution (Aziz
1989:218).
Latihan Mujahid Dakwah training activity was the embryo of the development
of Islamic intensification groups in Salman Mosque of ITB and in the Bandung
area which have continued until now. The LMD was originally aimed to create
a breakthrough in the development of Islam, especially in the ITB. It formed
cadres of Islamic preachers who became pioneers of the development of Islam.
23 According to Imaduddin, his idea to hold such activities was inspired by the book Mujahid Dakwah
(Dakwah Warrior) written by Isa Anshary, an important Masyumi and PERSIS figurein Bandung.
Imaduddin further explains, his experience while he was in America, especially when he attended
missionary training, was also infuential (Ulumul Qur'an 2:5:94).
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To achieve this, at least three aspects were stressed: basic knowledge of Islam,
implantation of the spirit of struggle, and commitment to the group. The first
aspect was related to the basic information (and some misconceptions) about
Islam and its teachings. Problems faced by Muslim Ummat were introduced and
discussed to develop participants' awareness and responsibility. Moreover, it
encouraged participants to struggle for Islam. The training, which lasted one or
two weeks continuously, was ended with a  bai'at, an oath as an inauguration.
With the bai'at, the collective determination of theparticipants to spread the
mission was strengthened.
Since LMD was considered as training to form preacher cadres, all participants
had to pass through a selection in the form of an interview. The selection was
based on participants' Islamic knowledge, personality, motivation, aims and
their attitude towards the program. Moreover, theintellectual potential of the
participants, specifically shown by the cumulative marks of the students (Indeks
Prestasi, IP), was considered. For the ITB students, for example, the minimal IP
was 2.75. Therefore the aim of the training, i. e. to form cadres withthe qualities
of faith and morals, combined with scientific and intellectual abilities was clear
in the first stage of training (Aziz 1989:268–9).
In 1979 the name of the training program was changed to Intensive Islamic Study
(SII). On the one hand, this can be seen as a broadening of the program, in terms
of target and time. On the other hand, this was the only way to keep the training
going in the face of external pressure. According to Imaduddin, there were
hostile feelings, especially from military authorities, with regardto the word
‘mujahid,’ in Latihan Mujahid Dakwah.24 This is because the word Interview
with Imaduddin, 8 March 1994. ‘mujahid,’ which means warrior, fighter and
one who fights in a holy war, has a rebellious connotation (like Komando Jihad
rebellion) and often implies the idea of an Islamic state (Darul Islam, DI). In 1978
he was accused of being anti- Pancasila, anti- Christian and not being nationalist,
and because of these accusations he was detained for14 months.25 Afterthis
detention he was not allowed to teach at the ITB, and in 1980 he went to America
to continue his study for a PhD degree. In 1986 he returned to Indonesia, but
he could not go back to the ITB because he had been fired by his dean (Ulumul
Qur'an 2:5:94).
In Imaduddin' s view for the umpteenth time he became a victim of corrupt
leaders and a bad system. Indonesia for Imaduddin was a place to be cleansed,
and it was full of injustice and therefore un-Islamic. The ideal for him was an
Islamic state, as it was practiced in the era of the Prophet and his four Caliphates.
24 Interview with Imaduddin, 8 March 1994.
25 According to Imaduddin, he was arrested only because of the BAIS (Badan Intelejen dan Strategis,
Intellegence and Strategic Bureau) action which controlled by Benni Murdani and his groups. For
Imaduddin, BAIS was not Badan Intelejen dan Strategis but ‘Badan Anti Islam’ (Anti-Islam Bureau).’
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However, for Imaduddin, the Indonesian constitution had some Islamic values
in it. ‘What we need now is the people behind the structure. They must be true
Muslims'. He believed that what was needed now was a true Muslim leader,
‘who lived according to the Quran, … who could stand in for the Prophet, …
who knew the Prophet’ s deeds so well that he would order affairs as the Prophet
himself might have ordered them’ (Naipaul 1981:350–2). For this reason,
Imaduddin was concerned with Islamic education for youngsters.
During his second time in America, he often met and discussed issues with
Muslim intellectuals, such as Nurcholis Madjid, Amin Rais and Syafi'i Ma'arif,
who also studied in America. From these discussions emerged an idea to unite
Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia. On his return he tried to promote his idea
through various activities but always failed. However, in1990 his idea became
a reality when a symposium of Muslim intellectuals was held in the Brawijaya
University Malang, from which Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association
(ICMI, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia) was born.
From Imaduddin's individual background emerge four important issues. First,
Imaduddinisan example of those who came from strong Islamic circles in rural
areas and then moved to a city, in which modernisation and Western (Dutch)
institutions clearly existed. Living in the Westernised and secularised milieu of
the ITB (at the time when most of its lecturers were European) he missedthe
‘religious’ environment he was used to. Second, Imaduddin's critical view of the
social and political situation led him to pseudo-political opposition to a
suppressiveand strict political system. Through various small group forums and
Islamic training among the university students, Imaduddin spread his political
perceptions and at the same time his theological and Islamic ideas, which often
supported one another. These discussion groups and training institutions later
provided a shelter for various students movements banned in 1979. Furthermore,
these institutions became a center of Muslim student activists who were not
satisfied with established Islamic student organisations. Such a tendency emerged,
I believe, because student movements and Islamic youth movements have
something in common, namely their social and political criticism of the existing
regime. Third, it is clear that Imaduddin's Islamic and political ideas were
influenced by various Islamic movements throughout the world such as
Ikhwanal-Muslimin (Muslim Brethren) in Egypt and Jamaat-i-Islami (Islamic
society) in Pakistan. His meeting in international Islamic forums led him to know
more about other Islamic movements and other political and Islamic ideas.
Furthermore, Imaduddin was deeply involved in the early emergence of the
Islamic youth resurgence movement in Malaysia, when he helped the foundation
of ABIM (Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia). Finally, without neglecting
the roles of other figures or institutions, Imaduddin was a charismatic figure, a
convincing radical and a brave person (cf. Anwar 1987:19–27) who played a
29
The Foundation of the Movement
significant role in the early emergence of Islamic youth resurgence movement
in Bandung, and perhaps in Indonesia.
In conclusion, this analysis has focused on the factors contributing to religious
resurgenceespecially among young people. First, there is social dissatisfaction
and frustration -notonly in terms of social, economic and political subordination
but also in terms of spiritual or religious deprivation- experienced by some part
of society. This dissatisfaction is an accumulation of a long period of unfulfilled
expectation. Second, this social dissatisfaction is initially experienced only by
a few individual members of society, by whom the idea of dissatisfaction is
spread to the wider part of the society. Very few of these individual members
are charismatic26 figures who are able to convince and spread the idea to other
people. Third, the nature of youth which is radical, critical and rebellious toward
the status quo became a significant factor for the early emergence of the
movement. Finally, there are some events or issues which triggered the initial
emergence of the movement. These events do not occur only at local or national
level but also at the international level.
26 Borrowing Weber's definition of charisma, it refers to “a certain quality of an individual personality
by virtue of which [one] is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural,
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible
to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them
the individual concerned is treated as a leader” (1947:358–9). This definition does not mean that
Imaduddin or other founders had superhuman quality or had miraculous or magical ability. Instead,
by charisma here I refer to a personality characteristicwhich is regarded as extraordinary. Those who
posses it are thought and regarded by their followers to have extraordinary qualities which cannot be
acquired by ordinary persons (Gerth 1969:258).
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Chapter 3: The Development of the
Movement
3.1 Introduction
“Religion is like a nail. The harder you hit it, the deeper it goes into the
wood” (Emerson, 1981:159).
The second stage, the focus of this chapter, is the development of the Islamic
resurgence movement among young people. The important feature of this period
is the spread of Islamic resurgence ideas through communication and evangelism,
either by persuasive individuals, or through various sorts of mass gatherings.
To assist an understanding of this process, I attend to two aspects of the
development: the organisations through which the movement developed, focusing
on public mosques, campus Islamic preaching organisations, and Islamic
movements; and the social phenomena which challenged or accelerated the
development of the movement during the 1980s.
3.2 Three Channels: Campus Islamic Preaching
Organisations, Public Mosques, and Underground
Movements
In the early 1980s, as reported by Panji Masyarakat,1 youngsters all over the
country became much more familiar with mosques. This was a new phenomenon.
Mosques were crowded by young people, especially during the month of
Ramadan. They spent much of their time in mosques. They came to mosques
not only to pray tarawih (an optional night prayer during Ramadan) and subuh
(morning prayer) but also to attend religious sermons, scientific discussions
(diskusi ilmiah), recitation of the Qur'an and to attend other activities held during
the day. Such phenomena could be seen in large and small public mosques in
most big cities of Indonesia. It was estimated that approximately 2,000 mosques
conducted such activities. Young Muslims active in these mosques began to form
mosque organisations for young people (Ikatan Remaja Mesjid and Pemuda
Mesjid).
University and school mosques were different from public mosques. In terms
of organisational structure, they were, directly or indirectly, attached to the
universities or schools where they were located. Therefore the chiefs of the
mosques could only be university staff or students, whereas in public mosques
there was no such requirement. Moreover, on some campuses, religious activities
were closely related to Islamic religion courses and were compulsory course
components. The activities were specifically aimed at students and academic
1 An Indonesian Islamic fortnightly magazine; 11 July 1982.
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staff. Later, however, because university mosques offered various interesting
activities, they were also attended by people from surrounding areas. Later these
Islamic organisations within university campuses became known as Lembaga
Dakwah Kampus (LDK, Campus Islamic Preaching Organisation)
Similar activities were also conducted by various Islamic groups known as
harakah (‘movement’).2 These harakah differed from others by conducting their
activities secretly. These Islamic groups usually held their activities in their
members' premises; for example, in homes, halls, and sports stadiums. Sometimes
they used mosques, schools or other places, as organised by their members. Like
other Islamic organisations, they held sermons (pengajian), small group discussions
(usrah), short training courses and other activities. Those activities could only
be attended by members who had completed certain training. Membership
recruitment in these groups was achieved through personal approaches. They
were also different from other Islamic organisations such as Muhammadiyah or
HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Islamic Student Association) in a sense that
they were not formally approved by the government, and they were not attached
to other Islamic organisations.
In Bandung and generally in Indonesia, these three types of organisations -public
mosques, campus preaching organisation and Islamic groups- played an important
role as channels through which Islamic revivalism among young people
developed. Representative of the first type are two of the most prominent public
mosques in Bandung, ie. Istiqamah and Mujahidin mosque.3 The second type,
ie. the Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK), is represented by three important campus
mosques: Salman Mosque of ITB (Bandung Institute of Technology), Padjadjaran
University (UNPAD) mosque, and Al-Furqan mosque of Bandung Teaching and
Education Institute (IKIP, Institut Keguruan Ilmu Pendidikan). The third type
is illustrated by Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengembangan Pesantren Kilat (LP3K,
Research and Development Organisation of Islamic Education Short Course),
which was also known as the Pesantren Kilat Movement, and Young Darul Islam
(DI Muda).4 There are other groups besides these. However, because of their
exclusiveness, I was able to collect only general information about them. In the
following section I describe the main types of organisations in turn, starting
with university mosques, followed by public mosques and harakah.
2 The word ‘harakah’, came from Arabic harakat al-Islamiyah, meaning ‘Islamic movement’.
3 In Bandung, there are more than a hundred large public mosques (Masjid Jami and Masjid Raya),
which are usually used for Jum'at prayer. However, only a few of them are used as centres for young
Islamic activists. The functioning of these two mosques, I believe, provides an understanding of the
role of public mosques in the development of the Islamic revivalist movement among young people.
Moreover, due to practical limitations, I focused my oberservation only on these mosques.
4 Darul Islam was an Indonesian Muslim rebellion movement, which aimed at establishing an Indonesian
Islamic State (NII, Negara Islam Indonesia). Dar al-Islam, an Arabic word means Islamic house and
family, and lands or territories under Islamic rule, as opposite of Dar al-Harb, the non-Muslim state,
lands in which Islamic rules do not prevail.
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3.2.1. a. Salman's Inspiration
The need for a mosque on the ITB campus emerged in 1950s, when academic
staff and students who came from santri families began to feel that their campus
did not provide for spiritual values, especially Islamic values. The need became
much greater as the number of Muslim students with strong Islamic backgrounds
increased every year. A committee was formed in 1960 to produce a mosque
development plan. In 1960, Sukarno approved the plan, and he even named the
proposed mosque ‘Salman’, the name of a Muslim technocrat in the Prophet's
era. Three years later, building of the mosque commenced, and Salman Mosque
was first used in 1972. In 1965 the management of the mosque was delegated to
Yayasan Pembina Mesjid Salman (YPM Salman, Salman Mosque Development
Foundation). Although this mosque is independently managed by the YPM
Salman, almost all of the board are academic staff of the ITB.
The Salman Mosque is located on the north side of Bandung. It is quite different
from other mosques in Bandung. The architecture of the mosque is unique, its
roof being flat, without a dome. The walls on the three sides and the floor are
made of wood, and this gives a shaded (teduh) impression. This impression is
even stronger at night, the arrangement of lamps giving a soft lighting effect.
There is a bright lamp only at the mihrab (the niche or chamber) located at the
very front of the main praying room where the imam (leader) leads the prayers
and khatib (preacher) gives speeches. The first floor is the main prayer room for
women. Close to the mosque, there are toilets, a hall, the YPM Salman office, a
student dormitory, a clinic, printing room, library, canteen, the Kharisma office,
and the PAS office. Behind the mosque is Ganesa Park, which is always used for
Karisma and PAS (Pendidikan Anak-anak Salman, Salman's Children's Education
of) activities.
The popularity of Salman Mosque increased rapidly after 1974, when it was
comanaged by “Sadali who is calm and Imaduddin who is furious” (Tempo,
13:5:1989). Among other things, what attracted young people to this mosque
was the Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (LMD, Preacher Training), which was
developed and engineered by Imaduddin. LMD was a type of Islamic training
in which university students were trained for about seven days without contact
with the outside world. During this training, students learned some basic
teachings of Islam, such as the source of Islamic values, Qur'an and Sunnah
(Tradition of the Prophet), and the Islamic faith (Aqidah Islam). Attracted to this
kind of training, students from various universities in Bandung, Jakarta,
Yogyakarta, Medan and other areas, came to the Salman Mosque. When they
returned to their universities, they began to develop Islamic activities in their
own universities. Not surprisingly, two or three years later (1976–77) Islamic
activities mushroomed on university campuses throughout Java. In IPB (Bogor
Institute of Agriculture), Islamic activities developed through the Islamic
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Spirituality Bureau (Badan Kerohanian Islam, BKI). At the University of Indonesia
(UI) Jakarta, the Arief Rahman Hakim Mosque was a centre of Islamic activities.
In Gajah Mada University Yogyakarta, Islamic activities also developed through
Jama'ah Shalahuddin.5 Similar phenomena also spread widely in Surabaya and
other cities outside Java.
 In 1979, LMD was expanded and renamed Islamic Intensive Study (Studi Islam
Intensif, SII). This change, according to Imaduddin,6 was because of government
pressure, which in turn resulted in the stagnation of the LMD program. In
addition, it was also an attempt to widen the program in terms of aims and time
period (Aziz and Thokhah 1989:265). LMD was available only to university
students. There was no opportunity for high school and junior high school
students to attend such training. The birth of the SII program offered similar
activities to school students. Other than training programs, Islamic activities for
adolescents were held from 1976, although initially they were not well organised.
Since September 1980, adolescent Islamic activities have been organised properly
and given the name Program Pembinaan Remaja (Youth Education Program). Its
activities included mentoring, Bimbingan Test (a preparation test before entering
university), theatre, a singing group and other activities. A year later in 1981,
the Program Pembinaan Remaja was renamed Keluarga Remaja Islam Salman
(Salman Mosque Youth Association) or Karisma, the name which is still used.
One of the most important activities of Karisma is “mentoring”, an obligatory
activity for all participants. When it was first introduced, it was a unique form
of Islamic education. Mentoring sessions involve groups of eight to fifteen
students discussing a ‘package’ of Islamic subjects. The main mentoring activity
is held every Sunday morning at six a.m, and lasts for two hours. It takes place
inside a mosque and its surrounding areas. The session always begins with a
recitation from the Qur'an and its Indonesian translation, followed by a short
speech given by the mentor as an introduction to discussion. The members then
discuss the planned topic. During the discussion, participants not only ask about
religious matters, but also discuss personal and family problems. Most of the
participants want Islamic solutions to the problems they face. During the
mentoring program, a bond among the members themselves, and among members
and the mentor, develops. They are encouraged to visit each other, and to get
to know each other better. To achieve this, every month they hold an excursion,
picnic, bush walking or some other relaxation activities.
The discussion is led by a mentor, who is also a resource person. To be a mentor,
one should be a university student (not only set aside for ITB students), pass an
interview and have attended mentor training. This opportunity attracted many
5 Jama'ah, an Arabic meaning group or community. Shalahuddin (Saladin), a Muslim leader during the
Crusades.
6 Interview with Imaduddin 8 March 1994
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students from various universities in the area of Bandung. From 1978 the number
of participants and mentors increased gradually and reached a peak in 1985–86,
when it was reported that there were 300 mentors (Anggota Pembina) from 25
universities in Bandung. Most of them (35%) were ITB students, followed by
UNPAD (15%), IAIN (11%), IKIP (8%) and the remaining 25% from 20 other
universities in Bandung. In the same year it was also reported that there were
about 2,700 participants or ordinary members (Anggota Biasa). In terms of level
of education, approximately 23% were university students, 57% Senior High
School (SMA) students, and 20% Junior High School (SMP) students. Most
university and school students involved in Karisma activities were usually
involved or later became involved in Islamic activities on their campuses. In this
way Islamic activities spread widely through university and school campuses
throughout Bandung.
The mentoring program is divided into several groups based on age and level
of education. “A” group, divided into four levels, is the first level of education
for basic Islamic teachings. Included in this group are young people, fourteen
years of age or junior high school students (SMP, Sekolah Menengah Pertama).
In this group, the topics of discussion stress moral (akhlaq) education and basic
rituals, such as prayer (shalat), religious alms (zakat), fasting (puasa) and
pilgrimage (haji). Students learn about the meanings and functions of rituals, to
recite prayer (bacaan dan do'a-doa dalam shalat) and the detailed rules for many
rituals (ibadah). The akhlaq education portrays some ideal Islamic personages,
for example the Prophet and his companions. Students, at this stage, learn proper
Islamic behaviour toward God (Allah), people and other creatures. The aim of
this stage is to lay a basic foundation for the development of Muslim personality.
Senior high school and university students complete a further six stages: I and
II B, III and IV C, V D and VI E. Each stage lasts one semester, or twenty-seven
weeks, and within three years a participant can complete all of them. During
these stages students begin to learn Islamic teachings in more depth. The package
of Islamic subjects consists of fourteen main themes, including ‘Toward
Understanding Islam’, ‘Qur'an as the Guide for Life’, ‘Islam and Sunnatullah
(Law of Nature)’, ‘Sunnah’ (example of the Prophet Muhammad) and ‘Tjtihad’,7
‘Tawhid’, ‘Muslim Personality’, ‘Islamic Leadership’, ‘Islamic Society’, ‘Islamic
Family’, ‘Long Life Education’, ‘Man’ (Manusia), ‘Dakwah’ (Islamic Preaching),
and ‘Trace of The Prophet’. Material on these fourteen themes is published in
the form of small guide books distributed to all mentoring participants a week
beforehand.
7 A term used in Islamic jurisprudence to designate the process of arriving at new judgments in a rule
of law in a particular case by drawing conclusions from basic sources of Islam, ie. Qur'an and hadits, as
opposed to acceptance of tradition
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Besides the main activity of mentoring, participants are also involved in some
“supporter” (pendukung) activities, usually held on days other than Sunday. One
of the most important programs is the Bimbingan Test, a preparation course to
enter top state universities.8 Compared to other organisations that offer similar
courses, Karisma is considered superior. Its instructors are usually ITB and
UNPAD students and graduates, who are regarded as superior to other students
and graduates. The cost of the course is lower than similar courses offered by
other organisations. Course participants are required to be members of Karisma
and to attend the mentoring program. Parents often prefer their children to
attend the Bimbingan Test in Salman rather than elsewhere because they believe
that besides acquiring general knowledge, their children also learn about Islam.
This course attracts many high school students from Bandung and surrounding
areas. At first students are only interested in attending the Bimbingan Test, but
through mentoring gradually they also become attracted to Islam.
Additionally, Karisma often organises other activities to coincide with the Islamic
calender, one of the most important being the fasting month Ramadan. A special
committee, ie. Panitia Pelaksana Program Ramadhan (P3R, Ramadan Program
Organiser Committee) is formed to plan the glorification of the Holy month with
various activities. The committee offers various activities, such as tarawih and
subuh sermons, distributing zakat fithrah, an Islamic book fair, various courses
and trainings, breaking fast (buka puasa bersama) with the poor, panel discussions
and an art appreciation night. These activities try to accommodate most age
groups. These programs also aim to attract other people to come to the mosque,
and in turn to become involved in Salman mosque activities or generally in
Islamic activities.
As well as the Ramadhan activities there are many activities organised for
different age groups. Activities for school and university students are organised
by Karisma; for children from primary and secondary schools, Islamic education
activities are organised by PAS (Pembinaan Anak-anak Salman, Salman Children's
Education); Islamic activities among women (ibu-ibu) are included in KKR (Kursus
Kesejahteraan Keluarga, Family Welfare Course); and for the general public there
are Sunday morning sermons (Kuliah Dluha). In fact, all these activities are
usually held on Sunday. Mentoring and PAS activities are held on Sunday
morning, starting from 6:00 a.m. Sunday morning sermons are usually held from
8:00 to 10:00. KKR activities are usually held in the afternoon. Every Sunday
8 Completing this course was often regarded as one of the ways to pass the “University Entrance Exam”
(Ujian Masuk Perguruan Tinggi, UMPTN). Today, when competition to enter higher education has
become harder, more and more students are attracted to such courses, although they are quite expensive.
Instructors are usually students or graduates of some top universities in Indonesia. The subjects studied
in this course are divided into two major areas: mathematics and natural sciences (Ilmu Pengetahuan
Alam, IPA), such as physics, mathematics, biology, chemistry and social sciences (Ilmu Pengetahuan
Social, IPS), such as accounting, geography and economics.
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Salman Mosque is always crowded by children, adolescents and adults, especially
in the morning.
Since its establishment, Salman Mosque has been a model for other Islamic
organisations on many university campuses throughout Java and even outside
Java. A lecturer of the University of Indonesia told me that in the early 1980s
he was part of a group delegated to attend the Islamic course in Salman.9 Upon
their return they applied what they learned at Salman, and became much more
involved in Islamic activities on their campus. The mentoring system, which
proved effective in Islamic education, has been followed by other Islamic
organisations, although they use different names for the approach. The
curriculum of Karisma was also used by other organisations. A lecturer of IKIP
Surabaya, who was also an organiser of Islamic activities in his campus and for
a big Islamic organisation in Surabaya, Al-Falah Foundation (Yayasan Al-Falah),
explained that the Karisma curriculum forms the Islamic education curriculum
on his campus. Similar information was also given by a lecturer at the Andalas
University Padang. A group of mosque activists was asked to attend Islamic
training at Salman Mosque, and soon after they returned, they applied what
they learned.10 Some Islamic youth organisations from outside Bandung came
to Salman to study the Karisma organisational system for managing Islamic
activities for young people.
In Bandung, the influence of Salman, and especially Karisma, on other Islamic
organisations, both public and university, has been significant. Some university
students involved in Salman activities such as LMD and SII training, or in the
mentoring program either as participants or as mentors became pioneers of
Islamic activities on their university campuses or in their communities. Bambang
Pranggono and Toto Tasmara, for example, after their involvement in Salman
LMD training later developed Islamic activities at Istiqamah Mosque. Another
example is Fahmi, who was involved in Karisma mentoring activities since he
was a senior high school student. When he was a student of UNPAD he became
a mentor in Karisma, and he was also involved in Islamic activities at UNPAD
mosque. Now he is a lecturer at the same university and was nominated as a
chief of UNPAD's mosque organisation.
One of the reasons why Karisma became one of the most important campus
preaching organisation is that it was the first on-campus Islamic organisation to
properly organise -in modern style- various Islamic activities for young people.
Moreover, it is supported by a good managerial system and relatively complete
facilities. Another reason is that Karisma is strongly associated with the ITB, one
of the most prestigious higher education institutes in Bandung and even in
9 Interview, 8 August 1994.
10 Interview, 7 September 1994.
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Indonesia. To a certain degree the prestigious image of ITB became a factor which
attracted many young activists to come to the mosque and join Karisma activities.
In the mid-1980s, when there were Islamic activities on almost all large university
campuses in Java, the Islamic preaching organisations at some universities began
to realise that they should unify in order to make the Dakwah movement more
effective. At the time the Islamic Campus Preaching Organisations were moving
in different directions and operating without coordination. Only a few were in
contact with each other. It was felt that if this situation continued, it would
disturb the dakwah movement generally. A meeting of Islamic Campus Preaching
organisations (Sarasehan Lembaga Dakwah di Kampus) was held for the first time
at Gajah Mada University, Jogjakarta.11 Delegations from thirteen top universities
all over Java attended this meeting.
This meeting was followed by another meeting (see Appendix A), and developed
into an annual forum among the university campus preaching organisations.
Every year the number of the participants increased, and the scope of the forum
became much wider. Since the fifth meeting in IKIP (Teaching and Education
Institute) Malang the scope of the forum has been widened to include all of
Indonesia. Participants at the meeting not only have come from campus preaching
organisation on Javanese university campuses but also from other islands in
Indonesia. As well as at this national level, at the regional (province) level such
meetings have also been held every year hosted in turn by various universities
and academies. In 1994 at both national and regional levels the forum was
convened nine times.
Besides unifying various campus preaching organisations throughout Indonesia,
the forum also aimed to establish the Islamic preaching organisation in university
campuses which did not have one. The forum encourages the members to
stimulate and help other universities in their region to establish similar
organisations. This is achieved through mutual visitation among activists
11 Four important agreements emerged from this first meeting: 1) to develop an Islamic brotherhood
(Ukhuwah Islamiyah, Arabic. Persaudaraan Islam, Indonesian) amongst Islamic Organisations on
university campuses, 2) to meet again in Salman Mosque ITB Bandung in 1987, 3) to reach a mutual
understanding among Islamic Organisations on campuses through informal and formal discussion, and
4) to divide the coordination of Islamic preaching organisations on Javanese university campuses
(Lembaga Dakwah Kampus) into three regions. The west, central and east regions were coordinated
respectively by Karisma of ITB, Jama'ah Shalahuddin of Gajah Mada University, and the Activity Unit
of Islamic Spirituality (Unit Kegiatan Kerohanian Islam UKKI BKK) of Air Langga University.
Later, these regions were named Centres of Regional Communication (PUSKOMWIL, Pusat Komunikasi
Wilayah). Each large region was divided into two or three smaller regions, coordinated by the Central
District Communication (PUSKOMDA, Pusat Komunikasi Daerah). The western region, for example,
was divided into two: Jabotabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Tanggerang and Bekasi), and Bandung and east
Priangan (including Karawang, Sukabumi, Bandung, Sumedang, Tasikmalaya, Ciamis and Cirebon).
This division aimed to make easier and more effective communication and coordination amongst
university campuses. Through effective coordination, it was hoped that the established Islamic Campus
Preaching Organisations could encourage and help those universities which did not have Islamic
preaching organisations to develop such organisations.
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(individual or collective) of campus preaching organisations in which they share
experiences with others that do not have one, encourage, stimulate and help
them. Another activity, which became an important element for the development
of the campus preaching organisation, is joint activities among those organisations
both in regional and national level. These joint activities include Leadership and
Management Training, Islamic Teachings Training and Muslim Female Training.
Moreover, the idea to establish Islamic organisations for young people was spread
further to other cities and remote areas by the mudik (back to home area) tradition
of the students. University students, most of whom come from other cities and
remote areas in Java and even other islands, go back to their home area during
most long holidays. For students involved in Islamic activity, this time is used
to form Youth Mosque Associations, or at least an Islamic youth discusion group.
They also try to stimulate Islamic activities generally in the areas where they
live. However, they often face obstacles in older circles, especially in a community
that in ritual aspects is affiliated with NU. The older circles are usually traditional
whereas the younger generation is modernist/reformist (see Appendix B).
3.2.2. b. Public Mosques: Mujahidin and Istiqamah
Students involved in Islamic activities began to realise that their activities
appeared to be exclusively for university students, and did not touch the wider
Muslim community. Consequently, some of them began to extend their activities
to public mosques close to their campuses or homes. This awareness forced
Bambang Pranggono and Toto Tasmara,12 two Salman activists, to build another
base of Islamic activities for young Muslims in Istiqamah Mosque. Later, this
mosque became a centre for young Muslim activists in Bandung to which
students, especially senior high school students, came to learn and discuss Islam.
The mosque was built in 1969 by the Istiqamah Foundation, and it was completed
and opened for use in 1971. Although Istiqamah Mosque is not affiliated to any
Islamic organisation, Istiqamah is regarded as a modernist mosque. This can be
seen from the membership of the Istiqamah Foundation board from 1991 to 1995.
Most members are important figures of Islamic reformist organisations, namely
Muhammadiyah,13 and Persatuan Islam (PERSIS, Islamic Association).14
12 Bambang Pranggono is now a manager of a large real estate firm in Bandung, and is also a preacher.
Toto Tasmara is now an employee of a large company in Jakarta.
13 An Islamic organisation established 18 November 1912 in Kauman Jogjakarta, by Ahmad Dahlan. As
an Islamic reformist movement, Muhammadiyah emphasised its program of (1) purifying Islam from
the incorrect teachings, (2) reformation of Islamic education, (3) reformation of Islamic thought and (4)
defending Islam from Western influence and Christian teachings (Natsir 1972:16). These programs are
implemented in religious, educational and social activities. Besides religious reformation, Muhammadiyah
established various social institutions such as hospitals and orphanages. Muhammadiyah also established
schools and other educational institutions as a response to the establishment of Dutch schools, believed
to be a means of promoting the Christian mission (Poerbakawatja 1970:22).
14 PERSIS is an Islamic mass organisation like Muhammadiyah, which was established in Bandung 12
September 1923. It was a response to the predicament of Indonesian Muslims, who, in the view of this
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Board members include K.H. Hambali Ahmad, a well-known Muhammadiyah
ulama in Bandung, and K.H. Rusyad Nurdin, one of the PERSIS ulama. The
pattern of Islamic thought within this mosque is reformist and modernist, and
because of this, all subjects preached should be in accordance with the above
patterns of Islamic thought, and all the preachers should be those who come
from the modernist or reformist circles.
At each prayer time, many people come to pray (shalat), including high school
students waiting for their classes to begin. During prayer time on Fridays, the
mosque is always crowded, and indeed the mosque cannot always accommodate
them, many of them having to pray outside. During the month of Ramadhan, as
in university mosques, the mosque organises various special activities, such as
religious sermons, Islamic training for school students, Islamic courses for women,
preaching courses, panel discussions and organising alms (zakat). Such activities
are organised by the board of the Istiqamah Foundation. However, the practical
organisers of these activities are usually young activists.
The involvement of young Muslim activists, according to K.H. Rusyad Nurdin,
started with the establishment of the mosque in 1971. At that stage young Muslim
activists had not been included in the organisational structure of the Istiqamah
Foundation. Moreover there were no special activities for young Muslim
activists. They only participated in the general mosque activities. Islamic
activities for young Muslim activists in Istiqamah developed during the
mid-1970s, when a few Salman Mosque activists, most of them ITB students,
began to organise special activities for school students and young Muslim
activists. These started with an informal, small-group discussion program, usually
conducted after Sunday morning sermons. At that time, according to an
informant, such activities had no name. The number of participants gradually
increased, especially among the young. It was at this stage that the idea emerged
among activists to establish a special section within the mosque's organisational
structure to organise Islamic activities for young Muslims.
After Islamic activities for young people were established in this mosque, the
idea emerged to extend such an organisation and its activities to other mosques
in other cities. To achieve this goal, Toto Tasmara proposed an idea to establish
an organisation in which youth organisations of various mosques could assemble.
This goal was achieved in Ramadhan 1976, when delegations from Surabaya,
Yogyakarta, Jakarta and Bandung gathered in Istiqamah Mosque. With the
approval of the Indonesian Council of Religious Clergy (MUI, Majelis Ulama
Indonesia), an organisation called the Communication Body for Mosque Youth
organisation, were trapped into “stagnation (jumud), superstition (Churafat and Tahayyul), heresy
(Bid'ah), polytheism (Syirik), and … Christian Dutch Colonialism”. See Tafsir Qanun Asasi Persatuan
Islam. Panitia Perubahan Qanun Asasi Persatuan Islam. Bandung: Pusat Pimpinan Persatuan Islam,
Muktamar Persatuan Islam VIII, 1967)
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of Indonesia (Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Masjid Indonesia, BKPMI) was
established. The first leader of this organisation was Toto Tasmara. The main
aim of this organisation was to make use of mosques not only for ritual activities,
but also for the quality development of the Islamic community (umat Islam) and
nation (bangsa Indonesia). It was felt that mosques should become a centre for
youth activities in the widest sense. Moreover, mosques, through various
activities, were seen as being able to balance secular influences on the young
generation (BKPMI 1991:1). The popular slogan of this organisation was “Back
to the mosque” (Tempo, 13.5.1989).
To achieve their aims, BKPMI tried to intensify communication, consultation
and synchronisation of mosque youth organisations throughout Indonesia. For
established organisations, BKPMI provided clear directions and aims for the
organisations and their activities. For mosques which did not have such an
organisation, BKPMI assisted and encouraged the younger generations and
mosque boards to establish them. To support these activities, various programs
were introduced, including magazine publications, joint activities amongst
mosque youth organisations, Islamic education and various other courses, and
Al-Quran Kindergarten. Every three years BKPMI held a national meeting to
share experiences to decide on national programs and to choose a new board.
By 1992 such meetings had been held four times. Today, BKPMI has spread to
all provinces of Indonesia.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Islamic activities among youngsters in Istiqamah
developed further. Many more school and university students from the Bandung
area came to this mosque to attend sermons, and to discuss and learn about Islam.
Some informants, who lived about 15 kilometres away from the Istiqamah
Mosque, said that they woke up before dawn so that they could arrive at the
mosque on time and attend the sermon. This was quite extraordinary, because
public mosques are usually attended by the community in which the mosque is
located. The attractiveness of Istiqamah Mosque was, perhaps, influenced by
the emergence of the Jama'ah Imran (Imran Group),15 which made Istiqamah
Mosque a centre of its activities.
 Jama'ah Imran attracted young Muslim activists for several reasons. The
appearance of its leader, Imran, who was dynamic, radical and attractive, and
his preachings, which were critical, were important factors in the recruitment
15 The Jama'ah Imran movement was an Islamic movement lead by Imran Muhammad Zein, who had
previously been unemployed, stubborn, fond of gambling, drunk and fighting. Because of this, he had
been in jail, although for a short time. Furthermore, his father had said “I cannot stand it anymore. You
or I should leave Medan”. Imran replied, “Let me go”. Not long after this, in 1972, he went to Saudi
Arabia. His real motivation was not clear; whether he wanted to confess or to look for a job. Imran
admitted that “In Saudi Arabia he found what he was looking for in Islam, safety and happiness”. With
his young Indonesian friends, Imran planned that when they returned to Indonesia, they would establish
an Islamic group (Jama'ah) which would apply Islam as revealed in the Qur'an and Sunnah (Tradition
of the Prophet) (Any 1982:21).
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process of this movement. From his preaching held every Sunday morning, it
was clear that he rejected Pancasila as being superior to Islam. Such an idea at
that time in government eyes was a considerable offense. Later Imran also
criticised Indonesian Islamic figures, such as Natsir, Hamka, Idham Khalid and
E.Z. Muttaqin, who were respectively the leader of Masyumi, the leader of
Indonesian Muslim Clergy Assembly (MUI, Majlis Ulama Indonesia), the leader
of Nahdlatul Ulama and the leader of West Java region MUI, for not struggling
(berjuang) for Islam. They, in Imran's view, only struggled for “their stomach”
(Any 1982:16). Such ideas, of course, provoked conflict not only within the
Istiqamah circle but also in the wider Muslim community. Opposition to this
movement became even clearer when it became involved in terrorist activities,
such as robbery, hijacking and murder.16 In August 1980 Istiqamah Mosque
was raided by the army and police, and forty-four young activists were arrested
initially. In the following days more activists were arrested.
 This event led to a decline in the number of young Muslim activists attending
the mosque. Many were scared to come to the mosque because they did not want
to be accused of being a member of the Imran movement. Furthermore, parents
of activists forbade their children attending the mosque. More widely, it created
a phobia in the Muslim community about being involved in Islamic activities.
However, after a year-long period of stagnation, Muslim youth activities in
Istiqamah started to re-emerge. Students, mostly school students, again began
to attend Sunday morning sermons. Some Istiqamah activists, who were not
involved in the Imran case, began to reorganise Islamic activities for young
Muslim activists. In the mid-1980s, Istiqamah again became a centre of Islamic
activities among young people. At this time, the motor of Islamic activities, as
discussed later, comprised those students involved in various Islamic groups
(harakahs).
There is another important mosque which serves as a centre for young Muslim
activists in Bandung: Mujahidin Mosque. It is located in the inner city, about
two kilometres from the city centre (Alun-alun). It is surrounded by a dense
population, by schools, a market, sports fields and busy roads. There are at least
ten junior and senior high schools close to the mosque. Each prayer session,
especially noon and afternoon sessions, are crowded by students. Moreover,
some schools organise praying lessons in this mosque. According to research
organised by IKIP Bandung, almost 75 percent of those attending daily and
Friday prayer sessions are young people (Djamari 1988:71).
16 In his trial, Imran explained that his idea to take up arms (angkat senjata) was inspired by Anderson's
book about the President and a copy of a CSIS document about a meeting between Dewan Gereja
Indonesia (DGI) and MAWI, signed by Ali Murtopo, T.B. Simatupang and others. In the latter, he found
that there was an attempt from Christian groups to eliminate Indonesian Muslims. In Imran's view “if
someone wants to crush me, I will crush him first. And if there are people who want to crush the Muslim
umat, the Muslim umat should move and crush them first”.
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Building of the mosque began in 1955 when a mosque development committee,
which consisted of Masyumi figures, was allotted an area by the local
government. In the same year, the project was assigned to the Muhammadiyah
organisation which has administered it ever since. Mujahidin Mosque began as
a temporary mosque, and the building proceeded gradually and was completed
in 1993. Throughout the building process, the mosque was used as a proper
mosque, for daily prayers, Friday prayer and sermons.
Unlike Istiqamah Mosque, the Mujahidin Mosque is clearly affiliated with
Muhammadiyah. As a consequence, all its policies and activities are in accordance
with Muhammadiyah policy. Sermons must be in agreement with the
Muhammadiyah teaching guidelines. All preachers, either as khatib (speaker)
during Friday prayers or as speakers during regular sermons are from modernist
organisations, such as Muhammadiyah and PERSIS. Islamic activities among
young activists in Mujahidin mosque have developed since the mid-1970s, when
some university students from various higher education organisations and high
schools in Bandung began to gather and discuss Islam informally. It started when
young people who attended regular sermons at the Mosque got to know each
other and began small discussions.
In the early 1980s, Islamic youth activities in Mujahidin mosque developed
further, and the number of young Muslim activists increased, especially when
young Muslim activists who had always attended Istiqamah Mosque moved to
Mujahidin mosque because of the Imran case. Beside being involved in general
mosque activities, they organised gatherings, mosque camps and short Islamic
training courses. During these activities some speakers addressed Islamic subjects
such as the Meaning of Islam, basic faith (Aqidah) and Jihad (Holy War). A
subject always mentioned was Muslim community problems (Problematika Umat
Islam). According to an informant, almost all speakers (all university students)
were very critical of the government. Moreover, they believed that Islam in
Indonesia was being forced into a corner (dipojokkan). The latter idea was often
spread through youth secretly distributing pamphlets to university and school
campuses. University students from various universities in Bandung area
organised these activities for senior high school students and taught them Islam.
University students visited the senior high schools from which they had
graduated to recruit students.
These two mosques are quite similar. First, they are located in urban17 areas
close to universities and other educational organisations. Sociologically Islam in
urban areas has been dominated, as Fachry Ali puts it, by Islamic reformists,
17 The urban environment with its characteristics of “isolation, insecurity and loneliness” as a result of
“loosening of traditional social bonds… [and] less apt to develop close personal association” (Louis
Wirth and George Simmel in Curran and Renzetti 1990:579) seem to be a fertile field for the development
of the Islamic movement.
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such as Muhammadiyah and PERSIS. This has led to another similarity: in terms
of their religious views, they are modernist mosques. In addition, these two
mosques show that the Islamic resurgence movements among young people are
mostly developed in Islamic reformist and modernist environments. Although
in Bandung there are some big mosques organised by NU,18 to date I have not
identified centres of Islamic youth activities among the mosques organised by
traditional Muslim Nahdlatul Ulama. These similarities show that there is a clear
connection between the reformist/modernist and the current Islamic resurgence
among young people. There is a continuation of ideas that previously raised by
the modernist and reformist movements that emerged since the turn of the
century.
3.2.3. c. Harakah: Independent Movements
Harakah is an Arabic word meaning ‘movement’ and refers specifically to Islamic
movements. However, harakah does not refer to conventional Islamic movements,
such as Nahdlatul Ulama (Association of Muslim Scholar, NU), Muhammadiyah,
PERSIS (Persatuan Islam, Islamic unity) or other Muslim organisations. Neither
does it refer to formal19 dakwah activities held by campus preaching organisations
such as at Salman Mosque of ITB, Jama'ah Shalahuddin of Gajah Mada University
in Jogjakarta and other Islamic organisations on university campuses which are
officially approved by universities. The term harakah emerged and has developed
since the early 1980s along with the further development of Islamic activities
among young people on university campuses and public mosques. According
to figures from one harakah, there are about ten harakah spread over many
campuses and public mosques throughout large cities of Indonesia, including
Bandung. A few reported by Tempo in 1993 included Ikhwan al-Muslimun
(Muslim Brotherhood), Hizb al-Tahrir (Liberation Party), Tarbiyah (Education),
Salafiyah, Dar al-Arqam, and Jama'ah Tabligh. All of these movements arose
outside Indonesia, most coming from the Middle East (Tempo 3.4.1993).
Harakah, in a broad sense, are organised Islamic movements20 aimed at applying
Islam comprehensively in all aspects of life, as the Prophet Muhammad
exemplified. On the basis of the Qur'an and Sunnah (the words, behaviour and
18 There has traditionally been a division between modernist and conservative among Indonesian
Muslims. In the 1950s Islamic political power was divided between the reformist Masyumi and
conservative NU. All Islamic reformist, modernist and even fundamentalist groups affiliated with the
former, whereas other Islamic conservative groups affiliated with the latter (Feith 1982:218).
19 The word ‘formal’ in ‘formal Islamic activities’ or ‘formal Islamic movement’ means that those activities
or movements are approved officially by authorities. The world ‘informal’ indicates the contrary.
Campus Islamic preaching institutions and public mosques are formal organisations because they are
approved by the government or by the universities.
20 According to Kalim Siddiqui in his book The Islamic Movement: a system approach, “The Islamic
movement is a world wide, open, diffuse system in which individual Muslims or Muslims organised in
groups are consciously working towards the reconsolidation of the Ummah into a behavioural, operational
and a goal seeking system” (1980:9).
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pattern of life of the Prophet), they seek to establish concrete Islamic alternatives
to existing socio-economic and political organisations in Muslim countries which
are believed to depart from Islam. They seek to resurrect the glory of Islam as
achieved during the era of the Prophet and his companions. This idea stems from
a deep consciousness that the world's Muslim community (Ummah) is in a state
of decline. They believe that most Muslim countries -whether ruled by Islamic
governments or not- are politically, economically, socially and culturally under
non-Islamic foreign (Western: Europe and America, and Soviet) domination.
Muslim countries, all of which are ‘third world countries’, are closely linked
with poverty, backwardness and dependence on foreign loans. Some leaders of
a few rich Muslim countries have been the ‘arms’ and ‘puppets’ of foreign
powers, which often suppress any Islamic movements. Moreover, in their view
moral decadence is a common trend throughout Muslim countries. Like Sayyid
Qutb, they found that:
Now [Muslims] are in a jahiliyah (ignorance) period, like in the early
period of Islam or even worse. Everything that exists around us is
jahiliyah, including conception, beliefs, customs, traditions, sources of
science, art and literature, laws and constitutions. Many things that we
thought of as Islamic cultures, Islamic sources, and Islamic ideas, are in
fact the product of jahiliyah (1978:1st chapter).
Although these harakah have similar ideological views each has different
interpretations about what real problems are faced by the Ummah. These
differences have resulted in various types of Islamic groups, with each harakah
stressing a specific problem and a specific solution.
Those harakah reported by Tempo are all imported harakah, which developed
later. In fact, local Islamic movements in Bandung emerged in the mid-1970s,
when some militant Muslim groups organised underground Islamic movements.
These Islamic movements originally reflected local backgrounds, environments,
ideas and other factors, although they were inevitably influenced by imported
Islamic movements. In Bandung, there are at least two important Islamic
movements which developed among, and greatly influenced, young Muslim
activists. These movements are the Young/New DI (Darul Islam Muda/Baru) and
LP3K (Lembaga Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Pesantren Kilat, Institute for
Education and Development of Islamic Short Course Training). Among the
movement activists, they are called respectively IIN, reversal of NII (Negara
Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic State), and PK (Pesantren Kilat). I have not
included Jama'ah Imran here because it lasted only a very short time, emerging
in late 1979 and dissolving in 1980. Moreover it did not influence greatly the
development of Islamic movements, either in Bandung or more generally in
Indonesia.
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The Young DI is a term I use to refer to various movements which are historically
and ideologically related to a 1950s Islamic rebel movement. It is difficult to
identify each of these Young DI movements, because although they have similar
historical and ideological sources, they have different names and different
teachings. This is, perhaps, understandable given that the important figures or
the founders of movements are those members of the Darul Islam (DI) movement,
who scattered and hid in various places in Indonesia. They continue to share
their ideas with the people, especially with young people in the community
where they live. To avoid the suspicion of the authorities, and to adapt to the
social and political environment, they have modified their teachings and
identities.
The basic idea of this movement can be traced to the establishment of the Darul
Islam itself. According to Van Nieuwenhujijze (cited in Boland
1985:59), Kartosuwirjo (full name Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo) began
openly preaching about the idea of an Islamic State in the Malangbong Garut
region, about 30 kilometres east of Bandung, in 1935. On 14 August 1945,
according to Alers (in Boland 1985:60), Kartosuwirjo proclaimed an independent
Islamic state, but when Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed Indonesian independence
on 17th August 1945, he took the side of the Indonesian Republic. However, it
did not last long because he rejected any negotiations between the government
and the Dutch. On 7 August 1949, Kartosuwirjo proclaimed for the second time
an Indonesian Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia)21, and proclaimed himself
as the head (Imam) of the new state, which was better known as Darul Islam
(territory or house of Islam). The law of the state was Islamic law, and the state
constitution was called Kanun Azasy (in Arabic, Qanun al-Asasi). These
documents argued that Islamic law should be adhered to by all Muslims, whereas
non-Muslims were free to practise their religions.
All members of the Young DI movements believe that the Indonesian Islamic
State has continued to exist since the time it was declared in 1949. According
to this movement there are only two states: the Islamic state (Dar al-Islam) and
the infidel state (Dar al-Harb). Each person has to choose between the two. The
present regime is considered to be a kafir (infidel) regime as it opposes the Islamic
state. Moreover, according to one informant, the Indonesian Republic has seized
the Islamic state, and there are continual confrontations between these two states.
There is a tendency to regard other Muslims who are not members of the Young
DI groups, as being un-Islamic, if not infidel. In the late 1980s, for example,
some Young DI activists in Istiqamah mosque and in UNPAD Jatinangor Mosques,
stole donation boxes (kotak amal) from the mosques, because they believed such
21 Its proclamation text is “In the name of Allah the Compassionate and the Merciful, we the Muslim
community (Umat Islam) of Indonesian people hereby declare the establishment of the Indonesian
Islamic State. The law of the Indonesian Islamic State is Islamic law. God is Great, God is Great, God is
Great”.
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acts were fa'i (robbing the enemy, in a war situation in the early era of the
Prophet). Some groups of the Young DI also forbade watching TV and listening
to the radio, because they believed it would “damage” their morality.
Similar to the “old DI” in the period of Kartosuwirjo, the Young DI tried to
spread the idea of establishing an Indonesian Islamic State by appealing to the
Muslim community in public mosques, university campuses, schools and other
places, through various activities. As in public mosques and university campuses,
they also held gatherings, religious sermons, short Islamic courses, and sports
or military simulation training. All of these activities were organised secretly
and carefully, and were to be attended only by members. Such care was taken
because they believed that if the authorities knew about the activities and their
involvement in them, they would be jailed. During the gatherings, besides
learning about and discussing Islam, they also discussed contemporary political
matters.
A distinctive activity of Young DI movements was bai'ah or an oath of allegiance
ceremony for new members, usually presided over by the leader (Imam) of the
Indonesian Islamic State. The ceremony began with recitation from the Qur'an,
and with the Imam giving a short speech. The bai'ah began with the leader
saying the shahadat, “There is no God but Allah, and the Prophet Muhammad
is His messenger”. This was followed by a statement that they would obey the
constitution and rules of the Indonesian Islamic State. Unlike other harakah, as
we shall see later, there was no special training before the bai'ah process.
Recruitment took place only through personal approach. People with similar
views about Islam would be asked to attend some of the gatherings, and then
they would be asked to perform bai'ah. Such open recruitment made it easy for
the authorities to infiltrate, and in the early 1990s almost all of the important
figures of the movement were arrested and sentenced. However, this did not
mean that the movement died completely because other members continued to
spread their ideas.
Another important local Islamic movement was LP3K, more commonly known
as the Pesantren Kilat movement. According to Mursalin Dahlan (1994), the
founder of the movement, the thrust of the Pesantren Kilat was to “defend the
basic faith (aqidah) of young Muslim generations, especially school and university
students from secularisation movements and the Christian Mission.” He further
referred to the struggle of santri against Dutch and Japanese colonialism. Thus
to resist secularisation and the Christian mission it was necessary to create santri,
and pesantren were needed to educate santri. Therefore, in 1976 Mursalin Dahlan
established an organisation called Pesantren Kilat (Islamic Short Course Training).
Since that time, Pesantren Kilat has become an Islamic movement which tries to
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revive the comprehensive teachings of Islam (Kaffah)22 among Muslim
community, especially the younger generations.
To further build and develop the Pesantren Kilat, Mursalin Dahlan in the same
year established the Organisation for the Building and Development of Pesantren
Kilat (Lembaga Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Pesantren Kilat, LP3K). Through
continuous and aggressive propagation this movement developed rapidly. In
the early 1980s the network of Pesantren Kilat spread to other big cities
throughout Java, while the centre of the movement remained in Bandung.
Activities of the movement were usually based in the premises (such as house,
sport hall, musholla) of members of the movement. They sometimes used public
mosques, university campuses, school campuses and other places, after they
managed to disguise themselves to get approval from the owner. For important
meetings and special training, they usually used facilities provided by members,
eg. houses, sports halls, or other buildings.
The term Pesantren Kilat has a special meaning which indicates the types of
activities of the movement. Pesantren are Islamic schools to educate young
Muslims to become Ulama (Islamic scholar). Students (santri) usually spend five
to ten years in mastering Islamic teachings, and when they graduate from the
pesantren they become ustadz (Islamic teacher) or ulama. The word ‘kilat’, means
flash of lightning. These meanings taken together show that Pesantren Kilat is
an Islamic school aimed at creating Islamic scholars and Islamic proselytisers in
a very short time.
Pesantren Kilat as an activity was a short Islamic course or training, in which
about five to ten participants, most of them school and university students,
study Islamic teachings and the problems of the Muslim community. The course
lasted three or four days, usually starting on Friday afternoon and finishing on
Monday morning. During the course participants were isolated from the outside
world; they did not read newspapers, listen to the radio, watch TV or have
contact with people outside the house. They spent all of their three or four days
in the same house, with the same people. The idea to create a condition of
isolation with less than ten participants, according to Dahlan, derived from the
story of the ashab al-kahf (people of the cave) in chapter 18 of the Quran, The
Cave. It relates how seven young, devout believers escaped from the tyranny
of injustice, and hid in a cave. In the cave they could not see or hear anything;
they were completely isolated from the outside world.23
22 An Arabic word meaning ‘comprehensive’. The idea was taken from the 208th verse of the 2nd chapter
of the Qur'an.
23 In Christian tradition it was known as the legend of the Seven Sleepers of the Ephesus. The story in
Christianity and Islam is quite similar, with the differences perhaps in its spiritual lessons. In The Decline
and Fall of the Roman Empire, as cited by Abdullah Yusuf’ Ali in The Meaning of The Holy Qur'an, it
was told that in the era of Roman Emperor when Christians were persecuted, seven Christian youths
of Ephesus escaped and hid themselves in a cave in a mountain from the oppressive tyrant, Decius.
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Throughout the course, participants engaged in two kinds of activities, core and
supportive activities. The former were sermons and discussions, whereas the
latter included reciting the Qur'an, praying tahajud (midnight optional prayer)
and daily prayers. Participants woke very early, at about 3:00 a.m., to pray
tahajud and to recite the Qur'an. At about 4:00 a.m. they attended morning
prayer, which was followed by a short speech, the speaker usually being one
of the participants. From 5:00 to 8:00 a.m. participants attended a sermon followed
by a discussion. After the sermon participants rested, bathed and then ate
together. The food was usually put in a big container from which two groups
of participants ate together with their fingers. The food was prepared by the
organisers, and was purchased using financial contributions from the participants
and the organisers. By about 9.30 a.m., participants were ready to listen to
another speech and discussion, which finished in time for the noon prayer. After
the noon prayer, lunch and a short rest, at 1.30 p.m. another speaker was ready
to give a speech, finishing before the afternoon prayer. The afternoon prayer
completed, participants had a short rest or walked around inside the room before
attending another sermon. Participants took a bath, had dinner and then
performed the evening (maghrib) prayer, read the Qur'an and rested before the
last session of the day, 8:00– 10.00 p.m.. At 10:00 p.m., participants were asked
to sleep, and were woken at 3:00 a.m.. On the last night, Pesantren Kilat activities
were brought to a close by an important ceremony. This began with a short
period of self-reflection and self-introspection led by an instructor: one by one
participants came forward and did bai'ah (oath) by saying the shahadat (the
profession of faith: “There is no God except Allah, and the Prophet Muhammad
is His messenger”) and shaking hands with the instructor, usually the leader of
the movement or a senior member of the movement.24 After this, one of the
organisers gave an Islamic or Arabic name to each participant who did not already
have one. However, in some cases, as an informant said, although participants
already had Islamic names, they also were given new Islamic names. These new
names were later used among the members of the movement. Sometimes these
new names were used even in daily social life, because the recipients believed
that their new names were much better and imparted a new personality.
The Pesantren Kilat activity was organised by a committee consisting of
university and school students, all of whom were members of the movement.
Usually, participants who completed the Pesantren Kilat activity were asked to
organise similar activities in the following months or even in the same month.
Participants were also encouraged to recruit their friends at school, their
They slept, and continued to sleep for some generations and even centuries. When they awoke, they
thought that they were still in the same period. However, when one of them came to the town, he
realised that the world had changed. The Christian religion had become the state religion (Ali 1991:709).
24 This ceremony is very much the same with the conversion ceremony when a non-Muslim converts
to Islam. One informant says, “After that ceremony I found myself as a ‘real’ Muslim. Before hand my
Islam was only hereditary (keturunan) without understanding and consciousness”.
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neighbours and even their brothers and sisters to attend Pesantren Kilat. Such
high mobility contributed to the movement spreading widely and rapidly.
The instructors of the Pesantren Kilat were the founder himself and alumni of
the Pesantren Kilat. Their levels of education varied: some were senior high
school students or university students, and others were university graduates.
They were all members of the movement who had received special instructor
training. No outsiders, even ulama and Muslim intellectuals, were ever invited
to be instructors in Pesantren Kilat activities. Each instructor usually mastered
one special subject of the Pesantren Kilat syllabus, and could be called upon at
any time to give a speech on that subject.
Activities of the Pesantren Kilat movement were interrupted in 1983, when some
of its members became involved in subversive and terrorist activities. Authorities
accused the LP3K movement of being a “training ground for militant cadres
prepared to set up an Indonesian Islamic State or NII”. A leader of the Surabaya
LP3K, who was also a preacher, was charged with subversion and was sentenced
to twenty years, because of his preachings. Another member of LP3K was
sentenced to twelve years for his involvement in distributing illegal pamphlets.
Further, some members of LP3K were accused of being involved in a series of
bombing incidents in Jakarta, Malang, Yogyakarta and Surabaya. One member
of LP3K was accused of being involved in LP3K courses, in a series of bombings,
and even in a plot to assassinate Suharto, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
The 1985 and 1986 trials of many subversive and terrorist cases involving Islamic
groups showed that the LP3K network had relations with a range of opposition
powers, such as the Petition-of-50 group.
From 1983, the level of activity of the LP3K movement began to decline, until
finally it ceased to function in the mid-1980s. However, wherever they are,
alumni of the Pesantren Kilat continue to spread ideas learned in Pesantren Kilat.
The term “Pesantren Kilat” and its type of activity has been used by various
Islamic organisations in recent development. It became a fashionable type of
Islamic education in Indonesia, usually held during holiday times, especially
during the month of Ramadhan. Some government offices, big companies and
other organisations held such activities, either for the children of the employees
or for the employees themselves.
Some members of the Pesantren Kilat movement moved to and became involved
in other harakah, which began to develop in 1982 and 1983, when the Pesantren
Kilat movement had begun to decline. Some other members of the movement
developed a new movement with a new orientation, new strategy, new style of
education and a new name. In terms of ideology, however, the new movement
was similar to its predecessor. Its type of educational process was modified and
divided into three stages: Ula (first), Wustho (second) and A'la (high). Each of
these stages had special follow-up activities involving what were called usrah
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groups, which had a core group of five to ten persons led by one of its members
called naqib (leader). Usrah group meetings were held weekly or fortnightly at
members' houses in turn. The gatherings usually lasted from Saturday night to
Sunday morning, and on Sunday morning, together with other members of the
movement, the group often engaged in sporting activities such as football,
badminton and occasionally swimming.
During usrah gatherings, commitment of the members to the movement was
reinforced and strengthened. Meetings started with reciting the Qur'an and
checking each others' memories of verses of the Qur'an. An instructor (zaim)
who had completed the higher stages of training gave a speech on a planned
Islamic subject and this was followed by a discussion. After this, members of
the group discussed topics such as the current socio-political situation or the
personal problems of members, and finally they mutually advised one another
(taushiyah, an Arabic term, meaning ‘mutual teaching’). The gatherings finished
at about 10:00 p.m., and at 3:00 a.m. participants woke up to pray tahajud. One
important aim of these activities was to increase a sense of brotherhood among
members. Such activities did have this sort of significance for many, especially
for university students, most of whom were far from their families.
Although not identical, usrah-type activities were in fact used by various harakah
which developed on university campuses. This type of activity, as in the
development of Islamic revivalism in Malaysia, was “the most effective vehicle”
in spreading the ideas of the Islamic movement (Anwar 1987: 45). The term
usrah, used to describe a type of Islamic education group, can be traced back to
the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimun) movement in Egypt. According
to Hassan al-Banna, the founder and the leader of the movement, usrah is a
family, which bound Muslims into brotherhood on the basis of Islam. There are
three pillars of usrah, namely acquaintance (ta'aruf), mutual understanding
(tafahum) and mutual responsibility (takaful) (al-Banna 1979:4–10).
During the mid to late 1980s, the number of harakah that developed amongst
young Muslim activists increased. Harakah which developed during this period,
in addition to local Islamic movements, mostly came from outside Indonesia,
especially from the Middle East. These movements, as I mentioned before, were
Ikhwan al-Muslimin, Hizb al-Tahrir, Tarbiyah, Salafiyah, Dar al-Arqam, and
Jama'ah Tabligh (see Appendix C).
These Islamic groups because of their independent characteristics and their
aggressive attempt to recruit and train the followers were an important channel
by which Islamic resurgence ideas spread rapidly among young Muslim activists.
The radical, rebellious, underground and secretive nature of these Islamic groups
became important factors which attracted young activists to join them. Members
of these groups usually became activists and the motor of various Islamic activities
both in campus preaching organisation and in the public mosques, through
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which they recruited their new members. This does not mean that there is a
clear division among activists of Islamic groups, preaching organisations and of
public mosques, since one activist can be a member of an Islamic group and at
the same time an activist of public mosque and of preaching organisation.
3.3 Fertile Milieu
This Islamic resurgence could not take place successfully without the right social
and political conditions. How much then do the conditions of the early resurgence
still apply?
One of the most common phenomena associated with the development of the
Islamic revival among young Muslims was the increased number of young female
Muslims who wore Jilbab.25 Since 1977, a few female Salman activists had begun
to wear jilbab, and gradually this practice spread widely amongst young, female
Muslim activists, especially university and school students. Wearing this type
of cloth spread through various Islamic trainings activities. Among the harakah
and Islamic movements generally, according to a leader of one harakah in
Bandung, wearing a jilbab became one of the parameters of success of training
or organised activity. If female participants continued to wear jilbab after the
training it meant that the training had been successful.
In 1982 when many more students were wearing jilbab, even when they went
to their schools, the Ministry of Education and Culture created a new act
concerning student uniforms. It detailed acceptable uniforms for both male and
female students. The act forbade female students to wear jilbab within the school
area. As a consequence, those who wore jilbab had to choose between removing
their jilbab and moving to other schools which allowed them to wear such
clothes.26
25 Garmen for women which reveals only the face, and falls down loosely to below the chest or the
waist.
26 Such a case first occurred in one of the top senior high schools in Bandung, namely SMA 3 (Sekolah
Menengah Atas Negeri 3 Bandung). In 1982 a sports teacher forbade some female students from wearing
tracksuits. The teacher said that if they did not wear short pants, he would mark them down. Moreover,
although they came to school, they were not allowed to enter the classroom nor to attend the class. In
later developments, they were not allowed even to enter the school area. However, the school staff did
not expel them formally from the school. Students felt that they were being treated discriminatively,
and asked the ulama, for their support, but the ulama could not do much. The students also went to
the Regional House of Representatives asking for a clear legal explanation of the prohibition to wearing
jilbab. Similar cases also occurred in other state public schools in Bandung, and other places throughout
Java.
Various negotiations were held among students, parents, ulama, and government authorities. In general
there were two sides, and these were in confrontation: the government authorities and the students.
The government authorities insisted that they only did what the Act and their superiors asked them to
do. Moreover, according to the government authorities, jilbab or kerudung was not a religious matter.
This led to the accusations that the spread of such clothing was only a political device of certain interests,
the identity and nature of whom was not clear. In contrast, students believed that they wore jilbab for
religious reasons.26 They argued that they knew nothing about politics. Furthermore, they argued that
what they did was guaranteed by the Indonesian Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945), which
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This led to a “confrontation” between students and the government. Such
confrontation created and reinforced two attitudes among students and young
Muslims activists generally. First, suspicious responses from the government
created a new view that the government was actually not in favour of Islam. For
student and Muslim activists who already viewed the present regime as
un-Islamic, government actions reinforced their belief. Second, the lack of
comment by the ulama, who were unable to advocate the freedom of using veils,
to a certain degree created an antipathy toward ulama among young Muslim
activists. Furthermore, the feeling of powerlessness and hopelessness of the
overwhelming majority of Muslims led to frustration and alienation. Such
feelings, given that Muslims are in the majority, were described by Wertheim
(1986) as a “Majority with minority mentality”.
Another influential event was the Tanjung Priok massacre in 1984, followed by
a series of trials of many Islamic activists, throughout Java. The beginning of
the first case was a Tanjung Priok massacre in which hundreds of people (Muslim)
were killed. A similar massacre against Muslims occurred in 1989, when an army
operation was held to quell unrest (Tapol 92:4:89) and ‘suspicious’ Islamic
activities (Tempo 18:4:1989) in the Lampung province. According to one source,
hundreds of people were killed and others injured. These massacres were followed
by many arrests and trials of the Muslim activists. For Muslim activists, these
cases showed that the government continously oppressed Islam.
These various cases from the late 1970s to the late 1980s illustrate some important
points. First, there was a clear indication that government authorities were
cautious and suspicious about the new tendency among young Muslims. This
cautiousness often was marked by unsympathetic and even oppressive attitudes
such as the prohibition to use veils that identified them as political devices.
Second, government attitudes in turn led to a state of frustration and antipathy
towards the government; fertile conditions for the development of the Islamic
movement because the teachings and methods of the Islamic resurgence
movement provided a kind of shelter from that frustration. At this point, I agree
with Emerson (1981), who says “Religion is like a nail. The harder you hit it,
the deeper it goes into the wood”. Here, some conditions of the early emergence
in early 1970s ie. frustration and dissatisfactions still apply in this development
says that all citizens are free to perform religious rituals, appropriate to their religion. In addition, they
pointed out that they never made trouble or did anything wrong at their schools, and they were never
involved in any political group. In fact, according to the Panji Masyarkat report, many of them performed
at the top of their class.
While negotiations continued, application of the uniform act continued. All attempts at negotiation
seemed to come to a dead end. Finally, in 1984 and 1985, almost all female students who wore jilbab
moved to other schools which allowed their female students to wear jilbab, whereas some others remained
in the same school, for examination reason, but took off their veils when they entered the campus area.
In Bandung, most of those who were expelled from their school because of their veils, moved to a private
school namely PGII (Persatuan Guru Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Teachers Association).
53
The Development of the Movement
stage. The difference is that in this stage the spread of the frustration and
dissatisfaction became much more pervasive, since it spread through various
channels.
To conclude there are some distinct characteristics of this development stage.
First, the movement initially centered on charismatic figures but developed with
the establishment of various organisations, both formal and informal, through
which the resurgent ideas dispersed effectively. Another important characteristic
of this stage was the aggressive preaching and evangelical attempts launched
by those organisations. Finally, as in the first stage the common trend during
the stage was towards emotional and radical expression.
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Chapter 4: Routinisation of the
Movement: Impacts of Social and
Political Changes
4.1 Introduction
In Ramadan 1994, I went to Jakarta to get my visa from the Australian Embassy.
When the time for afternoon prayer came, I went to the Musholla 1 of a private
bank, located in the basement of a car park. I was struck by the scene there. The
basement usually used for a car park was crowded by approximately 800 people.
Men and women, most of them employees of the bank, were sitting on plastic
mats waiting for the afternoon (zhuhur) prayer. There were rows of men at the
front and women at the back. In between the men and the women was a green
curtain about one meter high. (On Fridays at this musholla, however, women do
not pray at the same time as men). After praying, a bank employee gave a fluent
Arabic introduction, announcing the speaker for that day, Imaduddin
Abdurrahim. After Imaduddin's sermon, all employees returned to their offices
and resumed working. According to the bank employee beside me, this activity
had been conducted every day since the first day of Ramadan in 1994.
This quite new activity emerged only during the 1990s, and is only one
phenomenon in a new wave of religious consciousness among the Indonesian
Muslim middle class, and Indonesian Muslims in general. Along with the
emergence of this new wave there have been some changes in social, political
and economic life. These changes, according to Indonesian and foreign observers,
are the result of the relation between the government and Islam, which has
become much more intimate. This new wave cannot be separated from the
development of the Islamic resurgence movement among young people which
emerged in the 1970s. Many ex-activists of the resurgent youth movement have
moved into various sectors of life, including into bureaucratic positions.
This chapter focuses on three important themes that have emerged since the late
1980s: 1) the extent of the social, economic and political changes, and the extent
to which government is paying more attention to the Muslim community; 2) the
Islamic resurgence movement's responses to those changes, particularly changes
to their teachings and views about Islam and to the social and political situation;
3) trends among young people in the Islamic movement in 1990s, and their future
prospects.
1 A small room or building set aside in a public place for praying.
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4.2 Social and political changes
The Islamic revival movement among young people continued to develop into
the 1990s, but with a much wider scope and relatively more smoothly. Since the
mid-1980s, various Islamic activities, which previously had been conducted
informally among Islamic student activists, have been legitimated by the
universities. At some universities, such as UNPAD, IKIP and ITB, the mentoring
(small Islamic discussion group) progam became compulsory for all Muslim
students, and for others studying Islamic religion courses.2 Such developments
were predictable since many Muslim student activists of the 1970s are now
becoming lecturers or university staff, and some even have become lecturers on
Islamic religion. They are supporters and resource persons for Islamic education
on the campuses where they work, and in Islamic proselytizing generally.
In the public sphere, those activists who now hold government and bureaucratic
positions continue to spread Islam wherever they work. They initiate and
organise Islamic activities in their offices. They hold small gatherings or Islamic
discussions, which often develop into bigger events. During the month of
Ramadan, Islamic activities are especially pervasive and intense. Breaking the
fast together (buka puasa bersama), followed by tarawih (Ramadan optional night
prayer) and sermon has become a routine program during Ramadan. Furthermore,
employees try to create an Islamic atmosphere at their office by expressing the
Islamic greeting asslamu ‘alaikum, even at formal events. Women continue to
wear veils, a custom which is becoming more widespread.
The 1990s period was also marked by wide-spread and aggressive dakwah (Islamic
proselytisation) attempts through the mass media. Besides various Islamic
magazines, which grew rapidly in popularity from the early 1980s, various
Islamic scholarly journals have emerged including Ulumul Quran, Islamika,
Ma'rifah and Kalam. Moreover, on 3 January 1993, ICMI launched a national
newspaper Republika, to which Muslims responded enthusiastically. In only six
months, the circulation of the Republika increased from 45,000 to 120,000. Many
Muslims, as one informant said, hope that Republika can compete with the
dominant Catholic and Protestant newspapers, which have for a long time been
regarded a presenting distorted news about Islam and Muslims.3
 Islamic proselytising is now prevalent on almost all television and radio stations.
In addition to the printed mass media, the frequency of Islamic programs has
increased considerably. Every Thursday night, all television stations, including
private stations such as RCTI, SCTV, TPI and ANTV, broadcast religious
2 In some cases, as an informant said, a Muslim can choose to study Christian, Catholic, Hindu, or
Buddhist religions. He said that although he is Muslim, he did not choose an Islamic course, but rather
chose to study Buddhism (Interview 29 May 1994).
3 Although, there has been a newspaper, Pelita, which is often regarded as a Muslim newspaper, it has
not attracted a majority of Muslims because of its poor quality of reporting, and managerial problems.
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programs.4 Moreover, similar programs are presented at about 5 a.m. every
morning on all private television stations. These programs include “Di Ambang
Fajar”, “Hikmah Fajar”, “Kuliah Subuh” and “Mutiara Subuh” (all of them have
similar meaning ie. morning sermons).5 The source persons or the speakers in
these programs vary from ulama and Muslim intellectuals to government
bureaucrats, including some government ministers. Also appearing as the
speakers are people, such as Imaduddin, who were formerly regarded as militant
anti-government preachers. This is another new phenomenon that has emerged
since the early 1990s. During Ramadan the frequency of Islamic programs always
increases considerably. Programs include Islamic education, sermons before
breaking the fast, movies on Islamic themes, Islam in other countries, live shows
from Mecca, and Qur'an recitations at the end of the daily program.
This increased intensity of Islamic proselytizing is also evident on various radio
stations. Every morning between four and six am almost all radio stations
broadcast dakwah Islam (Islamic proselytisation). Because there are so many
similar dakwah programs when switching from one station to another, one can
choose different topics or speakers. The types of program broadcast on radio,
as on television, vary from sermons, discussions and interviews to live discussion
between the radio announcer and the audience. This latter type of program has
become one of the most popular among young Muslims, who talk on air about
their personal problems, and ask for solutions based on Islamic values. During
Ramadan, dakwah Islam on the radio becomes even more prevalent, as on
television. Special programs are broadcast every day at the end of fasting (buka
puasa) and sahur (the meal before daybreak).
This pervasive and progressive Islamic dakwah has gradually resulted in a
widespread demand by the Muslim community for a more Islamic way of life.
Along with the development of the dakwah movement which increased Muslims'
understanding of Islam, many parts of the Islamic community began to realise
that aspects of their lives were not in accordance with the teachings of Islam. In
mid-1989, for example, one research project reported that some manufactured
foods contained pork fat. The rumour spread that several products such as soap
and tooth paste were haram (forbidden) because pork was used in them. This
created a social tension, later demonstrated through a widespread boycott of
those products among the Muslim community. Those who already possessed
those products, threw them away or destroyed them. The ‘pork fat issue’
subsided after some senior ulama and cabinet members were televised nationally
eating these products.
4 Hindu, Buddhist, Catholic and Protestant programs are also broadcasted at different times.
5 Such morning sermons are not presented on the government television station (TVRI, Televisi Republik
Indonesia) because its program begins later than those of private television stations.
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After a long and heated polemic, the draft Law on Religious Courts (Rancangan
Undang-undang Peradilan Agama, RUUPA) was finally accepted on 14 December
1989 by the House of Representatives (DPR). For Westerners like the Far Eastern
Economics Review reporter Vatikiotis, this was “a surprisingly generous
concession to the Muslim community” (1994:137). According to Munawir Sjadzali,
“it is the will of history” (ini kehendak sejarah) of a country in which 150 million
of its 175 million people demanded such a law (Serial Media Dakwah 8.1989).
Historically, there were laws on religious courts from 1750 when they were first
introduced by Sultan Agung Hanyokrokusumo of the Mataram empire, but
gradually the laws were replaced by the Dutch, until 1937 when they disappeared
altogether.
Before the new law was accepted, there was strong objection from Christian
groups. As reported in the Christian weekly publication, Hidup (No. 7), “RUUPA
is an attempt to establish Islamic law [in Indonesia]. A state ruled by a religious
law is a state religion… And if religious courts are only for Muslim citizens, this
implies [that Indonesia] is an Islamic state” (p.28–9). The Islamic magazine Serial
Media Dakwah (8:1989) reported that, “It is true that RUUPA will establish
Islamic law, which means Islamic law will be applied to Muslims who desire it.
The scope of the law is limited to civil law, marriage, grants (hibah), inheritance
(waris) and other similar cases. Therefore, it is not true that religious law will
control the state”. Lukman Harun, a Muhammadiyah leader, said “I was amazed
by those Christians who strenuously objected to the RUUPA, which is not related
to them and will not inflict any loss at all upon them” (ibid.: 12). The Christian
resistance to the draft religious law, according to some Muslims and as reported
in Media Dakwah, was “a continuation of the Dutch plan to demolish the Islamic
community in Indonesia”.
In October 1990, there were widespread demonstrations against a tabloid
magazine Monitor, in big cities throughout Java. The issue started when the
tabloid, edited by “Christian editor, Arswendo Atmowiloto,” ran a poll to find
out “the most admired figures” (tokoh yang dikagumi). Publication of the poll
result showing that the Prophet ranked 11th, just below the editor of the tabloid,
angered Muslims. They were outraged to see the Prophet compared with common
people (Tempo 27.10.90:28–32). A wave of demonstrations swept almost all big
cities throughout Java, especially those with higher education institutions. In
Jakarta the Monitor's offices were stoned and destroyed by demonstrators, most
of whom were students. Demonstrators demanded that Arswendo be put on trial
because he humiliated Islam and disturbed inter-religious harmony (kerukunan
antar umat beragama). In Bandung demonstrations took place continuously in
almost all large university campuses. Demonstrations attended by more than
four thousand at each site took place at ITB, UNPAD, IAIN (Islamic State
University) and IKOPIN (Indonesian Institute of Management and Cooperation).
During these demonstrations they hanged and burned an effigy of Arswendo.
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Similar demonstrations also occurred in Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Ujungpandang.
According to some senior journalists, the Government through Information
Minister Harmoko, was forced to ban the tabloid in order to dampen the
increasing Muslim outrage. The banning of this tabloid to meet the demands of
the community was the first such phenomenon in the press history of Indonesia
(Tempo 3.11.90: 26–30). Muslim anger gradually subsided after the banning of
the tabloid, and when Arswendo was put on trial.
The banning of the tabloid and the Muslim reaction towards this phenomenon
elicited a variety of responses. Arief Budiman, a sociologist at the Satya Wacana
Christian University, tried to plead the case of Arswendo and the Monitor by
saying that “Arswendo was a victim of a social process which needs a ‘scapegoat’.
Islamic groups, although constituting the majority of the nation, have a marginal
political role” (Tempo 10.11.90:43). A moderate response was made by
Abdurrahman Wahid. He regretted the attitude of Muslim society which forced
the government to ban the tabloid. According to Wahid, the Monitor case arose
merely due to carelessness. He regretted those who used religious spirit as a
justification for anger, hatred and vandalism. Yet another reaction, like that of
UNISBA (Bandung Islamic University) students and Rendra, regretted the banning
of the tabloid, saying “If wrong has been done, hold a trial. Do not ban the
tabloid… Such banning is not appropriate in the democratisation process we
are developing”. In contrast to these responses, Nurcholis Madjid maintained
that the government act was appropriate because “If the government had not
acted, society would have tried (mengadili) the case. This is more dangerous”
(Tempo 3.11.90). According to Madjid and Amin Rais, the Monitor case ruined
all attempts to develop inter-religious harmony (kerukunan umat beragama)
(Tempo 27.10.90). Madjid further explains, “I did not see the Monitor case as
Arswendo's act as an individual. It was a result of a mechanism, namely
arrogance, conceit, indifference, and insensitivity of certain groups, and they
should be punished as heavily as possible”. What Madjid was referring to was
in fact the Christian group which owned Kelompok Kompas Gramedia (KKG),
one of the biggest printing and publishing companies in Indonesia.6
The Muslim outrage can also be seen as a climax or a peak of Muslim
disappointment, especially among young Muslims, not only with the Monitor
but with all publications of Christian publishers. Among young Muslims,
especially those involved in various Islamic movements, there was a belief that
the aggressive Christian mission had three aims: first, to convert Muslims to
6 At this point I agree with Arief Budiman's statement that the Monitor case and Arswendo was only
the scapegoat. From Nurcholis Madjid argument and generally Islamic community, it appears that
behind the Muslim's outrage against this case, there has been accumulated feelings of frustration and
helplessness against the dominant Christian power on publication in particular and other sectors of life
in general. Various theories related to the Monitor case were reviewed by Jalaluddin Rakhmat in his
Islam Aktual (Bandung: Mizan, 1994:64–5).
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Christianity; second, to diminish Muslim commitment to Islam; finally, to
discourage Muslim children and young people from becoming committed to
Islam. These aims were believed to be applied through various facilities including
newspapers, magazines, hospitals (inherited from the Dutch colonial).7 Here, all
Christian publications were suspected of being agents of Christianisation. The
Monitor had long been criticised for its pornographic content which was often
seen as a source of moral degradation, especially among the young generation.
However, those criticisms were seemingly ignored, and the Monitor continued
to publish pornographic pictures. Because of this the Monitor was known as
“the hottest tabloid in Jakarta” (Tempo 3.11.90), and probably in Indonesia,
because it was distributed not only in Jakarta but also in other cities throughout
Indonesia. Regarding the pornographic themes, Arswendo admitted that “I
consciously exploited sex and crime in journalism” (Ibid). So demonstrations
became aimed at Christian targets as well as at Arswendo. As Zainuddin MZ, one
of the most famous preachers, said “arrogance and insensitivity made my Muslim
brethren, because of their poverty, become a target for the development of other
religions. … This arrogance and insensitivity was shown by Allah in the figure
of Arswendo Atmowiloto” (Ibid,:28). These various anxieties resulted in
widespread tension among the Muslim community, and when the tabloid
published the poll result showing the Prophet as ranking 11th, it triggered an
explosion of hidden Muslim annoyance.8
Another important phenomenon of the early 1990s was the revoking of 1982
decree which forbade female students from wearing veils at school. On 16
February 1991, the Head of School Education and the Indonesian Council of
Muslim Clergy (MUI, Majelis Ulama Indonesia), as witnessed by the Minister of
Education Fuad Hasan and the Minister of Religious Affairs Munawir Sjadzali,
signed a new decree which allowed female students to wear veils at school. This
ended eleven years of uncertainty, discrimination and even intimidation. Some
women had hovered between being students or not; they were students but
they were not allowed to attend classes. Although they were not allowed to
attend classes they were not expelled from school. Others were expelled from
their school, and others were intimidated through the terror and threat of
interrogation. Every week they were interrogated by their teachers, like political
prisoners (Panji Masyarakat 676.1991). Some of them appealed to the court but
were unsuccessful. Wearing veils was prohibited not only among school and
university students but also among teachers. A female teacher was fired because
she wore a veil. The school headmaster said “If the teachers wear veils, I worry
7 Interview with Muchtar Adam, 23 December 1993.
8 Fachry Ali seemed not to agree with this statement, because in his view there must have been someone
who mobilised and motivated the mass. The poll result, in his view, had nothing to do with the
demonstrations, the main factor in these being the existence of a mobiliser and motivator. I agree that
there must be a motivator or a mobilizer; however, how can someone mobilise a widespread demonstration
without a common and deep interest among the masses?
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that students will wear veils as well”. In some cases, including a case at ITB,
students who wore veils were not allowed to attend practical work or
examinations. In 1989, female Muslims who wore veils were slandered as “food
poison disseminator” (penyebar racun makanan). As a result of this slander (fitnah),
some female students were attacked (Panji Masyarakat 674.1991:15), and in
other cases were even stripped and attacked by a crowd (Panji Masyarakat
629.1989:62-3). Islamic school students, and Muslim women who wore veils,
were harassed and humiliated. These episodes took place in Semarang, Jakarta,
Bogor, Serang. However, the impact of this phenomenon spread widely and
strongly influenced other places in Indonesia. It created fear among Muslim
women, who became scared to go out wearing the veil (Panji Masyarakat
628.1989:18-24). This slander against Muslim women, according to some
informants including Hasan Basri, the leader of MUI, was another attempt to
discredit Islam by those not in favor of the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia.
Outside the UNPAD mosque more than a thousand students demonstrated against
the slander, their theme being “We do not acquiesce to jilbab (veils) being
slandered, we do not acquiesce to Islam being slandered”. The demonstration
was followed by a Tabligh Akbar (big sermon), which was supported by various
Islamic preaching institutions in Bandung.
The advent of the 1991 decree allowing female students to wear veils at school
resulted from consultations amongst ulama, the mass media, community
representatives, the Indonesian Intellegence Bureau (BAKIN), the State Minister
for control of machinery of the state, the Attorney General and the Minister of
Education (Panji Masyarakat 676.1991:28). The need for a new act became
pressing when cases continued to emerge in a situation where there were no
clear laws or solutions. Moreover waves of demostrations and protest continued
throughout the big cities, not only in Java but also in Sumatra, Sulawesi and
Kalimantan. These demonstrations became much more frequent especially
between 1989 and 1991. When the French government allowed female students
to wear veils at public schools, Bandung Islamic youth and students demonstrated
in front of the French Embassy in support of the French government allowing
female Muslim students to wear veils at school. One slogan was “In France the
veil is allowed, why not in Indonesia?”. Finally on 16 February 1991, the 1982
decree was replaced by the 1991 decree allowing the veil to be worn at school.
In late 1991, the Muslim obsession to have a “more Islamic” banking system was
realised when a new Islamic-style bank called Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI)
was established. This new bank was backed fully by President Soeharto. He
blessed the new bank and, together with leading businessmen, contributed to
the bank's starting capital. This bank works “in a manner similar to a venture
capital company. Depositors are regarded as investors and are allocated a return
based on how profitably the bank invests their money. In practice customers
are likely to receive a return very close to what conventional banks pay on
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deposits, but with significantly less protection for their funds” (Schwarz
1994:189). The problem with conventional banking, for many Muslims, derives
from the practice of charging interest, which in their view is similar to usury,
which is forbidden. More than a year before, in mid 1990, NU (Nahdlatul Ulama),
under Abdurahman Wahid's leadership, set up a joint venture with Bank Summa
to develop a network of rural community credit banks. This attempt was praised
by Dorodjatun Kuntjorojakti, Dean of the School of Economics at the University
of Indonesia, and Munawir Sjadzali, Minister of Religious Affairs, as “a
magnificent idea” that “should [have been] done much earlier” (Ibid,: 188-9).
However, it was appallingly criticised by the some parts of Muslim community,
because the bank charged interest (usury), and perhaps because the Bank Summa
was owned by a Chinese Christian, William Soeryadjaya. Unfortunately, Bank
Summa was closed in late 1992 because of financial mismanagement. Managing
financial matters in Islamic ways continued to develop, when the finance minister
officially opened an Islamic style of insurance called “Asuransi Takaful Keluarga”
(Perwataatmadja 1994:6).
On 25 November 1993, the government-supported gambling and lottery SDSB
(Sumbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah) was closed because of a strong demand from
the community. Widespread demonstrations had been triggered in late July
1991 by a statement from the minister for social affairs about the continuation
of the SDSB lottery in late July 1991. One week after the minister launched the
statement, various Islamic youth and student organisations in Bandung
demonstrated to demand that the government close the lottery. Subsequently a
wave of demonstrations against the government's supported lottery swept
through the big cities such as Jakarta, Bogor, Cirebon, Yogyakarta, Semarang,
Surabaya, Medan and Ujungpandang. In contrast to the Monitor case,
demonstrators were not limited only to students and young people but also
included members of the wider community. The demonstrations reached a peak
in late 1993, occurring almost weekly in large and small cities alike. The last
demonstrations were held in front of Istana Negara (the State Palace) and Bina
Graha (the president's office). Such demonstrations, according to State Secretary
Moerdiono were “actions which already touched state symbols”, and if they
were not responded to immediately, they might be used (ditumpangi) by other
interests that would challenge national stability (Tempo 4.12.1993). Finally, after
several sessions in the House of Representatives, the social minister announced
that the SDSB was discontinued.
Long before the SDSB lottery, there had been similar types of gambling under
different names. In 1986, the government introduced PORKAS, which Muslims
viewed as a kind of gambling. In response to Muslim criticism, it was later
changed into TSSB (Tanda Sumbangan Sosial Berhadiah). After further criticism
it was given yet another name KSOB (Kupon Sumbangan Olahraga Berhadiah)
and finally SDSB, but all of them, in the Muslims' view, remained similar,
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gambling or lottery. Although demonstrations against gambling practices took
place in various places, they were not potent enough to force the government
to discontinue the gambling. The government only-changed the name, whenever
government support of gambling was criticised. From the government point of
view, such practices were not gambling. They constituted the only way to gain
financial support for national sports. The anti-gambling contingency, however,
did not find this to be a convincing reason, stating that there were many better
ways to gain such financial support, including taxes, donations and other halal
sources. Aside from religious concerns, anti-gambling demonstrators demanded
that the government recognise the undesireable impact of gambling on society,
such as the decrease of purchasing power (daya beli) in lower class communities,
the withdrawal of local funds (dana daerah) and the increase in crime. Moreover,
there was also the issue of mismanagement and corruption, in which an
ex-government bureaucrat and a retired general were involved (Tempo, 4:12:93).
In addition to these various phenomena, since 1992 there has been a new
phenomenon in the history of the New Order (Orde Baru), an increase in the
number of Muslim figures who have become members of the House of
Representatives. On 1 October 1992, about a thousand representatives were
inaugurated, of which 424 were from the biggest fraction, GOLKAR (Golongan
Karya), and most of them were important Muslim figures. Among them were
ulama, such as H. Ali Yafie, KH. Yusuf Hasyim and KH. Ilyas Rukhiyat, KH.
Azhar Basyir, Hasan Basri, Tuty Alawiyah, and KH. As'ad Umar; intellectuals
and educators, such as Nurcholis Madjid, Watik Pratiknya, Ismail Suny, Marwah
Daud Ibrahim and Mukti Ali; bureaucrats, such as Azwar Anas, Abdul Gafur
and Akbar Tanjung; and youths and enterpreneurs, such as Ferry Mursyidan
and Fadhel Muhammad (Panji Masyarakat 734:1992).9 These representatives
came from various Islamic groups and organisations, such as NU, Muhammadiyah,
and the Neo-Modernists. This phenomenon, according to many observers, was
a genuine “greening” (penghijauan)10 process.
This process necessarily meant that the number of Christian intellectuals in both
the House of Representatives and in the cabinet decreased. CSIS personalities,
such as AMW. Pranarka, Djisman Simanjuntak, Hadisusastro and Yusuf
Wanandi were no longer members of parliament. Previously, this group had
been an influential power and became a barometer and ‘think tank’ within the
parliament. Similarly in the new 1993 cabinet there were only four members
who were not Muslim, while in the previous cabinet more than ten members
were non-Muslim. Many influential Christian figures, such as General Benny
Murdani, Radius Prawiro, Adrianus Mooy and Johannes B. Sumarlin (the last
9 Moreover, many of these representatives were ex members of HMI (The Islamic Students' Association).
10 Green is identified as the color of Islam, so greening means Islamisation.
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three names were jointly known as RMS,11 standing for Radius Mooy Sumarlin),
were not named to the new 1993 Cabinet.
The above chronology shows that since late 1989, relations between the Islamic
community and the government have become much more intimate. This
development cannot be separated in general from the Muslim intellectual
movements (see Appendix D), and in particular, from the birth and growth of
the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association (ICMI, Ikatan Cendikiawan
Muslim se-Indonesia). ICMI, with its founders and supporters who consist of
government bureaucrats, intellectuals and businessmen, has been an accelerator
factor in this development. Moreover, ICMI was blessed by the government,
especially by president Suharto himself. It was another new phenomenon in
Indonesian Muslim history in the New Order era. The establishment of ICMI,
however, as I will discuss later cannot be separated from the role of young
Muslim activists. My intention here is not to include ICMI as part of the youth
resurgence Islamic movement, but to see the connection between the two.
4.3 ICMI: A New Hope
University students in Brawijaya University Malang were worried that potential
Muslim leaders and intellectuals were scattered, and that there was no one
institution which could unite them. They sought the establishment of an
institution in which Muslim intellectuals and leaders could develop friendship
bonds (silaturrahmi) and communicate with each other to effect collective
creativity, which in turn could contribute positively to national development
(Pelita, 4.12.1990). A group of students of the Technical Faculty, together with
the Islamic Activity Unit (Unit Aktivitas Kerohanian Islam) at Brawijaya
University planned to hold a symposium from 29 September to 1 October 1990.
The theme was “Muslim Intellectuals’ Contribution Toward the Take-off Era
(Era Tinggal Landas)” (Tempo 8.12.1990). This group of students consisting of
Erik Salman GD,12 Ali Mudzakir, Muhammad Zaenuri, Awang Surya and
11 ‘RMS’ has also another connotation which refers to the Republic of South Maluku (RMS, Republik
Maluku Selatan), a Christian pro-Dutch separatist movement. Dr Soumokil proclaimed the establishment
of the Republic of South Maluku in Ambon in 1950 because the new republic was dominated by Javanese,
Muslims and leftists (Ricklefs, 1993:233).
12 Erik Salman was the leader of the group, and became the head of the committee of the symposium
and of the founding group of ICMI. He was born in Yogyakarta on 31 March 1967, and is an activist of
the Islamic preaching institution in his campus, besides being a student activist. He is a board member
of the Student Senate of the Technical Faculty at Brawijaya University. His parents are well educated,
his mother having a PhD and his father being a dentist who works for the State Owned Oil Company
of Indonesia (Pertamina, Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara). His father's job
required that he often move from one place to another. Erik Salman attended primary and secondary
school in Langsa, Aceh, and high school in Jakarta. During his school years his Islamic education had
almost been neglected. Eventually, through campus mosque activities, he began to study Islam
intensively. He says, “now I tend to be more interested in studying Islam and preaching. Sometimes,
this tendency is much stronger than for the other subjects I have studied so far in the faculty” (Pelita
4 December 1990).
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Muhammad Iqbal, later met the Rector of Brawijaya University to promote their
symposium plan and, although he “hesitated in the face of the expense and
political sensitivity”, he gave his permission.
With their rector's permission these students -at their own expense- travelled
to promote their ideas and to raise funds for the symposium. In their travels
they first met with two prominent Muslim intellectuals Dr. M. Imaduddin
Abdulrahim and Drs. M. Dawam Rahardjo, who suggested that they also promote
an association for Muslim intellectuals. Through Imaduddin's recommendation
they met Emil Salim, the Minister of Environment and later the former Minister
of Religion, Alamsyah Ratuperwiranegara. This meeting led these students to
meet Habibie, the Minister of Science and Technology who was later nominated
as a candidate for the chairmanship of Muslim intellectuals association.13 Based
on support from his colleague ministers and Muslim intellectuals Habibie met
President Suharto to promote the idea and ask his permission. Without hesitation,
as it was reported, the president says “This is good, you can do it” (Hefner
1993:16–19). In a later development, through the figure of Habibie, who has a
close connection with President Suharto, the idea to form an association of
Muslim intellectuals was realised in late 1990.14
Thus, the students’ plan to hold a simple symposium snowballed smoothly to
become a national event. On 6 December 1990, a symposium on “Developing
Indonesian Society in the 21st Century” (Membangun Masyarakat Indonesia Abad
XXI) was attended by about 512 Indonesian Muslim intellectuals from
various disciplines, professions and backgrounds and was opened by President
Suharto. Three days later, Vice President Sudharmono closed the symposium.
From this symposium, certain conclusions were drawn. First, social development,
basically, is a transformation process towards better conditions. Therefore, social
transformation means improving an individual's quality of life. Second, this
transformation has structural, cultural and spiritual dimensions. Therefore
changes of these dimensions should take place simultaneously and harmoniously.
13 In the meeting between Habibie and students accompanied by Imaduddin, Dawam Raharjo and Syafii
Anwar, Imaduddin stated that “Habibie should have stepped forward, because he has an international
reputation, strong integrity and is devout” (Berita Buana, 4.12.1990). He is known as a Minister who
always fasts on Mondays and Thursdays. The students said, “we are confused because we do not have
a leader or idol. We believe that you can be the idol of young Muslims” (Tempo, 8.12.1990). According
to Kompas (16.12.1990), there were three reasons why Habibie was promoted and later chosen as the
leader of ICMI. First, “he was known because of his intellectuality, especially in aeronautical technology,
not only in Indonesia but also in America, Europe and Japan”. Second, he was a Muslim intellectual,
whose integrity was made exemplary for his umat (Muslim community) and nation. Finally, “he showed
his commitment to promoting Indonesian development in science and technology, so that Indonesia
could compete on the international stage.”
14 For more detail information on the establishment of ICMI see Hefner, 1993:1–35. A similar account
was also given by Nurcholis in November 1993, when he spoke on the birth of ICMI at an Indonesia
Study Group at the Australian National University, and in a discussion with the Indonesian Students
Association at the ANU, Canberra. For detailed information about ICMI see Documentasi Kliping Tentang:
ICMI, published by CSIS, January 1993 and ICMI Dalam Sorotan Pers, published by ICMI Jakrta, 1991.
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Third, the goal of the transformation itself is to raise the status of humans to
khalifah (representatives, successors of God) on earth. Fourth, in the next 25
years there would be structural and cultural changes as a result of development
and technology. In this process, conflict between old and new values is inevitable.
Structural change will be marked by changes in social behaviour which will be
experienced as a clash between the old and new patterns. In such a situation a
spiritual base, ie. Islam, is needed. Finally, they agreed to form ICMI, as an
institution which could optimise their roles in social, economic and political
development as an expression of their gratitude to God's blessings (ICMI,
1990:359–62).
Historically, the birth of ICMI was a unique event in Indonesian history. In
terms of protocol, it was quite extraordinary because usually a ceremony is
opened by either the President or Vice President, and then closed by a Minister.
In addition, the founders of this organisation represent various sectors of Muslim
power, and include even those usually critical of the government, such as
Imaduddin Abdulrahim. Furthermore, the leader of this organisation is a Minister,
who heads various State Companies (BUMN, Badan Usaha Milik Negara) and
government agencies, and most importantly is known for his closeness to Suharto.
 The birth of ICMI was responded to unfavourably not only by non Muslims
but also by other Muslim intellectuals. The latter expressed similar concerns to
non-Muslims, especially that ICMI would become a political organisation, which
would create sectarianism and primordialism within society, and in turn would
threaten the national integrity. There was also a concern that ICMI would become
another political means of the government. Abdurrahman Wahid, Deliar Noer
and Ridwan Saidi were among those who were not supportive of the birth of
ICMI. Wahid said, “let me stay outside managing ‘Muslim kaki lima’ (sidewalk
traders), so that there is an Islamic group which is nursing them”. He also said
that “intellectuality cannot be represented by an institution, and cannot be born
in an institution.” Furthermore, he said “I do not know Habibie… I only pray
for the success of the organisation” (Tempo 9.12.1990). Wahid shares the worry
that ICMI will trap Indonesia into sectarianism and primordialism. According
to Deliar Noer, ICMI is not an independent (mandiri) organisation. Like Wahid,
he states “I was asked to sign a letter supporting Habibie. I refused because I
do not recognise him. I do not know his way of thinking, especially about Islam.
He has never been involved in an Islamic organisation”. Deliar Noer worried
that ICMI would be used by the government, and said “I hope the establishment
of this organisation has no connection with the 1992 general election”. Ridwan
Saidi, like Noer, also worried that ICMI would become the only mass Muslim
organisation (wadah tunggal). “Intellectuals,” he says, “are not mass” They work
individually. They struggle on the basis of truth and do not need mass support”
(Ibid). Non Muslims responded carefully, with a wait and see approach. Kompas,
a Catholicowned newspaper (3.9.1991), jokingly describing ICMI as “itch me”
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(garuklah saya), reported “An inter-religion positive pluralism principle clearly
does not want a religious group to be facilitated by politics for political interest”.
Like Kompas, Suara Pembaruan (a Protestant-owned newspaper) described its
concerns in an editorial, saying:
Thus, the integralistic state ideology (paham negara integralistik) is very
appropriate for our very complex (majemuk) nation, namely a state
ideology which will not attach itself with the majority group, but will
accommodate all groups and will respect the uniqueness (keistimewaan)
of all groups either majority or minority. This ideology, characteristic
of our Democracy Pancasila does not approve of the tyrany of the
minority (tirani minoritas) and majority domination (7.12.1990).
The ICMI founders and supporters responded by demonstrating the irrelevance
of those concerns and criticisms. Habibie, for example, said “What is wrong
with this intellectual organisation? [ICMI] is not the first intellectual organisation
in Indonesia”. There have been various intellectual organisations long before
the establishment of ICMI. Among the Christian community there is PIKI
(Persatuan Intelegensia Kristen Indonesia, Indonesian Christian Intellectuals
Association), and ICKA (Ikatan Cendikiawan Katolik, Catholic Intellectual
Association). There is also a Hindu intellectual association called FCHI (Forum
Cendikiawan Hindu Indonesia. Indonesian Hindu Intellectual Forum). In the same
vein, Emil Salim, without explaining his reason, said “I do not agree that the
birth of ICMI can be regarded as an attempt to develop primordialism”. He also
argued that ICMI was not a “test case” step to confront the Christian mission.
In a meeting attended by some ICMI figures, he said that the accusation of
fundamentalism or sectarianism came from Zionist agents. He further said “I do
not understand why some people accuse ICMI of being sectarian. They are
unaware that the ICMI program is a national program, that what is being
produced by ICMI is, of course, not enjoyed only by Muslims” (Pelita 23.5.1992).
In various meetings, Habibie stressed that ICMI is “an open organisation, is not
exclusive and is non-political” (Pelita 26.4.1991). He also said that ICMI has no
political interest (politis kekuasaan). Moreover, he said “ICMI was established
not to win for Golkar or other political parties in the general election. ICMI was
established to solve problems faced by the whole of society, especially the
Indonesian Muslim community (umat)” (Suara Karya 3.6.1992). ICMI is a cultural
organisation which is scientific (keilmuan), open (terbuka), free and independent,
and formally emphasises a cultural approach process and culturalisation
(pembudayaan) (Antara 26.10.1992).
While Habibie was promoting ICMI, he often, if not always, talked about one
important theme, namely the development of the quality of the Indonesian
people (Manusia Indonesia). In his speech on the foundation of “Nation Servant
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Foundation” (Yayasan Abdi Bangsa, YAB),15 he pointed out that the development
of the quality of the Muslim community is crucial because it means developing
more than 85% of Indonesian society. Besides, this development is aimed at
improving the quality of Indonesia as a whole (Pelita 18.8.1992). On an other
occasion, he stated that Indonesian Muslims should not only participate or
become followers (ikut-ikutan) but should become initiators, motivators and
doers of development (Pelita 6.12.1991). He further said that the Islamic
community, which comprises the majority of Indonesia, should not accept being
directed and determined by others because in democratic life, the majority should
be able to lead and direct the minority and not vice versa (Pelita 13.3.1992).
 In the first ICMI national meeting (Silaknas, Silaturrahmi Kerja Nasional), which
was held on its first birthday (5–7 December in Jakarta 1991), the above theme
became the main topic of the meeting. The meeting, attended by 545 participants
from 32 delegations throughout Indonesia (ICMI 1992:40), focused on attempts
to increase the quality of life of the people, through what was called the
“economy of the people” (ekonomi kerakyatan). In ICMI's view the economy of
the people does not have power or access to production factors, especially
financial capital and management. This is because it faces economic powers
which are oligopolistic and monopolistic.16 Moreover, during the meeting there
emerged an awareness that the Islamic community is a major element of the
nation and has significant role and responsibility to help achieve national goals.
However, in reality the Islamic community had been alienated from national
and state life. Historically, the Snouck Hurgronje policies facilitated Muslim
performance of rituals, but suppressed Islamic political awareness (Suara Merdeka
13.12.1991). The results of these policies were deception (pembodohan) and
pauperization (pemiskinan) of Islamic community, which are still experienced.
Distorted information about Islam and the Islamic community has been aimed
at reducing the role and pioneering (kepeloporan) of Islamic community in national
development” (ICMI 1992:47), which in turn has made the Islamic community
a peripheral majority. The opposition and non-cooperative attitudes of the Islamic
community toward the colonial government, which had been internalised and
perpetuated among Muslims groups, put the Islamic community “outside the
system” (di luar system)17 in the whole process of development. Based on this
consciousness, two major themes emerged: first, increasing the Islamic
15 This foundation was established in Jakarta on 17 August 1992. It was initiated by 45 social figures
and leaders, including 10 ministers, wives of ex Vice Presidents, ex Ministers, ulamas, and the ICMI
founders. The goals of this foundation are to help and support ICMI by collecting, managing and
supporting funds for ICMI programs and activities (Pelita 18 Augugst 1992).
16 Such topics which were discussed among bureaucrats and Muslims, were quite taboo, since they often
included references to the children of President Suharto and to collusion between Chinese conglomerates
and bureaucrats.
17 A similar conception can be seen in McVey's “Faith as the Outsider: Islam in Indonesian Poitics”, in
James P. Picastori, Islam in the Political Process.
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community's and intellectuals' awareness of their role and responsibilty in
structuring national and state life; second, looking for a more appropriate political
format, so that the Islamic community and Muslim intellectuals' potential could
have a more positive role in the development process” (Suara Merdeka
13.12.1991). The idea to increase the role of Muslim in national and state life
continues to be an important topic in the following meetings.18
The birth of ICMI and its development to 1994 showed various important
characteristics. First, Muslim student activists played a crucial role as initiators.
The birth of ICMI was the result of a long struggle by various potential Islamic
powers. It was a ‘convergence point’ (titik temu) of two streams of Islamic
movements: the Muslim student movement, which emerged in the 1970s, and
the Muslim intellectuals movement, which emerged in the late 1960s19 amid
lively (semaraknya) and on-going dakwah attempts.
Second, ICMI to a degree was able to unite Muslim intellectuals from various
“Islamic patterns of thought”. In the view of Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy,
there are four of these: Islamic neo-modernism,20 Islamic democratic socialism,
Islamic universalism and internationalism, and Islamic modernism (Ali and
Effendy, 1986). Another categorisation offered by M. Syafi'i Anwar (1994) divides
Muslim intellectuals in terms of their political thought into six, namely:
formalistic, substantivistic, transformatic, totalistic, idealistic and realistic
(chapter IV). Previous attempts to devise such a unity had always failed.
Imaduddin, among others had tried to establish such an organisation. Imaduddin
recalls “I wanted to establish an organisation like ICMI. But unfortunately, at
the very beginning of the process, the police [military authority] put a stop to
it” (Tempo 8.12.1990). Similar attempts were made in the mid-1960s, when about
100 Muslim scholars agreed to establish the Muslim Scholars Association (Persami:
Persatuan Sarjana Muslim Indonesia), but after ten years, this organisation ceased
with the death of its founders (Tempo 8.12.1990:36).
18 A year later, 5–7 December 1992, a second meeting (Silaknas II) was held in Jakarta. About 500
participants both from Indonesia and including expatriots (Indonesian Muslim intellectuals resident in
foreign countries either as students or as bureaucrats), attended this meeting (Pelita 7.12.1992). Speaking
during the opening ceremony, the Minister of Internal Affairs, General Rudini, stated “ICMI should
not be suspected of being connected to the extreme right-wing Islamic power”. “If such suspicion
exists”, he further says, “this is because of suspicion toward Islam as a result of the tragedy of the Darul
Islam rebellion” (Merdeka 7.12.1992). Similarly, Suharto's advice, presented by Habibie, reminded ICMI
not to experience the same tragedy, ie. extremity and rebellion. Meanwhile, Habibie, in another speech,
quoting Alamsyah Ratuperwiranegara, said “the establishment of ICMI has erased shame and fear,
which have haunted the Islamic community. Today, the Islamic community is proud of its ‘Islamity’
(ke-Islaman) (Suara Karya 7.12.1992).
19 See Appendix D.
20 Neo-Modernism, according to Fachry Ali and Bachtiar Effendy, is a pattern of thought which combines
modernism and traditionalism. It is different from modernism which opposed traditionalism.
Neo-modernism accommodates both modernist and traditionalist ideas.
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Third, there was a new wave of Islamic consciousness, not only among what
Geertz called santri, but also among abangan and priyayi. There was a process
of “Santri-fication” (Schwarz 1994:174), “greening” (Hefner 1993:11), of the
abangan and the priyayi marked by their growing involvement in Islam. Related
to this, Harry Chan Silalahi, a CSIS founder, was quoted by Hefner as saying,
“What we saw fifteen or twenty years ago, described by Geertz as [abangan]
and [priyayi], almost does not exist anymore. Today it's clear that the great
majority of people want to be more Islamic” (Hefner 1993:31).
 Fourth, since many devout Muslims occupied various important positions as
government bureaucrats or private enterpreneurs, Muslims, especially those
who were previously haunted by an inferiority complex, today are proud of
being Muslim. At this stage, as Aswab Mahasin (1990) points out, there is a
process of “priyayisation of the santri” or “embourgeoisement” of the santri
generations (p.138–46). Schwarz reports “[no] longer is Islam seen as the opiate
of the uneducated and economically deprived. Professionals and the middle class
increasingly are seeing it as a religion which can provide for their spiritual needs
in the context of contemporary society” (Schwarz 1994:174).
Fifth, ICMI became an institution in which various contemporary problems faced
by Indonesian society in general and Muslims in particular, are discussed. It
encourages open discussions of many topics which previously had been regarded
as “taboo” politically, as being subversive. Themes like the inadequacies of
contemporary economics, and the inequality of roles and responsibilities of the
majority became main topics of discussion. Within ICMI, Muslim group
consciousness of their being a majority was raised and the need to play a greater
role in nation and state lives was emphasised. ICMI founders and members aimed
to redevelop the self-esteem and dignity of the Muslim community, after a very
long period of being treated as marginal. The statements of Habibie and other
ICMI figures which raised the idea of Muslim marginality implied that there was
a kind of inferiority syndrome among not only the ordinary Muslim community
but also among Muslim intellectuals.
The above development for many young Muslim activists is a good sign for the
Muslim future. They believe that their ideas are now also shared by the
bureaucrats and intellectuals. Their idea to have a more Islamic Indonesia to a
certain degree has come true. There has been a routinisation of ideas previously
proposed by various Islamic youth movements. Ideas that were formerly uniquely
characteristic of the Islamic youth resurgence movement are now becoming
common ideas among Muslims in general.
4.4 Changes: The Recovered Pain
These changes have been viewed differently by various Islamic youth
movements. First, there are those who view these changes positively as clear
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evidence of a rise in the predominance of Islam. Many formerly critical issues,
such as the marginal role of Muslims in Indonesian political, social, economic
and cultural life, are no longer concerns. When many Muslim intellectuals and
leaders became members of the House of Representatives and became Ministers,
their numbers lessened Christian influence in the parliament and in the Cabinet.
Some young Muslim activists believe that Islam in Indonesia is no longer
peripheral, no longer kept in a ‘corner’ (terpojok) position. The friendly attitude
of the government toward Islam is regarded as reflecting purely good intentions
for which the Islamic community should be grateful.
Second, other young Muslim activists have responded carefully to the
government's action and to recent Islamic developments in Indonesia. They view
these as something for which they should be grateful but, at the same time,
something they should be wary of. In their view, it is true that there have been
some changes in the government's attitude toward Islam, but they question the
motives behind those changes. They are worried that this apparent attitude
represents a government strategy to gain wider support from the Muslim
community. They are worried about being used by others, as previously in
Indonesian Islamic history. Despite their worries, they believe that such changes
and developments will benefit their movement. They hope that the decline in
military suspicion of Islam will create a much wider opportunity for dakwah
activity. Islamic youth activities, which previously were always suspected as
being political activities, today are conducted freely, without the fear of being
accused of subversiveness. Nowadays Islamic dakwah activities involve almost
all strata of society, from the lower to elite classes, from children to older people.
The third view is quite extreme. Some young Muslim activists maintain that as
long as an Islamic system has not been adopted across the board and as long as
an Indonesian Islamic state has not been established, there has been no significant
progress or development. For them, the increasing number of Muslims in the
House of Representatives and in the new Cabinet are not signs of advances for
Islam in Indonesia. They argue that recent developments are similar to others
in the previous history of Islam in Indonesia. Many times, they believe, Muslims
have been tricked into unwaranted rejoicing.
It is difficult to pin-point exactly which view belongs to which movement since
among those youth movements each of these views is shared among them. Among
members of the Young DI movement and ex-LP3K, for example, I found two
different views, one which views the social and political changes carefully and
moderately and the other which claims those changes have nothing to do with
Islamic prospects. In the latter view, “there have been no changes at all as long
as the existing regime remains in control.” As long as the existing system is not
replaced by Islam, there is no significant change.
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Similar division can also be seen among other movements. It is quite different
in those movements which originated outside Indonesia. Indonesian social and
political changes have no significant impact on them, because they already have
certain standards which have been drawn up internationally. One informant, a
sympathiser (or probably a member) of Hizb al-Tahrir, said “it is true that there
are some changes within society, but they are nothing as long as the Islamic
Caliphate (Khilafah Islam) has not been established (in Indonesia or
internationally) and as long as Muslims’ thought is far from the true Islamic
thought.” This is an example of the extreme view.
Unlike the Young DI, LP3K and Hizb al-Tahrir, the Darul Arqam and Jamaah
Tabligh seem to be happy (or not bothered) with those social and political
changes. This is perhaps because they put more emphasis on ritual aspects and
are less concerned with social and political matters. Jamaah Tabligh for example
always tries to avoid even talking about political matters. Darul Arqam’s view
toward those changes can be found in a book written by its leader Ashaari
Muhammad, Presiden Suharto Ikut Jadual Allah (President Suharto Follows God's
Schedule). In this book he supported President Suharto for doing the pilgrimage
to Mecca, and praised him for becoming a much better Muslim. On the evidence
of this view, these movements belong to the first category which view these
changes positively as clear evidence of a rise in the influence of Islam.
Despite these differences of opinion, political, social and cultural changes have
inevitably influenced Islamic resurgence movements among young people.
During the development period, those revivalist movements encountered
resistance and criticism from many parts of the community and the government.
Moreover, with various changes within society, they in turn were forced to
change certain aspects of their movement to suit current social and political
situations. Therefore, in order to survive and to make their ideas more acceptable
to a wider community, they modified their original doctrines, their methods of
education, their syllabus, and their views of the current social and political
situations. During this adaptation process they were often trapped into internal
conflicts, which often ended in disunity (perpecahan) among them. Although all
of the movements tried to adapt to the current situation, their degree of
adaptation varied considerably.
The adaptation process resulted in new trends among the resurgent Islamic youth
movements. Previously, most of them were quite radical, and they paid more
attention to increasing Islamic emotional attachment. Since the late 1980s Islamic
youth movements have varied in how radical they are. At least two major trends
developed among young Muslim activists: namely ‘activism’ and ‘intellectualism.’
The former trend is seen among young Muslim activists who put more emphasis
on Islamic activism and behaviour, that is concrete and visible application of
Islam. They believe that Islam should be applied comprehensively to daily life
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activities, including those of the individual or of the community. Today, in their
view, Islam is not visible in Muslims' daily activities, and consequently the
blessing of God and His glory have never been gained by Muslims. The
intellectualism is represented by those who believe that the thinking (pemikiran)
of the Islamic community should be enlightened, and that Muslims'
understanding of Islam should be reconstructed. They argue that the main cause
of various problems faced by Muslims is due to intellectual weakness and
backwardness. Unlike other activists, they pay more attention to the intellectual
aspects of Islam.
The activist camp is divided into five categories: ritualists, mystics, radicals,
philanthropists and fun-seekers (hura-hura). Ritualists are those young Muslim
activists who stress the ‘ritual’ aspect of Islam, or the concrete aspects of
Islam. They wish to practise Islamic activities, exemplified, they believe, by the
Prophet (sunnah), and they call these practices “rituals”. According to them, the
Islamic community has strayed from the sunnah. Such a tendency can be seen
clearly, for example, among the Darul Arqam and Jama'ah Tabligh movements.
They wear a special type of clothing, wear beards and moustaches, have special
ways of eating and other behaviour, which they believe are sunnah.
The mystics emphasise the mystical aspects of Islam. They seem to be unsatisfied
with those Islamic organisations and movements that are devoid of the mystical
aspects of Islam. They began to involve themselves in various tariqat (Islamic
mysticism) orders. In the Bandung pesantren Bengkel Ahlak Darut Tauhid (see
Appendix E), about four thousand people, mostly students each week, attend
sermons which always finish with a kind of “collective confession” during which
all attending cry. An informant said that through this kind of sermon “I
experienced the pleasure of crying”. As in tariqat orders santri are also
introduced to a package of dzikir (recitation).
The third category are the radicals including those who wish to change,
revolutionarily and immediately, the existing system including the government
into an Islamic system. According to this group, the world is divided into two
sides: the Islamic (God's system) and the non-Islamic (thaguth or jahiliyah).21
These two sides, in their view, cannot accommodate one another. Furthermore,
they view every aspect of life from this radical ‘black or white’ perspective.
Since the present system is non-Islamic, it should be changed as soon as possible.
Within this category, there are usually imam (leaders), who take their followers'
oaths (membaiah). Included in this category of radicals are the Young Darul Islam
movements, and Islamic youth movements which are genealogically related to
the Darul Islam movement.
21 Thaguth means evil or anything worshipped that is other than God. Jahiliyah (state of ignorance)
refers to pre-Islamic paganism and pre-Islamic times.
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The philanthropists stress the social aspects of Islam. In their view, Islam should
help and assist people who are poor, who have suffered and who are oppressed.
For them, freeing peple from their suffering means applying Islam to other
people. Such a tendency derives from their dissatisfaction with other Islamic
organisations which neglect the social aspects of Islam. Their activities are
directed toward helping people in rural areas, or in the slums of urban areas.
Their activities include teaching children who do not go to school, helping at
orphanages, being readers for the blind and other social actions.
‘Fun-seekers’ represent a new trend among young Muslim activists. They are
more interested in fun activities but their actions are still inspired by Islamic
teachings. This tendency, I believe, is a response to other Islamic groups and
activities, which they view as too strict and rigid to accommodate those of an
elite and Westernised younger generation. This young elite Westernised group
has found psychological and social difficulties in involving themselves in many
existing Islamic activities. Besides ordinary religious sermons, they often hold
glamorous activities, such as big artistic performances, concerts, dances and
other big events. One channel of development for this category is through various
radio stations. In Bandung, one of the favourite stations is the Ardan radio
station, and in Jakarta Prambors Rasisonia radio station (Tempo 29:4:1994).
The intellectuals can be divided into three sub-categories: philosophers,
pseudo-scientists and Islamic-experts (tafaquh fial-din). The first includes those
who focus on Islamic philosophy in particular and philosophy in general. They
try to revitalise Islamic philosophy through various study centers and Islamic
higher education. The pseudo-scientists are Muslim activists who try to seek
scientific explanations of Islamic teachings. They argue that Islam, and the Qur'an
in particular, are scientific, and the true Islam, for them, should be scientific
Islam (Islam yang ilmiah). The last category of Islamic experts is more interested
in Islamic knowledge in general and Islamic law in particular. This tendency
can be seen clearly in the emergence of various Pesantren Mahasiswa (University
student pesantren), which like ordinary pesantren, teach their santris (students)
Islamic knowledge. In Bandung, there are at least two Pesantren Mahasiswa,
namely Miftahul Khair (Key of Goodness) and Fi Zhilal al Quran (In the Shade of
the Qur'an).22 Similar types of pesantren have also been established in other cities
such as Bogor and Yogyakarta.
Compared to activism, intellectualism tendency seems to have a much better
future. First of all -unless there are dramatic political changes- a more stable
social and political climate will give a greater possibility to the development of
this trend, and at the same time militate against the development of activism,
especially the radical one. Activism can easily develop in a situation where
22 This name is taken from the book of Sayyid Qutb Fi Zhilal al-Qur'an, 30 volumes of Qutb's comment
on the Qur'an.
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ideological conflicts frequently occur, or in a time of political turmoil. Second,
the next period of Islam, as Kuntowijoyo (1985:71–7) points out, will be a period
of “ideas and science” in which the Islamic community, including young people,
become more enlightened. This is a period when modern communication
technology will give Muslims a wider access to information, including
information about the Islamic ummat in other parts of the world and about the
diverse views of Islam.
 The emergence of these idiosyncratic categories of Islamic youth movements
shows that in conjunction with the social, political and cultural changes in
Indonesia, Islamic resurgence movements among young people also change. In
response to resistance and criticism from the community, they modify their
original teachings and doctrines by adding, emphasising, playing down and
eliminating certain aspects of their own movement. Because each movement has
responded differently, there is greater variation in the emphases of the
movements. Some of these categories already existed before, but they developed
and spread more widely in the 1990s, when they gained more followers than
before. The influence and popularity of some other categories declined.
This stage, borrowing Weber's term (1947:358–373), is the routinisation of
charisma, a phase in which charismatic ideals and practices are transformed
-either traditionalised or rationalised, or a combination of both- into a “permanent
routine structure.” In Weber's view this transformation is based on “(1) the ideal
and also the material interests of the followers in the continuation and the
continual reactivation of the community; (2) the still stronger ideal and also
stronger material interest of the charismatic leader in continuing their
relationship.” Similar to Weber, Anthony F. C. Wallace (1979:427) named this
stage as the routinisation stage in which effective actions and programs of the
movement in “nonritual spheres [reduced] stress-generating situations, … [and]
established as normal economic, social, and political institutions and customs.”
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Chapter 5: Conclusion: Continuation
of TAJDID Tradition
At the turn of each century there will arise in this ummah those who
will call for a religious renewal (the Prophet Muhammad, in Abu Daud,
Cairo 1348)
The argument developed in this thesis is that contemporary Islamic resurgence
among young people in Bandung, Indonesia, is a continuation of tajdid (renewal)
tradition in Muslim societies. Current Islamic resurgence is another form of
Muslim internal transformation that attempts to maintain the Muslim commitment
to the fundamental principles of Islam and to reconstruct an Islamic society in
accord with the Qur'an and the Sunnah (Traditions of the Prophet). The tajdid
movement has always been related to two aspects of Muslims' lives -the spiritual
and the worldly-which cannot be separated. The former refers to an attempt to
purge Islamic teachings and practices of non-Islamic influences and to present
it once again in its original pure forms. The latter refers to an endeavour to solve
social, economic, political, and cultural problems faced by the Muslim
community.
Like previous reformist movements such as the Muhammadiyah movement
(founded in 1912) and Persatuan Islam movement (founded in 1923), current
Islamic resurgence attempts to call Muslims to return to the basic teaching of
Islam, the Qur'an and sunnah. The difference is that the contemporary Islamic
movement not only promotes purification of Islamic beliefs and rituals from
bid'ah (innovation), khurafat (superstitions) and pre-Islamic traditions and
practices but also promotes purification of much wider aspects of Muslims' lives,
including economic, social and cultural institutions and practices, from both
foreign and native non-Islamic influences.
 Similarly, like Muhammadiyah and PERSIS which -directly or not- struggled
for Indonesian independence from the Dutch colonial domination, current Islamic
movements, also have the same spirit, ie. to free themselves from another form
of domination. This refers to the idea that the overwhelming Muslim majority
(during the New Order) has always been marginal and under the domination of
certain minority groups. It also refers to foreign cultural domination which is
believed to threaten Muslim identity.
Like previous Islamic reform movements, the contemporary Islamic movement
arose both from within the local tradition of Islam and undoubtedly under the
influence of international Islamic movements. Previously, the international
influence was limited in terms of ideas and merely spread through personal
communication or books which only arrived in Indonesia after long delays.
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There was thus a clear time gap between the Islamic movement in Indonesia and
other parts of the world. This is very different from the contemporary Islamic
movement. Through the advance of electronic mass media international influence
is not limited to the slow spread of Islamic ideas. Islamic ideas can spread rapidly
and widely regardless of national boundaries. Moreover, this globalisation era
enables one movement in one Muslim country not only to spread its ideas but
also to establish its branches in other countries. The growth of the global system
reinforces the notion of the unity of the Muslim community (ummah).
This study examines current Islamic resurgence in three stages of development.
The first stage which I called the foundation of the movement, refers to the early
emergence of the movement in which certain individuals experienced spiritual
dissatisfaction. Through these individuals the idea of dissatisfaction spread
widely in particular social, political, economic and cultural conditions. The next
stage was the development of the movement in which these individual figures
and their followers established various organisations through which the Islamic
resurgence ideas spread in agressive and pervasive ways. The conditions of the
early emergence remained similar. Both stages were characterised by emotional
and radical features. The third stage was routinisation of the movement, a phase
in which social, political, economic and cultural conditions were transformed
into more desired conditions. In response to this transformation various Islamic
groups changed their original teachings and doctrines to adapt to the new
conditions. These new conditions also created a new ground for the emergence
of new types of Islamic movements ie. mystic and intellectualistic.
This study confirms the “processual structure” of revitalisation movements of
Anthony F.C. Wallace. Islamic resurgence in Bandung, however, seem to be in
conflict with his prediction that “Human affairs around the world seems more
and more commonly to be decided without reference to supernatural powers.”
(1979:428). He further argued that:
… the evolutionary future of religion is extinction. Belief in supernatural
beings and in supernatural forces that affected nature without obeying
nature's law will erode and become only an interesting historical memory.
To be sure, [religious movement] is not likely to occur in the next
generation; the process will very likely take several hundred years, and
there will always remain individuals or even occasional small cult groups
who respond to hallucination, trance and obsession with a supernaturalist
interpretation. But as a cultural trait, belief in supernatural powers is
doomed to die out, all over the world, as a result of the increasing
adequacy and diffusion of scientific knowledge … the process is
inevitable (1966:264–5).
In contrast with Wallace prediction, the forgoing survey shows how modern
people in a globalisation era become much more attached to religion not viceversa.
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 Furthermore, the study of Islamic resurgence among young people in Bandung
shows that, as Nakamura says, “Islam [in Indonesia] has been getting stronger”
(1983:181). This also confirms Victor Tanja's statement that “the history of Islam
in Indonesia is a history of expansion (perluasan) of santri civilisation and its
influence on religious lives, social and politics in Indonesia. … Despite the
presence of various obstructive factors, the foundation for santri influence,
which is gradually broadening, has been built.” This broadening influence of
santri, in the 1980s, is marked by the process of “santrinisation” or
“santrification” of the priyayi (Schwarz 1994), also known as Islamisasi Birokrasi
(Islamisation of bureaucracy). At the same time there are also process of
“embourgeoisement of santri” (Mahasin 1990) or the “priyayisation of santri”
and the “intellectualisation of santri” (Anwar 1994:212). These processes created
what many observers have called a “santri middle class” which has filled various
positions from bureaucrats, entrepreneur, academics to NGO activists. At this
point, Geertz's dichotomisation of santri and priyayi seems to have been diffused,
if indeed it exist (Ibid,:214, cf. Harry Chan Silalahi in Hefner 1993:31).
This tendency seems to continue to develop along with the growth of the santri
middle class, the renaissance of Muslim intellectuals and the more accommodative
attitude of the government toward Islam. This tendency is also associated with
a new orientation of Islam in Indonesia, that is, cultural Islam not political or
ideological Islam. The future trend of young Muslim activists, along with this
general tendency, seems to be more intellectual in its nature but at the same time
strictly attached to the fundamental sources of Islam.
The tendency of the Islamic resurgence movement among young people toward
a more intellectual nature cannot be separated from the ideas proposed by
the Muslim intellectuals movement. The intellectuals endeavour to shift Islamic
values as scientific conceptions which balance out various established
conceptions, including social and economic conceptions (Anwar 1994:225). This
seems to be in conjunction with the concerns of the youth movement of Islamic
resurgence which wants to apply Islamic values in all aspects of the Muslims'
lives. One of the most important evidence of this was the birth of ICMI in 1990
in which the paths of two movements, of Muslim intellectuals and Muslim youth,
converged at the same point.
Islamic resurgence is a global phenomenon throughout the Muslim world;
however, it is unique from one culture to another. Unlike Islamic resurgence in
the Middle East, Islamic resurgence in Indonesia did not take its form in radical
political activism and revolutionary action. There was a tendency toward political
and revolutionary activism, but it carried little power. The common tendency
rather is more cultural in nature, ie. “an attempt which does not challenge
dramatically and in revolutionary terms the established social and cultural system
through political and military force. [It is Muslims'] attempt to colour and fill
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the established social and cultural building with Islamic spiritual and moral
perspectives” (Anwar 1994:226). This Islamic cultural strategy, as Munawir
Sjadzali said, “creates a comfort atmosphere, invites sympathy and creates a
much better relation between Islamic community and the New Order government
(Mizan 1990:49–53).”
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Appendix A: The Meeting Forum of
Islamic Campus Preaching
Organisations
The second meeting was held in Salman ITB at January 1987. The meeting was
titled Sarasehan Antar Lembaga Dakwah di Kampus. During the meeting the
word Sarasehan was changed to Silaturrahim, an Arabic word meaning
brotherhood or friendship bond. According to an informant who was involved
in the meeting, use of the word Saresehan was criticised because it came from
Javanese, seen as the source of Kejawen.1 This second meeting resulted in several
agreements. They agreed to hold coordinated activities involving active
participation by Islamic Preaching Institutions on many campuses. These
coordinated activities were Islamic Training (Dauroh Dirosah Islamiyah) in IPB
Bogor, Preaching Management Training (Latihan Management Dakwah) in Salman
of ITB, Muslim Women's Training (Bina Wanita dan Keluarga) in all LDK and
publication of the bulletin Al-Urwah.2 Another agreement was that Salman of
ITB should become the Coordinating Centre for Campus Islamic Preaching
Institutions for all of Java (Pusat Komunikasi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus se-Jawa).
The third meeting was held in September 1987, at Air Langga University.
Delegations from 30 important universities in Java attended this meeting. Two
important agreements arose from this meeting. First, the name of meeting was
changed to Forum Silaturahim Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (FSLDK, Forum of
Campus Preaching Institutions), by which it is still known. Second, the forum
agreed on a set of basic required activities (kegiatan standar internal) for a campus
preaching institution. The delegations also agreed to keep the forum informal,
without either a leader or an organisational structure. The intention was to keep
the forum independent and free from pressures that could threaten the dakwah
movement. There was concern that if the forum had a formal organisational
structure like other Islamic organisations it would be easily infiltrated and
coopted by other interests.3
In the following meeting (1988) of the “Forum of Campus Islamic Preaching
Institutions in All Java” (Forum Silaturrahim Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (FS-LDK)
se-Jawa), another important step was taken. Participants agreed to formulate a
set of guide lines for Islamic Preaching Institutions in Campuses comprising
1 Kejawen is mysticism associated with the Javanese view of the world, and general Javanese knowledge.
Javanese beliefs and traditions were regarded by many participants (most of them Javanese) as un-Islamic.
2 An Arabic word meaning ‘link’. It was taken from The Qur'an, chapter 2: 256. This name is similar to
the political journal of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani al-Urwat al-Wuthqa (The Most Solid Link).
3 These could be government authorities, especially army intellegence operatives, and other groups
which were believed always to be hostile to Islam. Included here were Christian elites.
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directions, aims and targets of dakwah attempts to revive Islam as shown by the
Prophet. Through these guidelines, activists hoped to create a common perception
of direction for the dakwah movement. These guidelines were called Khittah
LDK. Khittah LDK could not explain all aspects of dakwah or provide a
comprehensive understanding of it. Khittah LDK was only a brief and practical
guide which often did not suit the different campus conditions. To fill in the
gaps, the forum agreed to develop Mafahim (understanding), a set of LDK
conceptions (cara pandang LDK) regarding three fundamental issues in Islam,
namely aqidah (basic faith), shariah (Islamic law) and dakwah. The Mafahim was
prepared by a committee consisting of a few representatives in consultation with
some ulamas. After it was reviewed by a special meeting in Pesantren Ngruki,
in central Java, the Mafahim was later distributed to all Campus Islamic Preaching
Institutions in Java, and on some campuses Mafahim became the source reference
for Islamic education (pembinaan ke-Islaman).
Since 1989, when the fifth meeting was held in IKIP (Teaching and Education
Institute) Malang, the scope of the forum has been widened to include all of
Indonesia. The name itself was changed to Forum Silaturahim Lembaga Dakwah
Kampus se-Indonesia (Forum of Campus Preaching Institutions in All Indonesia).
Participants at the meeting not only came from Islamic Preaching Institutions
on Javanese university campuses but also from other islands in Indonesia.
Attending the meeting were delegations from Sumatera, Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara
and Bali. This was an attempt to the spread the dakwah movement to other
campuses in big cities outside Java. Moreover, the idea was also put forward by
some activists of Islamic Preaching Institutions outside Java who had attended
the meeting as observers (peninjau). By 1994 the forum had been convened nine
times. Every year the scope of the meeting became much wider and the number
of participants increased.
In the Bandung and the East Priangan region, FSLDK is held every year hosted
in turn by various universities. In early 1994, the FSLDK meeting was hold for
the ninth time, this time in Mandala College of Technology (Sekolah Tinggi
Teknologi Mandala) Bandung. About 60 delegates from Islamic preaching
institutions from various colleges, academies and universities attended this
meeting. They came from most parts of West Java, including Sukabumi, Cianjur,
Karawang, Bandung, Sumedang, Cirebon, Tasikmalaya and Ciamis (DKM
Baiturrahman STTM, 1994). Some of the universities had already established
Islamic preaching institutions on their campuses, such as ITB and UNPAD, but
others were still planing to do so even if they did not have any idea what an
Islamic preaching institution is. The meeting identified one of its aims as being
to encourage campuses with established institutions to share experiences with
others that do not have one, encouraging and helping them.
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Appendix B: The Nature of Reformist
and Modernist Islam
These terms, ‘reformist’ and ‘modernist,’ refer to Islamic groups or individuals
who believe that the Islamic community drew on stagnating ideas (kejumudan
pemikiran) and was trapped in diverge act mysticism, superstision (khurafat),
innovation (bid'ah), and even worse, that Islamic community had fallen to
Western (Christian Europe) domination. To solve these problems, they asked
and persuaded Muslims to reanalyse and reinterpret Islamic doctrines in a
language and formulation that would be accepted as ‘modern thought’. Islam
should be understood rationally and should be presented in a form that was
appropriate to the contemporary situation, so that Islam would be able to compete
with the modern civilisation. Through this way, it was believed, the Islamic
community (umat Islam) would be able to free themselves from Western
colonialism, poverty, ignorance and backwardness, and would return to the real
situation of Islam, in which Islam was superior to other powers.
Reformist attempts center on three issues. First is purification of Islamic doctrines
and practices (fiqh, jurisprudence, law covering all aspects of life including
rituals) from superstition (khurafat), innovation (bid'ah), and un-Islamic influences
and traditions, which are commonly accepted by Muslims as proper Islam. The
second issue concerns the Islamic political movement, ie. independence
movements against the Dutch colonial domination and suppression. The third
issue is Islamic educational and social movements which are marked by the
adoption of Western (Dutch) organisational and educational systems and ideas,
including those of Christian missionaries, without violating Islamic principles.
The result of this adoption was the establishment of Islamic schools, social and
political organisations, scout movements and missionaries with modern Western
(Dutch) methods and techniques. Among these three issues, the first issue, i.e.
the fiqh issue became the most important issue, often creating tension among
Muslim groups. Because of this, modernists and reformists often concentrate
only on the fiqh issue.
These reformist and modernist ideas were represented by Islamic organisations
such as Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam (PERSIS, Islamic Unity), Al-Irsyad,
Jamiatul Khaer and Sarikat Dagang Islam (SDI, Muslim Trade association) which
later became Sarekat Islam (SI, Muslim Association). The roots of these movements
can be traced back to the Islamic purification movement of Muhammad ibn Abd
al-Wahab, the Pan-Islamic political struggle of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, the
Muhammad Abduh reformist movement and other movements developed in the
Middle East, especially in Mecca and Cairo. These reformist and modernist
movements, since they challenged Islamic traditionalists, later provoked the
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establishment of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, the Rise of Religious Scholars), which
was worried that Islamic traditions would dissapear (Ali and Effendy 1986).
Sociologically, there are two distinct characteristics of the reformist and modernist
movements. First, different from traditionalist groups which centered in rural
areas (pedesaan) and developed among peasant community, they commonly
developed among educated and entrepreneur circles in urban areas (perkotaan).
This tendency, according to Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy, derives from two
different responses of religious figures (ulama) toward the Western (Dutch
Christian) cultures. The traditionalist circles tended to avoid Western penetration
and isolated themselves from contact with Western agents by establishing
religious institutions, educational and other social institutions exclusively in
rural areas. This isolation strategy, Ali further argues, was even more
strengthened and justified by the Prophet Muhammad's words “man tasyabbaha
bi qoumin fahuwa min hum”: Those who imitate (traditions of) a group of people
are part of them. On the contrary, modernist circles, usually businessmen and
educated people in urban areas, had closer contact with the Western culture
and its agents which clearly existed in urban areas.
The second sociological characteristic of the reformist and modernist movement
is that the followers and supporters are usually of the younger generations. The
radical reformist approaches and rebellious attitudes toward traditions and
practices existing in the Islamic community, attracted young people. Borrowing
Ben Anderson explanation in his Java in time of Revolution: Occupation and
Resistance 1944–1946, young people played more of a role than the elite
intellectuals in the Indonesian revolution. This important role of young people
in Java, Anderson argues, is based on the Javanese cultural view that youth is
the period of isolation, transition and independence, which is potentialy
rebellious (Anderson, 1972:2–7, cf. Hadiz's, 1992:22–3 and Tholkhah, 1994:8–9).
Young people, who came from of the traditionalist circles in rural areas, were
acquainted with the modernists ideas in urban areas, where they studied or
worked. When they returned to their country areas they spread what they
learned in cities. As a result of this, there was an inevitably conflict between
the young modernist generation and older traditionalist generation (Noer, 1973:6,
216–46).
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Appendix C: International Islamic
Movements and Their Presence in
Indonesia
Ikhwan al-Muslimin was established in 1928 in Ismailyya, Egypt by Hasan
al-Banna, a charismatic figure who later became the first leader of the movement.
He was born in Mahmudiyya, a small town in the Nile delta, in 1906 in a strong
Muslim middle class family. His father was a sheikh and the Imam of a mosque,
who was also a student at the Al-Azhar in the time of Muhammad Abduh, one
of the most important figures of Islamic modernist tradition in Egypt. After
finishing his study at the local Teacher Training College, Hasan al-Banna
continued his study at Dar al-Ulum College in Cairo. In his school days, Banna
involved himself in various Islamic associations which emphasised individual
religious and moral reform and on commitment to preach Islam to other Muslims
by visiting mosques, public entertainment centres, coffee houses and other
public gatherings. When he graduated in 1927, he joined the government service
and served as a teacher in a Ismailiyya primary school but finally resigned in
1946.
Hasan al-Banna's experience in Cairo greatly influenced his idea to establish the
Muslim Brethren (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) movement. In Cairo he met Rashid Rida
(1865–1935) and his Salafiyya (Islamic reform) movement which promoted
political and social aspects of Islamic reform, the need for an Islamic State and
the introduction of Islamic law. Hasan al-Banna was also attracted by Rida's ideas
of total Islamic self-sufficiency and of the danger of Westernisation. At the same
time, in Cairo he also saw the presence of British political and cultural domination
which threatened traditional Egyptian society and Islam. The Westernisation
threat, he believed, came not only from British colonial officials, but also from
Westernised Egyptian elites who attempted to replicate Western models of
political, social and economic development.
Hasan al-Banna, like Rashid Rida, saw Western secularism and materialism as
the major causes of Egypt's political, social and economic problems, and of
Muslim impotence and decline. Hasan al-Banna believed that only through return
to Islam, following the Qur'an and the example (sunnah) of the Prophet, would
Muslim all over the world recover from their ilness. Different from his modernist
predecessors, who were deeply concerned with Western learning, he stressed
the perfection and comprehensiveness of Islam and its self-sufficiency. Concerned
with these problems, he then formed Islamic discussion groups. Later in 1928,
a year after he finished his study at the Dar al-Ulum College he established the
movement called Ikhwan al-Muslimin, the Muslim Brethren. Hasan al-Banna
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who was the “unique embodiment of the Sufi spiritualist, Islamic scholar, activist
leader who possessed a rare ability to evoke mass support by translating doctrinal
complexities into social action” (Dekmejian 1985:80) made the movement develop
rapidly.
There is no clear information about when exactly this Islamic movement came
to Indonesia. However, from various books written by many members of Ikhwan
al-Muslimin, which were later translated into Indonesian, it appears that the
ideas of the movement reached Indonesia in the early 1970s. From the translation
books which were used by various Islamic youth groups in Indonesia in their
early development, it is clear that among other movements, Ikhwan al-Muslimin
played the most important role. It is also not clear whether this movement has
a formal branch in Indonesia or not. However, there are many young Muslim
activists who regard themselves as member of Ikhwan al-Muslimin. Among
Islamic youth activists, it is often called ‘IM’.
  Hizb al-Tahrir (Liberation Party) was established in 1953 in Lebanon by
Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani, a great thinker, politician and Jerussalem Supreme
Judge. The movement spread throughout the Middle East especially in Jordan.
The main aim of this movement, as stated in its constitution, was to carry out
Islamic life and to re-establish a Khilafah Islam (Islamic Caliphate). Ideas of the
movement were introduced to Indonesia from 1987, mostly in some large cities
of Java, such as Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Yogyakarta and Surabaya, and
especially on university campuses. Books and papers about this movement had
limited circulation among university students.
As admitted by one of its propagandists, Hizb al-Tahrir as an exclusive movement
does not exist in Indonesia. However, its ideas have been spread systematically
through a method of education called halaqah, a study group under an Ulama.
Within the halaqah, about 23 reference books are studied, including Nizham
al-Islam (the Islamic way of life), al-Nizham al-Iqtisadi fi al-Islam (the Islamic
Economic System), Al-Shakhsiyat al-Islamiyah (Islamic Personality), and Naqd
al-Isytiraiyat al-Marksiyah (Critique of Socialism-Marxism). Like other
movements, this one tried to apply Islam to all aspects of daily life. However,
practical and symbolic matters, such as ritual practices and moral attitudes
towards television, and music, were left up to members themselves.
In Indonesia, as in other countries where this movement developed, the
movement spread its ideas secretly. In Iraq, Syria, Lybia, Jordan, Egypt and
Tunis many figures of this movement were arrested and killed. For this reason,
Hizb al-Tahrir became an underground movement. Some of the reference books
were even buried by members of the movement for security reasons. Because
of the need for secrecy, relations amongst branches of the movement in various
countries were very weak. This is turn led to large differences in the Hizb
al-Tahrir movement from country to country.
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Another movement was Darul Arqam (Arabic Dar al-Arqam, Arqam territory).1
Members of this movement can be identified easily by their clothes and features.
Male members usually wear a long dark or grey dress, and a turban. They also
usually have a thin moustache and a beard. Female members usually wear black
clothes which covered all parts of their body, except their eyes. They open their
veils (cadar), which cover their faces, when they are in a female area or when
they are among their muhrim (unmarriageable relatives)2 Another distinct
characteristic of members is their practice of eating together from the same
container. In Indonesia, especially in Bandung, this movement has developed
and attracted students since early 1990.
This movement was established in Malaysia in 1972 by Muhammad Suhaimi.
Suhaimi was born in Wonosobo, Central Java in 1295 Hijri (1917). According to
members of Arqam, Suhaimi was the 33rd descendant of the Prophet Muhammad.
In Singapore and Malaysia Suhaimi created controversy, when he taught a wirid
(recitation), called Awrad Muhammadiyah. According to his followers, this wirid
was directly given by the Prophet inside the Ka'bah in Mecca. The wirid consists
of recitating 50 times the istighfar (astagfirullah, I ask God's forgiveness), reciting
the al-Ikhlas chapter of the Qur'an, and reciting 50 times the Shalawat Nabi
(invocation of the Prophet). This Awrad Muhammadiyah, which is believed to
diverge from true Islamic teachings, became one of the reasons that Darul Arqam
was banned in Indonesia in 1994. Already, in 1990, the West Sumatran MUI
(Assembly of Indonesian Ulama) had banned this movement for the same reason.
Darul Arqam was also banned in Malaysia in 1994 because of its ultimate aim to
apply the Prophet's preaching strategy, i.e. to create an Islamic village that would
develop into a wider region and finally into an Islamic state. Malaysian
government accused the Darul Arqam of preaparing arm forces, which
threathened national security (Panji Masyarakat 21:7:1994).3
1 Arqam was the name of one of the Prophet's companions. In the early period of Islam, his house became
a secret centre for the spreading of Islam; a meeting place of the Prophet and His followers, and a place
to educate new coverts.
2 In Arabic mahram means ‘forbidden’. In Islamic law, it is the degree of consanguinity between a man
and woman that renders marriage impossible but gives them the right of association.
3 On 20 October 1994, Ashari Muhammad, ex-leader of the Darul Arqam which has been banned since
5 August 1994, admitted in front of Malaysian ulama and mufti (official expounder of Islamic law) that
the Darul Arqam teachings, especially Awrad Muhammadiyah, were wrong and conflicted with Islamic
teachings. He also admitted that he made stories about his meeting with the Prophet in order to assure
his followers. Furthermore, he promised to correct and reeducate his followers who had been lost. In
this meeting Ashaari Muhammad, who always wore a long dark cloth and turban, wore a white Malay
cloth and a white cap (peci) without turban. Likewise, his wife, who usually wore a black veil that
covered her face, wore the usual veil that only covers hair, neck and shoulder (Panji Masyarakat
1:11:1994). His confession raised then question whether he honestly and consciously admitted his wrong
doing or did so merely because he was forced to do so to save himself, his followers and his movement
from the government restrictions. How he could easily and suddenly change his mind after 26 years
was difficult to understand. Would he be able to change his followers' beliefs and practices?.
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Jama'ah Tabligh is another Islamic movement that has attracted many young
people, most of them students. Like Darul Arqam, female followers usually wear
dark clothes which cover all parts of their body. Male members usually have a
moustache and beard. Their practice of eating from the same container using
their hands and sitting on the floor are similar to the habit of Darul Arqam
members. The differences is that they wear special Indian-style clothes, and
they always use a siwak (tooth brush made of speical wood). They claim that all
of these habits identified them as the sunnah (tradition) of the Prophet.
This movement was established in India in 1930 by Syaikh Malik Maulana
Muhammad Ilyas (1887–1948). According to its members, the emergence of
this movement was inspired by the fact that the Muslim mentality had
degenerated, and that mosques were empty. There was no other solution except
to resume the teachings of the Prophet. One of its main activities is called khuruj
(to go out), which means to go out to do dakwah (preaching). Members usually
walk from house to house, from mosque to mosque, and this is not limited by
country boundaries. Senior members of the movement usually visit various
neighbouring countries.4 During khuruj, members usually stay at the mosques
they are targetting. According to this movement, khuruj activity can be done
for about three days a week, a month in a year, or at least 40 days in a whole
lifetime.
Their khuruj activities usually start with visiting Muslim families and inviting
them to come the mosque to pray. One member of the khuruj group, which
usually consisted of less then ten persons, gives a bayan (speech) after prayer.
The speeches, according to the constitution of the movement, would deal with
politics or khilafiyah (differences in the Muslim community in matters of doctrinal
importance); would not ask for charity or talk about others' mistakes; and would
not humiliate the government, other groups or particular individuals. The
movement's slogan, according to a member of Jama'ah Tabligh, was “if there is
something wrong correct it immediately, and do not engage in polemic” (Tempo
3:4:1993).
From these Islamic groups emerges an important issue. Although they have
similar ideological views and orientation ie. to solve problems faced by the
Muslim ummat, they differently identify what these problems are. These
differences have resulted in offering different solutions and emphasising different
aspects. This is especially the case among those Islamic groups which come from
overseas, such as the Middle East and India, since they originally emerged in
different countries with different causes, different historical backgrounds and
different cultural settings. These imported Islamic groups although they do not
4 One of my students, at the IAIN, told me that he had visited Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia, although
he had been a member for only two years.
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neglect local Indonesian situations, arere concerned with international Islamic
issues.
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Appendix D: Muslim Intellectuals'
Movement at Glance
Since Indonesian independence, in 1945, along with the process of educational
democratisation, there has been a strong demand for education, including tertiary
education (Ranuwiharjo 1991:53). Because of their underprivileged condition,
in terms of status and finance, very few students, who came from santri
background, had access to higher education (Tempo 14.6.1986). In the 1960s,
when the number of higher level education institutions increased rapidly,
students from santri circles began to have a wider access to continue their study
to the tertairy level. The result of this was that in the 1970s those students who
graduated from various tertiary educational institutions began to occupy
bureaucratic positions in the government, and some of them became involved
in private and business circles.
In the political sphere, however, they did not give voice to their view, especially
because at that period, as McVey (1983:199) puts it, the New Order regime of
Suharto “[restricted much more] the political and social role of Islam than the
preceding leftist government of Sukarno had dared”. Such restrictions, as a
matter of fact, had been experienced by Indonesian Muslims since the late 19th
century, when the Dutch began to colonise the Indonesian archipelago. The
Dutch realised that Islamic political power threatened their domination. C. Snouck
Hurgronje, the architect of Dutch policy on Muslims affairs, discouraged any
Islamic involvement in politics (McVey 1983:200). Later, long after the Dutch
and other colonial powers left the Indonesian archipelago, the Islamic
de-politisation process continued to take place.
 From such a continuous restriction, Muslims became much more aware of the
sensitivity of an Islamic attribute in political sphere, since it had always been
identified as anti-government and with rebellions to establish an Islamic state.
Moreover, they also became aware of the continuous political defeat experienced
by Muslims by other powers on the political stage. This awareness led to the
need for a new “format” (Ma'arif 1993:177) or “break through” (Tempo June
1986) of Islam in its involvement in Indonesian development in general. In the
late 1960s, Indonesian Muslim intellectuals set out a new step of Islamic history
in Indonesia. Instead of expressing Islam through political jargon, they promoted
what was called “cultural Islam”. By this new strategy, they tried not to be
involved in mass politics, instead they applied a cultural approach to Islamic
revitalisation, which in the long term would neutralise military and government
suspicion and strengthen the “roots of Islam in the nation as a whole”. According
to this new view, Islam should not serve as a political ideology, but as a “source
of ethical and cultural guidance” (Hefner 1994:4, cf. Ali 1986:175–191).
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The emergence of this Muslim intellectual movement cannot be separated from
the role of Nurcholis Madjid, an ex-leader of the Islamic Students' Organisation
(HMI, Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam). One of the most controversial themes
proposed by him was “Islam, yes. Islamic Party no”. In his view, “there is nothing
sacred, except Allah. Islamic parties are not sacred, therefore, it was wrong to
say that those who did not vote for the Islamic party were not Muslim” (Tempo
June 1986). In 1970s, this idea was criticised as being “secular”, that is trying
to separate Islam from political life. Various strong criticisms came from Islamic
militant groups, including various Islamic movements which began to develop
in the same period of time. Despite these criticisms, this Islamic cultural approach
with its friendly (ramah) image gradually gained support from Muslim
intellectuals, and the most important point was that the government seemed not
to be allergic to this new format of Islam. Relations between Muslim intellectuals
and the government became much more intimate, in the sense that those who
promoted cultural Islam either voluntarily or forceably supported government
policies. This could be seen for example when the government launched a “Mass
Organisation” act, which forced all Islamic organisations to replace their
foundation (azas) with Pancasila. Almost all Muslim intellectuals, after a heated
polemic, supported or accepted the rule. In the view of militant Muslims, such
a decision was a major defeat for Muslims. Such accomodative attitudes of Muslim
intellectuals towards the government might be understood also as the only way
to survive in an emergency situation (darurat), because if they openly opposed
or disagreed with government policies, they took risks. For more detail
information about Muslim intellectual movement, its history, classification, and
its role in national development see Federspiel's Muslim Intellectuals and National
Development in Indonesia (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992). See also
Muhammad Kamal Hasan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to “New Order”
Modernization in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1980),
Fachry Ali and Bachtiar Effendy, Merambah Jalan Baru Islam (Bandung: Mizan,
1986), and M.Syafi'i Anwar's thesis, Hubungan Islam dan Birokrasi Orde Baru:
Study tentang Pemikiran dan Perilaku Politik Cendikiawan Muslim dalam Orde
Baru 1966–1993 (Jakarta: Fakultas Pasca-Sarjana Universitas Indonesia, 1994).
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Appendix E: Moral Workshop Daarut
Tauhid: a New Trend among the Youth
Daarut Tauhid was established in September 1990 in Bandung by Haji Abdullah
Gymnastiar, a young ustadz (religious teacher) who always wears a white shirt,
a sarong and a white turban. It is not really an Islamic movement, in terms of
distribution networks and ideological views, but it is similar to an ordinary
pesantren in Indonesia. However, in term of its influence on young Muslim
activists in Bandung it is quite significant. In December 1993, about four
thousand people were attending weekly sermon at the pesantren, most of whom
were university students and school students, who came from various places
throughout West Java.
The main activity of this pesantren, like other pesantren, is daily study of Islamic
subjects, especially Tawhid (Unity of God) and Dzikir (recitation). Dzikir here
does not refer to any classic book of dzikir, like Al-Adzkar of Imam Nawawi (one
of the great Indonesian ulama, whose books became a text book in many
pesantren throughout Indonesia). Abdullah Gymnastiar tries to develop a type
of dzikir based on a book written by Hasan al-Banna, a leader of Ikhwan
al-Muslimin. Once a week there is always a public sermon which is attended by
approximately four thousand people. At the end of this weekly sermon, Agim,
as he is affectionately known, usually asks the audience to reflect on their
previous deeds, and gradually the audience becomes more self-reflective. Finally,
the thousand-strong audience breaks down and cries (Risnawati 1993).
The full name of Abdullah Gimnastiar's pesantren is Bengkel Akhlak (Moral
Workshop) Daarut Tauhid. With this pesantren, Abdullah Gymnastiar wanted
to create Muslims who were “intellectual, devout, and entrepreneurial” (ahli
pikir, ahli dzikir, and ahli ikhtiar) (Tempo 3.4.1993). Furthermore, he wanted to
develop a new strategy and pattern of dakwah in order to make dakwah more
effective (Risnawati 1993). This pesantren organises not only ritual activities,
but also economic and social activities. By 1994, it had 14 businesses including
printing, public transportation, retailing and computer rental. Its assets were
more than Rp. 175 million and each month it earns about Rp. 40 million. From
its name, Bengkel Akhlak it can be understood that this pesantren has become a
place to rehabilitate the morality of its students. According to Gymnastiar,
youngsters who come to the pesantren, generally become better citizens (Tempo
3.4.1993).
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Glossary
Aqidah (Arabic) A statement of doctrine, or an article of faith.
Bai'ah (Arabic) ‘Contract’ or oath of allegiance binding members of an
Islamic sect or Sufi tariqa to their spiritual guide.
Bid'ah (Arabic) Innovation; a view, thing or mode of action that has
formerly not existed or been practised. The term has come
to suggest change in religious belief or action that leads
to heresy, but not necessarily to disbelief.
Dakwah
(Indonesian from
Arabic da'wa)
Missionary or propagatory activities, to call or invite
mankind to believe in the true religion, Islam. This word
also means to make Muslims better Muslims.
Darul Islam
(Arabic Dar
al-Islam)
Realm of Islam; those lands under Muslim rule.
Fiqh (Arabic) Understanding of syari'ah; the system of jurisprudence
based on the usul fiqh (roots or foundation of
jurisprudence).
Harakah (Arabic) Originally means ‘movement.’ In Indonesia it refers to
various independent Islamic movements which are not
formally approved by government.
Haram (Arabic) A sanctuary which is forbidden by the shari'a (Islamic
law).
Imam (Arabic) One who stands in front to lead the shalat (prayer), and
who leads the Muslim community.
Jihad (Arabic) War against unbelievers in accordance with shari'a. Also
applied to an individual's struggle against baser impulses.
Jama'ah (Arabic) Group or community.
Jilbab (Arabic) Long, loose robe worn by Muslim women activists over
regular clothes. It also often refers to kerudung, a
head-dress that reveals only the face. It falls down loosely
to below the chest or the waist.
Khutbah (Arabic) The sermon delivered on Fridays at the noon prayer. The
khutbah is also given in the morning after sunrise at the
‘Idul Fitri (end of Ramadan) and ‘Idul Adha (Sacrifice
festival).
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Mihrab (Arabic) Niche or chamber in the front part of mosque where the
imam (leader) leads prayers and khatib (preacher) gives
the sermon.
Mubaligh
(Arabic)
Originally means bearer or messenger; A Muslim
propagandist or preacher.
Muhammadiyah
(the Way of
Muhammad)
One of the most significant Islamic modernist organisation
of Indonesia, established in 1912.
Mujahid (Arabic,
pl. Mujahidin)
Soldier fighting a holy war or Jihad.
Mujaddid
(Arabic)
The person who leads tajdid (renewal).
Musholla
(Arabic)
A small room or building set aside in a public place for
praying.
Pengajian
(Indonesian)
Learning the Qur'anic recitation; religious lecture; public
sermon.
PERSIS
(Persatuan Islam)
An Islamic modernist organisation -established in
1923-played important role in the debate between
traditionalist and modernist viewpoints in religious
matters.
Pesantren
(Javanese,
Islamic school with fully boarding students.
Pondok
Sundanese)
Pesantren Kilat
(Indonesian)
Short course of Islamic training activity. It also refers to
an Islamic group or movement.
Priyayi
(Javanese)
Aristocrate, court official.
Ramadan
(Arabic)
The holy month in which the Qur'an was revealed. It is
the fasting month in which Muslims may not eat, drink
or have sexual intercourse during the daylight hours.
Sahur
(Indonesian from
Having meal before dawn during fasting.
Arabic sahira
meaing to stay up
at night)
Santri
(Sundanese)
Student in pesantren. It also refers to a pious Muslim.
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Shalat (Arabic) Ritual worship performed five times daily, one of ‘five
pillars’ (rukn) of Islam.
Syari'ah (Arabic) Sacred law of Islam which governs all aspects of a
Muslim's life. It is elaborated through the discipline of
fiqh.
Subuh
(Indonesian from
Arabic subh)
Dawn; daybreak.
Sunnah (Arabic) Custom sanctioned by tradition of the Prophet enshrined
in hadits.
Tajdid (Arabic) Renewal, regeneration of the commitment to the
fundamental principles of Islam and the related
reconstruction of society in accord with the Qur'an and
the sunna.
Thagut (Arabic) An idol, tempter to error, something worshiped other
than God. Among Muslim activists in Indonesia this refers
those who hostile to Islam, especially intellegence
operatives. Tahajud (Arabic) Optional prayer after
midnight.
Tarawih (Arabic) Optional prayer at night during the month of Ramadan.
Tawhid (Arabic) Unity of God. It is a fundamental tenet of Islam.
Ulama (Arabic
singl. ‘alim)
Those Muslims who are considered knowledgeable in
religious learning, particularly in jurisprudence and
theological matters.
Ummat
(Indonesian from
Arabic ummah)
Community of believers, in particular the community of
Muslims.
Usrah (Arabic) Family; One type of Islamic education among young
Muslim activists, in which small and solid groups of
activists discussed Islam and developed a sense of
brotherhood. It was first introduced by Ikhwan
al-Muslimin (Muslim Brethren) in Egypt.
Ustadz (Arabic) Religious teacher.
Zakat (Arabic) Religious duty imposed on all Muslims to give a portion
of their wealth, as prescribed by religious law, in alms to
the poor. It is one of the ‘five pillars’ of Islam.
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